US foreign policy approach remains adrift
24 May 2024
Commentary
Edmund O'Sullivan
Former editor of MEED
Former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Chas Freeman, said in May that the US has no Middle East strategy and is stumbling from one improvisation to the next.
Some say this is because Secretary of State Tony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan both rose to where they are now principally because of their loyalty to the Democratic Party generally and President Joe Biden specifically. Their influence is consequently shaped more by political considerations than a broader understanding of the complexities of international affairs or America’s long-term interests.
There is little chance that this short-term approach will change, regardless of who wins in November’s presidential poll. Donald Trump is focusing on what will work for him this autumn and, if elected, will likely continue to follow a formula of self-interest; what works for the US in the Middle East will always come second.
There is little chance that this short-term approach will change
If there was a golden era for US Middle East policy, it may have begun in 1945 when President Roosevelt met Saudi Arabia’s King Abdul Aziz Al Saud to reach an understanding between the world’s most robust democracy and one of the most conservative kingdoms that served the interests of both.
In 1956, President Eisenhower then intervened to force Britain and France to stop their war on Egypt over the Suez Canal. From then on, the US became the dominant foreign force in much of the region and a welcome alternative to the old imperial powers and the Soviet Union.
That balance was lost in 1967, however, when President Johnson stood behind Israel despite its expansionary war against Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
A brief flicker of hope flared following the 1973 Arab-Israel war, but by then the polarisation in the region was reflected in US policy.
It was not until 1991, after Iraq had been expelled from Kuwait by a coalition that enjoyed almost unanimous Arab support, that a new opportunity arose for the US to at last develop a strategy that was built on solid foundations.
The Madrid conference in October 1991 put Washington at the heart of a multilateral process that aimed to bridge the gap between Israel and the Arab nations. This was destroyed, however, by President Clinton – another political partisan – who opted for the bilateral approach defined by the Oslo agreements of 1993. It was bound to fail, and did.
Optimists say we will have to wait at least four more years before there is another opportunity for Washington to get it right. Pessimists say it will take longer than that, perhaps a generation or more. But what if they are both wrong and the long-term plan that Ambassador Freeman wants, and we all yearn for, does not actually exist?
Connect with Edmund O’Sullivan on Twitter
More from Edmund O’Sullivan:
> Rainmaking in the world economy
> New shock treatment for Egypt’s economy
> Syria’s long march in from the cold
> Lebanon’s pain captured in a call from Beirut
> Troubled end to 2023 bodes ill for stability
> The Holy Land and delusions it inspires
> Region to mark golden jubilee of 1973 war
> Gulf funds help reshape football
> When a war crime is denied
> Embracing the new Washington consensus

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With a small economy and exports almost wholly reliant on passage through the Strait of Hormuz, Bahrain has been painfully exposed to the turmoil caused by the Iran war. The country’s social makeup – with a Shia majority ruled by a Sunni-dominated regime – is also showing signs of strain.
The economy is expected to contract by 11.3% this year, according to the IMF’s latest Regional Economic Outlook report. That is not quite as bad as some of its neighbours, such as Kuwait and Qatar, but it is well above the 4.8% fall expected for the GCC as a whole.
Just as importantly, Bahrain also starts from a much weaker base than its Gulf peers, with a smaller economy, limited hydrocarbon resources and high levels of government debt.
“Countries with the largest reserve declines since the start of the conflict generally entered the shock with comfortable reserve positions, with Bahrain as a notable exception,” the IMF noted in its 22 October report.
Physical disruption
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz this year has cut Bahrain off from its most important trade route for both exports and imports. In addition, major industrial and military targets have been hit by Iran on multiple occasions, including the US naval base and the Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) plant.
The latter suffered a 32% year-on-year drop in sales volumes and a 61% fall in output in the first half of the year as a result of the Iranian attacks – although higher aluminium prices and lower costs meant that the company’s revenues held steady and profits actually increased year-on-year.
Other areas of the economy have been badly affected too, with the Bapco oil refinery, a desalination plant and an Amazon data centre all hit in Iranian strikes. The IMF also noted that Bahrain has seen one of the worst declines in hotel occupancy rates during the year. Inflation has also been rising, reaching an annual rate of 3% as of July.
As a result, the government’s already weak financial position is under even more pressure. The Central Bank of Bahrain’s reserves have slumped sharply since the start of the war, falling from BD1.8bn ($4.8bn) as the war broke out, to a low of BD568m three months later. They recovered some of the ground lost in the following months, but remain well below the pre-war level. Reserves stood at BD887m by September, supported by drawing on a BD2bn ($5.4bn) currency swap line provided by the UAE in early April.
Total public debt had reached BD20.3bn at the end of August, the most recent data available, up from BD18.2bn a year earlier. That is significantly larger than the country’s GDP, which stood at BD15.7bn in 2025 and is expected to end this year at just BD13.9bn.
To make matters worse, the markets have been pushing up Bahrain’s borrowing costs to levels not seen since 2018, when the government had to turn to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE for a bailout to avoid a potential sovereign default.
External support
With no easy way to reduce its debts or plug its budget deficit, Bahrain is likely to seek more assistance from its wealthy neighbours – although any aid will likely come with demands for spending restraint and other reforms that will be uncomfortable for the government to accept.
The appetite of some neighbouring states may also be more limited than in the past, given their own economies have been weakened by the war, but King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa’s close ties with the UAE leadership in particular are likely to ensure some help is forthcoming.
Asharq Bloomberg reported in late October that Manama has been holding talks with neighbouring states for a fresh round of support, with the UAE expected to emerge with a leading role. However, the timing and scale of any bailout remain unclear.
Without external assistance, the country’s finances are likely to deteriorate further. Ratings agency Capital Intelligence said in an October report that it expected debt levels to rise further in 2027-28, with the budget deficit averaging 9.3% of GDP in those years.
“The burden of government debt on the budget is also very high, with interest payments projected to average 30.7% of revenues in 2026-28, up from 27.1% in 2025,” it noted.
King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa’s close ties with the UAE leadership in particular are likely to ensure some help is forthcoming
Political tensions
Politically, Manama has appeared increasingly cautious towards its own citizens, with planned elections for both municipal councils and the Council of Representatives delayed until next year. Announcing the postponement of the council elections in mid-October, deputy prime minister Sheikh Khalid Bin Abdulla Al-Khalifa referred vaguely to “the current circumstances and their resulting effects” as the reason for the delay.
The postponement removes a formal channel for the public to express grievances about the country’s current situation. At the same time, the authorities have moved against perceived support for Iran during the conflict. More than 600 people have been arrested this year on charges including espionage and supporting an enemy state, according to the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (Bird), a London-based advocacy group that is critical of the government. Dozens of people have also had their citizenship revoked.
“Since the outbreak of the Iran war, repression in Bahrain has intensified sharply,” said Bird advocacy director Sayed Ahmed Alwadaei.
Some analysts warn that the crackdown could prove counterproductive. The Bahrain researcher at conflict monitoring group Acled said that tensions between the government and its Shia opposition were gradually placing the country at high risk of instability.
The economic outlook could change quickly if a resolution to the Iran-US conflict is found. The IMF predicts that the economy could rebound to a growth rate of 13.9% next year, before settling back to a more sustainable 3.1% the year after – but that depends on Gulf trade routes reopening and energy production normalising. The country’s political tensions will be harder to resolve.
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Engie completes refinancing of Oman power plants5 November 2026
French developer Engie has announced that it has reached financial close on the refinancing of the Sohar 2 and Barka 3 independent power projects (IPPs) in Oman.
The transaction follows 15-year extensions to the plants’ power purchase agreements (PPAs) in March, securing their long-term operations through to 2043.
As previously reported by MEED, the new agreements for the 750MW Sohar 2 and 750MW Barka 3 IPPs will take effect on 1 April 2028.
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SAR tenders railway track design framework5 November 2026

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Saudi Arabia Railways (SAR) has invited consultants to bid by 14 December for a framework agreement covering railway track design services.
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SAR has scheduled a pre-tender meeting for 12 November.
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Other upstream projects
In its Q3 2026 results statement, Aramco also announced EPC progress on other key upstream oil and gas projects, including:
Jafurah phase two – Aramco awarded 16 contracts, worth a combined total of about $12.4bn, on 30 June 2024 for the second expansion phase of the Jafurah unconventional gas development programme in the Eastern Province.
The second phase aims to raise the field’s processing potential to up to 2 billion cubic feet a day (cf/d) of raw gas. The EPC scope of work includes constructing gas compression facilities and associated pipelines, and expanding the Jafurah gas plant, including the construction of gas processing trains, utilities, sulphur and export facilities, Aramco said in a statement.
Fadhili gas plant expansion – Through the estimated $7.7bn project, Aramco aims to increase the Fadhili gas plant’s processing capacity from 2.5 billion cf/d to up to 4 billion cf/d. The expansion includes three new processing trains, each with a capacity of 500 million cf/d.
Aramco awarded contracts for four main EPC packages of the Fadhili gas plant expansion project in April 2024 to South Korean contractors Samsung E&A and GS Engineering & Construction and Saudi contractor Nesma & Partners.
Dammam development project – The project represents the second development phase of the Dammam field. Its objective is to install infrastructure, including pipelines, trunklines and pumps, to increase the field’s crude oil production capacity by 25,000 b/d and 50,000 b/d in separate phases.
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