Mena economies living dangerously
27 December 2023

Gaza conflict puts the region on edge once again
Middle East and North Africa (Mena) economies enter 2024 in a state of flux. While most are well placed to continue their post-pandemic growth trajectory, albeit in the context of weaker oil sector growth, some states – Egypt and Tunisia notable among them — are under pressure to undertake painful reforms in order to elicit IMF funding packages.
Overall, hopes are high that growth in the Mena region will at least outpace the sluggish performance of the past year. Policymakers across the region will also be looking to double down on the private sector dynamism that saw non-oil growth outpace hydrocarbons performances in 2023.
The overall rear-view mirror is not especially encouraging. The IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook has Mena real GDP slowing to 2 per cent in 2023 from 5.6 per cent in 2022, a decline attributed to the impact of lower oil production among exporters and tighter monetary policy conditions in the region’s emerging market and middle-income economies. Geopolitical tensions – not least the Gaza conflict – and natural disasters in Morocco and Libya have also weighed on regional economies.
GDP growth
The World Bank estimates that in per capita terms, GDP growth across the region decreased from 4.3 per cent in 2022 to just 0.4 per cent in 2023. By the end of 2023, it says, only eight of 15 Mena economies will have returned to pre-pandemic real GDP per capita levels.
Much hinges on developments in the oil market. The Opec+ decision on 30 November to agree voluntary output reductions that will extend Saudi and Russian cuts of 1.3 million barrels a day (b/d), is designed to shore up prices, but it will come at a cost.
Saudi Arabia’s GDP data for the third quarter of 2023 revealed the full impact of output restraint, as the economy contracted at its fastest rate since the pandemic. Saudi GDP notably declined by 3.9 per cent in the third quarter compared to the previous quarter – after the kingdom implemented an additional voluntary 1 million b/d oil output cut.
As a whole, GCC economic growth has been tepid, despite a resurgence in services hotspots such as the UAE, where retail and hospitality sectors have boomed. The World Bank’s Gulf Economic Update report, published in late November, sees GCC growth at just 1 per cent in 2023, although this is expected to rise to 3.6 per cent in 2024.
Oil sector activity is expected to contract by 3.9 per cent in 2024 as a result of the recurrent Opec+ production cuts and global economic slowdown, according to Capital Economics. However, weaker oil sector activity will be compensated for by non-oil sectors, where growth is projected at a relatively healthy 3.9 per cent in 2024, supported by sustained private consumption, strategic fixed investments and accommodative fiscal policy.
“There has not been much GDP growth this year, but the non-oil economy has been surprisingly robust and resilient, despite the fact that the liquidity has not been as much of a driver as it was a year earlier,” says Jarmo Kotilaine, a regional economic expert.
“Of course, the cost of capital has gone up and there have been some liquidity constraints. But we do have a lot of momentum in the non-oil economy.”
In Saudi Arabia, beyond its robust real estate story, the ventures implemented under the national investment strategy are unfolding and semi-sovereign funds are playing a key role in ensuring continuity. “You are seeing more of these green energy projects across the region. It really has been a surprisingly positive story for the non-oil economy,” says Kotilaine.
Government spending
Fiscal policy will remain loose, at least among Mena oil exporters, whose revenues endow them with greater fiscal fire-power.
Saudi Arabia’s 2024 pre-budget statement bakes in further budget deficits, with government spending for 2023 and 2024 expected to be 34 per cent and 32 per cent higher, respectively, than the finance ministry had projected in the 2022 budget. This is not just higher spending on health, education and social welfare, but also marked increases in capital expenditure, including on the kingdom’s gigapojects.
That luxury is not open to the likes of Bahrain and Oman, the former recording the highest public debt-to-GDP ratio in the region at 125 per cent in 2023. Those two Gulf states will need to maintain a closer watch on their fiscal positions in 2024.
There are broader changes to fiscal policy taking place in the Gulf states, notes Kotilaine, some of which will be registered in 2024. “There are areas that the government will play a role in, but in a much more selective and focused manner. Much less of the overall story now hinges on government spending than it used to in the GCC,” he says.
For 2024, a consensus is emerging that the Mena region should see GDP growth of above 3 per cent. That is better than 2023, but well below the previous year and, warns the IMF, insufficient to be strong or inclusive enough to create jobs for the 100 million Arab youth who will reach working age in the next 10 years.
The Mena region’s non-oil buoyancy at least offers hope that diversification will deliver more benefits to regional populations, reflecting the impact of structural reforms designed to improve the investment environment and make labour markets more flexible.
“The labour market in the region continues to strengthen, with business confidence and hiring activity reverting to pre-pandemic levels,” says Safaa el-Tayeb el-Kogali, World Bank country director for the GCC. “In Saudi Arabia, private sector workforce has grown steadily, reaching 2.6 million in early 2023. This expansion coincides with overall increases in labour force participation, employment-to-population ratio, and a decrease in unemployment.”
El-Kogali adds that non-oil exports across the GCC region continue to lag, however. “While the substantial improvement in the external balances of the GCC over the past years is attributed to the exports of the oil sector, few countries in the region have also shown progress in non-oil merchandise exports. This requires close attention by policymakers to further diversify their exports portfolio by further promoting private sector development and competitiveness.”
Regional trade
There is a broader reshaping of the Gulf’s international trading and political relations, shifting away from close ties with the West to a broader alignment that includes Asian economies. The entry of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran to the Brics group of emerging market nations, taking effect in 2024, is a sign of this process.
The decision of the Saudi central bank and People’s Bank of China in November 2023 to agree a local-currency swap deal worth about $7bn underscores the kingdom’s reduced reliance on the Western financial system and a greater openness to facilitating more Chinese investment.
“You want to be as multi-directional, as multi-modal as you can,” says Kotilaine. “For the Gulf states, it is almost like they are trying to transcend the old bloc politics. It is not about who your best friend is. They want to think of this in terms of a non-zero sum game, and that worked very well for them during the global financial crisis when they had to pivot from the West to the East.”
Near-term challenges
While long-term strategic repositioning will influence Mena economic policy-making in 2024, there will be near-term issues to grapple with. High up that list is the Gaza conflict, the wider regional impacts of which are still unknown.
Most current baseline forecasts do not envisage a wider regional escalation, limiting the conflict’s impacts on regional economies. The initial spike in oil prices following the 7 October attacks dissipated fairly quickly.
Egypt is the most exposed to a worsening of the situation in Gaza, sharing a land border with the territory. However, the Gaza crisis is not the only challenge facing the North African country
Elections set for 10 December will grant President Abdelfattah al-Sisi another term in office, but his in-tray is bulging under a host of economic pressures.
Inflation peaked at 41 per cent in June 2023. A currency devaluation is being urged, as a more flexible pound would offer a better chance of attracting much-needed capital inflows.
The corollary is that it would have to be accompanied by an interest rate hike. Capital Economics sees a 200 basis point increase to 21.25 per cent as the most likely outcome, ratcheting up the pain on Egyptian businesses and households.
A deal with the IMF would do much to settle Egyptian nerves, with a rescue plan worth $5bn understood to be in the offing. But Egypt has to do more to convince the fund that it is prepared to undertake meaningful fiscal reforms. Privatisations of state assets, including Egypt Aluminum, will help.
Other Mena economies will enjoy more leeway to chart their own economic path in 2024. Iraq has achieved greater political stability over the past year, and may stand a better chance of reforming its economy, although weaker oil prices will limit the heavily hydrocarbons-dominated economy’s room for manoeuvre.
Jordan is another Mena economy that has managed to tame inflation. Like Egypt, however, the country is also heavily exposed to what happens in Gaza.
Few could have predicted the bloody events that followed the 7 October attacks. Mena region economic strategists will be hoping that 2024 will not bring further surprises.
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Can the Gulf build back better? The GCC has done much to put itself on the global map through effective reputation building. But, notes regional economic expert Jarmo Kotilaine, the focus of policy will now have to change from building more to building better, making the existing infrastructure and systems operate with greater efficiency. Above all, the region will need dynamic and adaptable companies and an economically engaged workforce. “The reality is the GCC has a lot of capital committed to the old economy. There is the question of how much of that should be upgraded, or made to work better, because fundamentally, one of the region’s big challenges is that local economies have very low levels of productivity.” It is by upgrading what the GCC has, by incorporating technology and energy efficiency, that the region can make productivity growth a driver, he tells MEED. “One area where GCC economies have started to make progress is in services: logistics, tourism, financial services. This is bringing money to the region,” he says. “We are also starting to see new potential export streams with things like green energy, and obviously green hydrogen. But the Gulf states have to manufacture more, and they have to manufacture better.” |
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Diriyah awards $727m Waldorf Astoria superblock deal17 June 2026

Saudi gigaproject developer Diriyah Company has awarded a SR2.7bn ($727m) contract for the main construction works on the development’s Waldorf Astoria superblock.
The contract was awarded to the joint venture of Hassan Allam Construction Saudi and UCC Saudi, the local branch of Qatar’s Urbacon Holding.
The Waldorf Astoria superblock is a mixed-use development comprising a Waldorf Astoria hotel, Waldorf Astoria-branded residences, commercial and residential facilities, and office space.
The Waldorf Astoria hotel will feature 200 keys, while the residential component will comprise 47 branded residences.
The project is located on the Grand Boulevard South and Northern Arterial Road in the Boulevard Northwestern district at Diriyah Gate 2.
Diriyah Company tendered the contract in November last year, with submissions due in January, as MEED reported.
Diriyah Company Group CEO Jerry Inzerillo said: “We are delighted to announce this latest major construction contract for the Waldorf Astoria superblock as we continue to progress at pace across the Diriyah development area. The Waldorf Astoria will be a world-class addition to our growing portfolio of globally renowned hospitality brands, further strengthening Diriyah’s appeal as a globally significant destination that offers world-class hospitality and lifestyle experiences.
“Together with our partners, we look forward to delivering another landmark development that supports the kingdom’s Vision 2030 ambitions and contributes to the continued growth and success of Diriyah.”
Hassan Allam, chairman and CEO of Hassan Allam Holding, said: “We are proud to support the development of one of the kingdom’s most ambitious and transformative destinations and to continue our partnership with Diriyah Company in bringing its vision to life.
“Drawing on more than 90 years of experience across the Mena region, we remain committed to delivering the highest standards of quality and excellence on landmark projects that are helping shape the kingdom’s future.”
Ramez Al-Khayyat, UCC Holding president and group CEO, said: “Being awarded this contract by Diriyah Company marks another important milestone in our growing partnership and reinforces our shared commitment to delivering world-class developments across the kingdom. This project builds on our ongoing collaboration in Diriyah, including the delivery of four luxury hotels and the Royal Diriyah Equestrian and Polo Club in Wadi Safar.
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The latest award follows Diriyah Company’s award of an estimated SR730m ($195m) construction contract for civic quarter buildings within the Diriyah development to local contractor Al-Rashid Trading & Contracting Company (RTCC).
In April, Diriyah announced a SR1.84bn ($490m) construction contract to build the Saudi Arabia Museum of Contemporary Art (SAMoCA) within the Diriyah development. The contract was awarded to a consortium of Egyptian contractor Hassan Allam Construction Saudi and Saudi Arabia’s Albawani.
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The Pendry superblock includes the construction of the Pendry Hotel alongside residential and commercial assets. The package will cover 75,365 square metres and is located in the northwestern district of the DG2 area.
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The Diriyah masterplan envisages the city as a cultural and lifestyle tourism destination. Located northwest of Riyadh’s city centre, it will cover 14 square kilometres and combine 300 years of history, culture and heritage with hospitality facilities.
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AHS Properties acquires Shangri-La hotel for $300m17 June 2026
Dubai-based real estate developer AHS Properties has announced the acquisition of the Shangri-La hotel for AED1.1bn ($300m), marking one of the largest single-asset real estate transactions in recent years.
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UAE moves to clear the path for recovery17 June 2026
Commentary
Colin Foreman
EditorMore than three months after the conflict began to disrupt business across the Gulf, the UAE is moving to resolve the technical challenges that the economy faces as it shifts towards recovery.
The insurance gap has been a key obstacle to the recovery of aviation and tourism. Several countries continue to maintain advisories against travel to the Gulf, making it difficult or impossible for visitors to obtain conventional cover for trips to or through the region. The concern is twofold: one, becoming stranded should hostilities resume, and two, not being able to secure medical insurance. Both Emirates and Etihad have now moved to address that directly, offering insurance to passengers flying to or through their respective home hubs. The Etihad scheme, backed by DCT Abu Dhabi and underwritten by Daman, will run from July to December and covers eligible visitors for up to 15 days.
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Libya signs three oil deals after licensing round17 June 2026
Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) has signed three production-sharing agreements with several international energy companies following the country’s first licensing round in nearly two decades.
The three agreements have been signed with the following consortiums:
- Block O1 – offshore – Eni (Italy; 60%) and QatarEnergy (40%)
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- Block C3 – onshore – Repsol and TPAO
The contracts are three of the five announced as awarded in February this year as part of the 2025 licensing round.
The three contracts were signed on 15 June.
It is not known why the remaining two awarded contracts have not been signed.
The remaining two contracts are:
- Block M1 – onshore – Aiteo (Nigeria)
- Block S4 – onshore – Chevron (US)
Libya is seeking to attract investment and raise oil production capacity to 2 million barrels a day (b/d) from around 1.4 million b/d currently.
The chairman of NOC, Massoud Suleman, said that the agreements reflected growing confidence in Libya’s oil and gas sector and would support exploration, development and production growth.
The 2025 licensing round was Libya’s first licensing round since 2007.
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US–Iran deal sets Hormuz road map17 June 2026
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The US-Iran agreement, declared complete on 14 June, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, lifts the US naval blockade and ends a war that has closed the Gulf’s export artery since 28 February. The strait reopens at Friday’s signing on paper, but the recovery will take months.
US President Donald Trump announced the deal on Truth Social, authorising the "toll-free opening" of the strait and the immediate removal of the blockade, with formal signing set for Geneva on 19 June – with vice-president JD Vance to sign for Washington and parliamentary speaker Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf for Tehran in the highest-level US-Iran meeting since 1979.
Iran’s deputy foreign minister Kazem Gharibabadi confirmed the text was finalised but said Tehran would not implement it until signing, with the strait staying closed in the interim.
Signing versus substance
The signing on 19 June is merely the starting line that will set in motion a partial reopening to traffic alongside a clearance operation to remove the mines laid by Tehran across key sections of the strait.
The memorandum gives Iranian forces 30 days from signing to clear the strait of mines. At the same time, the Pentagon’s estimates appear to suggest that a full minesweeping could take up to six months, even with three dedicated vessels in the region.
Such gaps – here a 30-day treaty obligation against a six-month operational reality – have become the running feature of the bilateral negotiations, which have been framed by mutual distrust and plagued by an absence of granular detail.
The deal is welcome for the region despite its uncertainty. Behind the mines sits a tanker backlog built over more than 100 days, and Gulf producers that throttled back production and need time and assurances to restore flow.
Before the war, roughly 100 ships transited daily; Kpler now projects around 40 a day could sail within the first month, but with an estimated 300 loaded vessels stranded on either side of the strait, and 250 more sitting empty and idle in the Gulf, it is a pressure release valve, not an immediate restoration of flow.
A total restoration of oil and trade flows is unlikely to come into view before the year’s end.
Insurance represents the second brake, with war-risk premiums standing at 1-4% of vessel value per transit, or about $8m for a $200m tanker – against less than 0.1% before the war.
Shipping associations are no less cautious, with the Baltic and International Maritime Council calling for verified mine-free routes before volume traffic resumes.
Insurance underwriters are likewise unlikely to relent on prices until clearance is confirmed.
Conditional relief
Markets have already traded the sentiment, however. Brent settled at $87.33 on 13 June – an eight-week low – and have fallen further as the deal has firmed. As of early morning trading on 16 June, the first full day of trading after the Islamic New Year, Brent was down at $78.
Yet the relief remains highly conditional: a 60-day nuclear negotiation now follows the signing, and a breakdown in either this, passage through the strait or peace in Lebanon could return the strait to crisis.
The US-touted toll-free terminology is also narrower than billed, with the Iranians instead affirming a 60-day grace period for fees but not eliminating the possibility of “fees” for navigation, environmental and insurance services after that point.
The distinction is legal, not rhetorical, with international maritime law barring tolls on passage through natural straits but permitting the imposition of service fees on vessels passing through territorial waters.
It is through this terminology that Iran is now consistently framing its plans to charge fees from passing vessels through the office of its Persian Gulf Strait Authority – established 5 May and since sanctioned by the US Treasury.
For the Gulf, a 60-day waiver that resolves into an Iranian (and possibly joint Omani) fee regime is a pause in Iran’s tollgate economy, not its end – and would represent a strategic concession for the US, the Gulf and the globe.
Levant entanglement
Lebanon is another conditional space that the deal cannot fully escape, with a flare-up on that front being the final potential trigger that could collapse the 60-day agreement.
Iran has explicitly tied a ceasefire in Lebanon to the resolution of transit in the strait, but Israel does not agree with this, and the linkage may have inadvertently handed Tel Aviv the exact tool it needs to disrupt the US–Iran ceasefire – through the simple of continuing a conflict that it already wants to continue.
Within a day of the deal, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said the IDF would stay in southern Lebanon “without any time limit”, with US officials corroborating that Israeli withdrawal was never a condition of a deal.
On the ground, the ceasefire is already looking frail, with post-deal fire straying in both directions and already endangering the regional calm and Hormuz reopening the Gulf is already pricing.
For Gulf producers and shippers, the distinction and in some cases friction between what the deal declares and what it actually delivers remains a cause for uncertainty.
A declaration is easy, but the delivery requires nuclear negotiation, mine-clearance verification, insurance repricing and a 60-day political test before barrels can again move at volume.
Trump, who has been frustrated for months with the slow progress on Iran from a US perspective, is also more than likely to be distracted by other concerns on a timeline shorter than 60 days – risking the political will to peace coming up short.
In the Gulf, whether Saudi Arabia and the UAE send cabinet-level representatives to Geneva on Friday will signal whether the region’s political leaders are willing to wield the political capital necessary to keep the US on track and pursue the ceasefire to fruition.
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