Riyadh takes the diplomatic initiative
2 April 2025

Saudi Arabia has been at the centre of regional diplomatic activity through the early months of 2025, positioning itself as an intermediary in the Ukraine conflict and at the forefront of engagement with the new regime in Syria.
The role of regional mediator is one that has in recent years been more closely associated with Qatar – particularly in relation to the Gaza conflict – and, on occasion, Oman.
Riyadh’s decision to throw its weight behind diplomatic initiatives is part of what Abdulaziz Sager, chairman of the Saudi-based Gulf Research Centre, has described as a “bold multi-alignment strategy”, which seeks to balance Riyadh’s economic and security concerns and its regional leadership ambitions.
Multipronged initiatives
The kingdom has gained plaudits for its efforts to resolve the Ukraine war in particular. Following his talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) in Jeddah on 11 March, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said: “Saudi Arabia provides a crucial platform for diplomacy, and we appreciate this.”
Zelenskyy added that he had “a detailed discussion on the steps and conditions needed to end the war” with the crown prince.
The previous month, US secretary of state Marco Rubio had said Saudi Arabia had played an “indispensable role” in setting up bilateral negotiations between Moscow and Washington to discuss the conflict.
Russia’s President Vladamir Putin has also praised the Saudi leadership for providing a platform for high-level meetings with the US and “creating a very friendly atmosphere”.
Whether all this leads to a lasting peace deal for Ukraine remains to be seen, but Saudi Arabia’s attitude to conflict may be coloured somewhat by its own experiences over the past decade in Yemen.
It is now 10 years since it launched a bombing campaign against Yemen’s Houthi rebels in March 2015, and the war has not gone as Riyadh had hoped, with the Houthis proving far more resilient than anticipated.
Saudi Arabia’s southern border has at least been relatively quiet since a truce took hold in 2022, but a comprehensive peace deal has proved elusive.
Riyadh has also been re-engaging in the Levant this year, in light of the new regime in Damascus.
The new Syrian president Ahmed Al-Sharaa travelled to Riyadh in early February, on his first trip abroad since taking power. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal Bin Farhan had been in Damascus a week earlier.
There are some key issues at stake for Riyadh. The regime of President Bashar Al-Assad had overseen the industrial-scale production of the amphetamine-type stimulant Captagon, much of which was smuggled into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Saudi efforts to disrupt the trade – both at its borders and via lobbying of the Syrian authorities – had failed to stem the flow of drugs.
In addition, Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, has pointed out that between 500,000 and 2.5 million de facto Syrian refugees are thought to be living in Saudi Arabia – a fact that gives Riyadh a clear interest in Syria’s stability, particularly if it wants to encourage them to return home.
“Saudi Arabia views the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to reassert its influence in the Levant,” he asserted in a recent commentary.
The ousting of Assad in late 2024 and the recent Israeli campaign against Hezbollah has also changed the situation on the ground in Lebanon, encouraging Saudi Arabia to reconsider its approach there too.
MBS hosted Lebanon’s recently elected President Joseph Aoun on 3 March. Following their meeting, Saudi Arabia said it would look again at allowing Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia and letting its own citizens travel to Lebanon.
Manoeuvring around Trump
The Saudi diplomatic push may also be motivated by a desire to ensure that relations with Washington remain on a positive footing in the wake of Donald Trump’s re-election as US president.
At first, it appeared that the bilateral relations would follow a similar pattern to Trump’s first term.
In January, MBS said in a phone call with Trump that Saudi Arabia was planning to invest some $600bn in the US over the coming four years, which the US president suggested should probably be increased to $1tn. This echoed the signing of $460bn-worth of defence deals when Trump made Saudi Arabia his first foreign trip as president in May 2017.
Riyadh appears to have conceded to Trump’s higher figure, with the US president saying in early March: “I said I'll go if you pay $1tn to American companies, meaning the purchase over a four-year period of $1tn, and they've agreed to do that. So, I'm going to be going there.”
However, other aspects of the bilateral relationship are more difficult and less predictable. Trump had been pushing Saudi Arabia to join Bahrain, the UAE and Morocco in normalising relations with Israel, but in light of the war in Gaza and Trump’s own plans for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the strip, that looks like a stretch too far.
Trump will nevertheless have been pleased by the decision by Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Opec+ bloc in early March to unwind some of the production restrictions they had voluntarily agreed.
From April onwards, the eight-strong group will start to bring 2.2 million barrels a day back onto the market over the course of 18 months. That fits in with Trump’s call in January, soon after taking office, for Riyadh and Opec to do more to help bring oil prices down.
However, that decision may also create fiscal challenges for the Saudi government, as any rise in production could be more than offset by lower prices.
Saudi Aramco has announced plans to trim its dividend payouts this year to $85.4bn – down from $124bn in 2024. These payments are a vital source of revenues both for the central government and for its Public Investment Fund (which holds a 16% stake in Aramco)
All that could force some public sector spending constraint in the kingdom, in a sign that balancing diplomacy and financial interests is not always straightforward.
MEED’s April 2025 report on Saudi Arabia includes:
> UPSTREAM: Saudi oil and gas spending to surpass 2024 level
> DOWNSTREAM: Aramco’s recalibrated chemical goals reflect realism
> POWER: Saudi power sector enters busiest year
> WATER: Saudi water contracts set another annual record
> CONSTRUCTION: Reprioritisation underpins Saudi construction
> TRANSPORT: Riyadh pushes ahead with infrastructure development
> BANKING: Saudi banks work to keep pace with credit expansion
Exclusive from Meed
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Saudi Arabia’s power award activity slows10 September 2026
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Groundworks under way for major Iraqi water project10 September 2026
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Oil prices rise above $100 a barrel as conflict escalates9 September 2026
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What actually slows a gigaproject down9 September 2026
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Qatari firm wins $221m Qiddiya stadium MEP deal9 September 2026
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Saudi Arabia’s power award activity slows10 September 2026

Saudi Arabia’s power market has seen a sharp fall in contract awards in 2026 following a major wave of renewable energy investment last year.
According to regional project tracker MEED Projects, about $3.38bn of power sector contracts were awarded in the kingdom as of early September, compared with $27.5bn in 2025, $54.2bn in 2024 and $26.1bn in 2023.
The relatively low level of contract awards this year has partly been influenced by a shift towards wider infrastructure such as battery energy storage systems (bess) and transmission projects, alongside delays in the procurement of renewable energy projects under the National Renewable Energy Programme (NREP) Round 7.
In September, Saudi Power Procurement Company (SPPC) awarded four Group 1 storage service agreements representing more than SR4.35bn ($1.16bn) of investment. The projects will provide a combined 2,000MW of capacity and 8,000MWh of storage.
Three bess projects, Al-Muwyah, Haden and Al-Kahafa, were awarded to a consortium of Saudi Energy, Acwa and Al-Sharif Contracting & Commercial Development Company. Another consortium of France’s Engie and Haji Abdullah Alireza & Co won the contract for the remaining Al-Khushaybi bess project.
Transmission awards
The battery storage projects are part of a broader shift towards the infrastructure needed to support Saudi Arabia’s expanding power system, with transmission accounting for most of the contracts awarded this year, reaching $3.35bn in new awards.
The largest is the estimated $500m contract awarded to Alfanar Projects in March for the 500kV overhead transmission line linking Saudi Arabia’s Eastern and Central operating areas. The 508-kilometre project will have a transmission capacity of 3,000MW.
Saudi Energy, formerly Saudi Electricity Company, is implementing a $58.7bn grid investment programme through 2030, including 130 high-voltage substations, about 12,900km of overhead transmission lines and 1,100km of underground cables.
Saudi Energy is the largest owner by value so far this year, accounting for about $1.9bn of contract awards, while SPPC has awarded more than $1.1bn in new contracts.
The focus on storage and transmission follows strong growth in renewable generation investment in 2025. Wind power contract awards reached $4.4bn, while 11 major solar contracts were also awarded.
In May 2025, developers signed $8.3bn of power purchase agreements with SPPC for five solar plants and two wind farms with a combined capacity of 15,000MW, somewhat inflating last year’s figures. The projects, backed by the Public Investment Fund, reached financial close in November.
Renewables projects
The next major phase of renewable procurement is now moving through the tender process. The seventh round of NREP, tendered in January, will add 5,300MW through four solar and two wind projects.
Based on the procurement timeline for the Round 6 projects, which were tendered and awarded in 2026, it was reasonable to expect Round 7 to follow a similar schedule.
However, according to one developer, rising supply costs have been a factor in recent deadline extensions for these projects, with those involved “waiting till these come down”.
With the latest bid submission deadlines set for September, the timing of the procurement process means contracts from NREP Round 7 may now fall into 2027 rather than materially lifting this year’s total.
The solar projects comprise the 1,400MW Tabarjal 2, 600MW Mawqqaq, 600MW Tathleeth and 500MW South Al-Ula independent power projects (IPPs). The round also includes the 1,300MW Bilgah and 900MW Shagra wind IPPs.
This helps explain why Saudi Arabia’s power sector contracting could remain relatively subdued in 2026 despite a substantial volume of projects progressing through procurement.
Project pipeline
According to MEED Projects, about $5.1bn of power projects are currently under bid evaluation and a further $7.3bn are at the main contract tender stage.
Solar projects make up the largest share, at about $5.1bn, or 41% of the total. There continues to be relatively strong diversification, with cable and overhead-line projects accounting for about $3bn, followed by wind at $2.2bn, oil and gas-fired power at $1.1bn and substations at about $1bn.
Renewable energy remains a particularly significant part of the development programme. Saudi Arabia raised its renewable energy target to 130GW by 2030 in 2023 and needs to add roughly 20GW of capacity a year to meet it.
Large-scale storage is also expected to continue expanding. The latest SPPC projects build on five bess facilities awarded by Saudi Energy through National Grid Saudi Arabia to Alfanar in 2025. The facilities have a combined capacity of up to 2,500MW, equivalent to about 10,000MWh.
SPPC has also issued the request for proposals for the second phase of its independent bess programme in Saudi Arabia. The Group 2 programme comprises six independent storage provider projects with a total capacity of 3GW, equivalent to 12,000MWh based on a four-hour storage duration. Developers are due to submit bids in October.
The timing means the Group 2 projects could contribute to contracting activity in 2027, alongside this next batch of renewable projects under NREP Round 7.
Nuclear power could provide another potential source of activity over the next 12 months. The US and Saudi Arabia signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in July, providing the legal foundation for a long-term, multibillion-dollar nuclear partnership.
While the agreement is unlikely to translate immediately into major contract values, further progress on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear programme could add another area of activity in the sector as the kingdom moves into 2027.
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Groundworks under way for major Iraqi water project10 September 2026

Early groundworks have started for Iraq’s Common Seawater Supply Project (CSSP), according to industry sources.
Design work is ongoing, and the project is currently scheduled to start up in late 2028 or early 2029, sources said.
Austria’s ILF Consulting Engineers is supervising the project, which has been split into two packages.
The first package focuses on developing pipelines, and the second on developing a water treatment facility.
China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP) is executing the contract for the pipeline package.
It signed a $2.5bn contract with Iraq’s state-owned Basra Oil Company (BOC) for the pipeline package in September last year.
The seawater treatment facility is expected to have a capacity of 5 million barrels a day (b/d), potentially rising to 7-8 million b/d in later phases.
In September last year, South Korea’s Hyundai announced that it had signed a contract worth KRW4.39tn ($3.16bn) for the processing plant package.
South Korea’s Hyundai Livart has won a contract worth KRW117.8bn ($80m) to build worker accommodation, offices and other infrastructure at the CSSP site in Basra.
South Korea’s Maeil Business Newspaper reported that Hyundai Livart secured the contract through a competitive bidding process against several Middle Eastern construction firms.
Work on the accommodation and infrastructure package is scheduled for completion by June next year.
Processed water from the CSSP project will be injected into some of Iraq’s largest oil fields – Rumaila, Zubair, West Qurna 1, West Qurna 2 and Majnoon – and also used in the Maysan and Dhi Qar fields.
Iraq’s Oil Ministry said the injected water will help maintain reservoir pressure and sustain crude production.
The CSSP is part of the broader Gas Growth Integrated Project (GGIP), which has an estimated total value of $27bn and a first phase worth an estimated $10bn.
GGIP is being developed by France’s TotalEnergies, Iraq’s Basra Oil Company and QatarEnergy, which hold stakes of 45%, 30% and 25%, respectively.
The GGIP programme is focused on developing four major projects in Iraq:
- CSSP
- The Ratawi gas processing complex
- The 1GW solar power project for Iraq’s electricity ministry
- A field development project at Ratawi, known as the Associated Gas Upstream Project (AGUP)
All four of these projects are currently under execution, though there have been some delays related to the regional war that started when the US and Israel attacked Iran on 28 February.
The conflict has caused significant disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iraq uses to export crude oil and import equipment and materials for projects.
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Oil prices rise above $100 a barrel as conflict escalates9 September 2026
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Oil prices rose above $100 a barrel on 9 September for the first time since July as the US-Iran conflict escalated and Iran-backed Houthi forces attacked Saudi energy infrastructure.
Brent crude futures reached $100.95 a barrel, while US benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) rose to $95.60. Brent had last traded above $100 on 24 July.
The latest escalation has heightened concerns about oil supplies from the region, with shipping through both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea facing disruption.
Flows through the Strait of Hormuz had fallen below 2 million barrels a day (b/d) from about 8-9 million b/d before the latest escalation, according to Rystad Energy.
At the same time, Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia threaten another important route for oil exports, with the group targeting energy infrastructure and shipping in and around the Red Sea.
US strikes on Iranian tankers
US forces destroyed five Iranian crude oil carriers on 8 September after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targeted a US Navy warship with ballistic missiles.
The US Central Command (Centcom) said the warship successfully evaded two Iranian attacks and that no US personnel were harmed.
Four of the Iranian vessels – Kaviz, Charminar, Horizon 1 and Riesco – were struck in the Gulf of Oman, while the Derya was attacked near Kharg Island, Iran’s main crude export hub.
The M/T Riesco subsequently sank in the Gulf of Oman, according to Centcom.
Iran responded by launching ballistic missiles towards Jordan. Jordan’s armed forces said 18 of 20 missiles were intercepted, with the remaining two falling in unpopulated areas.
Iran’s IRGC also said it had attacked two US naval vessels, eight oil tankers and 10 other vessels in the Gulf, although it did not identify the vessels or provide evidence of the attacks.
The latest exchanges mark a further escalation in the US-Iran conflict, which began on 28 February.
Houthi attacks raise supply concerns
The conflict has also widened into a renewed confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi movement.
On 8 September, Saudi authorities said Houthi attacks had targeted civilian and economic sites in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran in the south of the kingdom, injuring 73 people.
Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy said several energy sector facilities and installations had been targeted, causing fires and forcing a temporary halt to some operations.
The Houthis said their attacks were in response to Saudi military action in Yemen, including what they described as attacks on Houthi positions and a Saudi blockade of ports and airports.
Riyadh condemns attacks
Saudi Arabia has strongly condemned the Houthi attacks and warned that it would take measures to defend its territory and national assets.
In a statement on 8 September, the Ministry of Energy said authorities were working to address the impact of the attacks and ensure the safety of facilities and personnel while maintaining operations in accordance with approved plans.
Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned the attacks and said the kingdom had the right to take measures to defend its sovereignty and protect its citizens, residents and national assets.
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What actually slows a gigaproject down9 September 2026

Ask anyone delivering a major programme in the GCC what causes delays and sequencing will come up early. Utilities go in too late. Approvals lag behind construction. Stations, depots and access roads are procured as if they belong to different projects rather than one system.
“None of this is new. The industry has understood these risks for years,” says Alan Caldwell, managing director for transport and infrastructure at WSP Middle East.
For Caldwell, that is what makes the pattern worth interrogating rather than simply restating.
“The more important question is why the same issues around interfaces, approvals, stakeholder alignment and delivery sequencing continue to slow major programmes when the risks are already so well understood,” he says.
The answer, he argues, is not that these programmes are too big or too technically complex. What breaks a schedule is a wider system delivered as a set of disconnected parts; an approval sitting with an authority team with no visibility of the construction sequence downstream; or a station package proceeding without the utilities diversion it depends on.
“Infrastructure programmes do not struggle because a railway is too large or a highway network is too complex,” Caldwell says. “They encounter difficulties when interconnected elements are delivered in the wrong order.”
Sequencing decisions are rarely purely technical either, he adds. They are commercial – shaped by which assets need to unlock value first, which phases are tied to funding, and where sales or investment assumptions depend on infrastructure landing in a particular order.
Approvals sit at the centre of that logic. On many programmes, they become one of the biggest sources of lost time – not because the requirements are unreasonable, but because approvals are not planned, evidenced or owned as part of the delivery logic from day one.
Caldwell has seen the same pattern across three decades of Gulf delivery, from early work on Palm Jumeirah to today’s region-wide transport programmes.
“The decisive factor has often been the same: whether interfaces, approvals, responsibilities and delivery sequencing are aligned early enough to prevent complexity becoming delay.”
Integration needs to be well understood
“Most programme teams in the region would say they understand the need for integration,” Caldwell says. Fewer are structured to deliver it. “The harder task is turning that understanding into the way projects are actually set up and managed,” he argues.
Riyadh Metro is the reference point he returns to, precisely because engineering complexity was not the deciding factor in its delivery.
Coordinating a city-scale transport system meant aligning design, construction, systems, utilities and stakeholder interfaces across every delivery vertical.
“The lesson for the region today is clear,” Caldwell says. “Ambitious programmes need a delivery model that gives every contributor a shared view of progress, risk, decision-making and the business case driving programme priorities.”
That shared view, he argues, will be what the next phase of Gulf delivery is judged on.
Whether clients, consultants, contractors, operators and approval authorities can work to a single delivery logic will be key.
“This requires more than coordination meetings. It requires integrated ways of working, shared common data environments and governance structures that make risks, decisions and dependencies visible before they become delays,” he says.
From reporting progress to managing risk before it lands
Digital tools have a role here, Caldwell says, but not as a headline in themselves.
Digital twins, programme visualisation and data-led modelling matter only if they help teams identify and address problems before they affect the wider programme.
“The real value is not technology for its own sake,” he says. “It is the ability to see, in one place, where approvals are outstanding, where interfaces are unresolved, where programme dates are slipping, where clashes are emerging and where decisions need to be escalated."
None of it works without governance behind it, he cautions. “A dashboard will not resolve a delayed approval if nobody knows who owns the decision, when it needs to be made, or how it should be escalated.”
Data only has value if the processes and responsibilities around it are clear, which is why Caldwell frames the shift the region needs not as digitisation, but as a move “from programme management as a discipline focused mainly on reporting and coordination, and towards project and programme intelligence”.
With many of the region’s programmes running for a decade or more, he adds, delivery models also need to flex as funding assumptions, user needs and policy priorities change along the way.
“The ambition behind the Gulf’s transformation programmes is not in question,” Caldwell says.
What will determine how much of it is realised on time is whether delivery models evolve at the same pace: earlier integration, clearer approval pathways, shared data environments, and every contributor working to a delivery logic that connects technical sequencing with the funding and operational case behind it.
“The region’s next challenge is not imagining bigger projects,” he says. “It is changing the way they are delivered, operated and adapted over time.”
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Qatari firm wins $221m Qiddiya stadium MEP deal9 September 2026

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Qatari contractor Elegancia MEP, part of Estithmar Holding, has won a SR829m ($221m) mechanical package contract for the Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Stadium in Qiddiya, Saudi Arabia.
The contract covers full mechanical, electrical and plumbing (MEP) works for the stadium, and is Elegancia MEP’s largest award in Saudi Arabia to date.
The 45,000-seat stadium will feature a fully combined retractable pitch, roof and LED wall.
The stadium’s main construction works are being undertaken by a joint venture of Spanish firm FCC Construction and local firm Nesma & Partners.
Saudi gigaproject developer Qiddiya Investment Company awarded an estimated SR15bn ($4bn) deal to build the stadium in October 2024, as MEED exclusively reported.
The contract covered the construction of a multipurpose stadium on top of the 200-metre-high Tuwaiq cliff in the new sports and entertainment district of Qiddiya City.
Once completed, the stadium will be the home ground for Saudi Pro League football clubs Al-Nassr and Al-Hilal.
US-based architect Populous is the project consultant.
The stadium is one of the venues for the kingdom’s 2034 Fifa World Cup bid and will host events such as the Saudi King Cup, the Asian Cup and the 2034 Asian Games.
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