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US foreign policy approach remains adrift

24 May 2024

Commentary
Edmund O'Sullivan
Former editor of MEED

Former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Chas Freeman, said in May that the US has no Middle East strategy and is stumbling from one improvisation to the next.

Some say this is because Secretary of State Tony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan both rose to where they are now principally because of their loyalty to the Democratic Party generally and President Joe Biden specifically. Their influence is consequently shaped more by political considerations than a broader understanding of the complexities of international affairs or America’s long-term interests.

There is little chance that this short-term approach will change, regardless of who wins in November’s presidential poll. Donald Trump is focusing on what will work for him this autumn and, if elected, will likely continue to follow a formula of self-interest; what works for the US in the Middle East will always come second.

There is little chance that this short-term approach will change

If there was a golden era for US Middle East policy, it may have begun in 1945 when President Roosevelt met Saudi Arabia’s King Abdul Aziz Al Saud to reach an understanding between the world’s most robust democracy and one of the most conservative kingdoms that served the interests of both.

In 1956, President Eisenhower then intervened to force Britain and France to stop their war on Egypt over the Suez Canal. From then on, the US became the dominant foreign force in much of the region and a welcome alternative to the old imperial powers and the Soviet Union.

That balance was lost in 1967, however, when President Johnson stood behind Israel despite its expansionary war against Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

A brief flicker of hope flared following the 1973 Arab-Israel war, but by then the polarisation in the region was reflected in US policy.

It was not until 1991, after Iraq had been expelled from Kuwait by a coalition that enjoyed almost unanimous Arab support, that a new opportunity arose for the US to at last develop a strategy that was built on solid foundations. 

The Madrid conference in October 1991 put Washington at the heart of a multilateral process that aimed to bridge the gap between Israel and the Arab nations. This was destroyed, however, by President Clinton – another political partisan – who opted for the bilateral approach defined by the Oslo agreements of 1993. It was bound to fail, and did.

Optimists say we will have to wait at least four more years before there is another opportunity for Washington to get it right. Pessimists say it will take longer than that, perhaps a generation or more. But what if they are both wrong and the long-term plan that Ambassador Freeman wants, and we all yearn for, does not actually exist? 

Connect with Edmund O’Sullivan on Twitter

More from Edmund O’Sullivan:

> Rainmaking in the world economy
> New shock treatment for Egypt’s economy
> Syria’s long march in from the cold
> Lebanon’s pain captured in a call from Beirut
> Troubled end to 2023 bodes ill for stability
> The Holy Land and delusions it inspires
> Region to mark golden jubilee of 1973 war
> Gulf funds help reshape football
> When a war crime is denied
> Embracing the new Washington consensus

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Edmund O’Sullivan

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