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Region to continue robust spending on oil and gas

29 December 2024

 

The upstream oil and gas industry in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region recorded more than $53bn of capital expenditure (capex) on oil and gas production projects in 2023. 

It was forecast that the sector might never repeat that level of spending on engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts, especially with hydrocarbons producers striving to achieve their net-zero carbon emissions goals and broader sustainability commitments.

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) led capex on Mena production projects in 2023, largely due to its $17bn spending on the Hail and Ghasha offshore sour gas development project.

Saudi Aramco was the second-largest spender in the region in 2023, on the back of the estimated $10bn-worth of EPC contracts it awarded for the second expansion phase of its Jafurah unconventional gas development. It also maintained spending on offshore field upgrade works, awarding about $5.3bn-worth of engineering, procurement, construction and installation (EPCI) contracts.

Yet upstream project spending in 2024 year-to-date has surpassed 2023’s level, with Mena hydrocarbons producers collectively spending more than $58bn on oil and gas production capacity maintenance and expansion projects.

Record year

Iran emerged as the largest spender in the Mena upstream sector in 2024, with the country’s capex exceeding $22bn. State-owned Pars Oil & Gas Company spent $20bn on EPC contracts in March, on a project to boost gas output capacity at the South Pars field.

Iran shares the South Pars field with Qatar, where it is known as North Field. The natural gas reserve in the Gulf’s waters is estimated to hold 1,800 trillion cubic feet of gas and 50 billion barrels of condensates.

Pars Oil & Gas Company aims to produce 90 trillion cubic feet of gas and 2 billion barrels of condensates from the latest expansion phase of the South Pars field development. The company expects to generate $900bn in total revenues from the expansion project.

Qatar was the second-largest spender in the region in 2024, with state enterprise QatarEnergy advancing its North Field production sustainability (NFPS) project, which aims to support its liquefied natural gas (LNG) expansion programme with gas feedstock.

QatarEnergy LNG, a subsidiary of QatarEnergy, awarded Italian contractor Saipem an estimated $4bn EPCI contract in September as part of the second phase of its NFPS project.

Saipem was awarded two packages, the scope of which encompasses EPCI work on a total of six platforms, approximately 100 kilometres (km) of corrosion resistance alloy rigid subsea pipelines of 28-inches and 24-inches diameter, 100km of subsea composite cables, 150km of fibre optic cables and several other subsea units.

Separately, in January, Qatar’s North Oil Company awarded $6bn-worth of contracts for four engineering, procurement, construction, installation and commissioning packages on a project to increase oil production from its Al-Shaheen offshore oil field by about 100,000 barrels a day (b/d).

The project, known as Ruya, is the third capacity-expansion phase of the Al-Shaheen oil field, which has a production potential of 300,000 b/d at present. North Oil Company – a joint venture of QatarEnergy (70%) and France’s TotalEnergies (30%), which has been the operator of Al-Shaheen since July 2017 – aims to increase the field’s output through the Ruya project.

Saudi offshore spending

In late January 2024, the Saudi Energy Ministry directed Aramco to abandon its campaign to expand its oil production spare capacity from 12 million b/d to 13 million b/d by 2027. As a consequence, Aramco cancelled the tendering process for at least 15 tenders involving the EPCI of structures at offshore oil and gas fields.

Since that decision, however, Aramco has gone the other way, spending an estimated $4.5bn in 2024 on offshore EPCI contracts, known in the Aramco ecosystem as CRPOs. 

Saipem has been the biggest beneficiary of Aramco’s offshore spending, winning all of the CRPOs awarded in 2024. In early May, Aramco awarded the contractor CRPO 143, which involves replacing an oil line between the Berri and Manifa oil fields in the kingdom’s Gulf waters.

Aramco then awarded Saipem the contract for CRPO 138, which involves laying a trunkline at the Abu Safah offshore field. The contract is estimated to be worth $500m. 

The firm then scooped three major CRPOs in August, starting with CRPOs 132 and 139, the combined value of which is estimated to be about $1bn. In early September, Saipem began work on the two contracts, which involve the EPCI of structures to upgrade the Marjan, Zuluf and Safaniya offshore field developments.

Just days later, Aramco awarded Saipem CRPO 127, a $2bn contract that involves EPCI of topsides and jackets for wellhead platforms, a tie-in platform jacket and topside, rigid flowlines, submarine composite cables and fibre optic cables at the Marjan oil and gas field.

Jafurah development

Aramco has also made swift progress in 2024 on successive expansion phases of its programme to produce and process gas from the Jafurah unconventional development in Saudi Arabia. Spending on the Jafurah expansion projects, along with offshore contracts, helped to make the kingdom the third-biggest upstream spender in the Mena region.

Aramco awarded contracts on 30 June for the Jafurah second expansion phase, which aims to raise processing potential to up to 2 billion cubic feet a day (cf/d) of raw gas. Aramco awarded 16 contracts, worth about $12.4bn, for EPC works and drilling services for the second expansion phase.

Within weeks of those awards, a consortium of Spanish contractor Tecnicas Reunidas and China’s Sinopec Group announced that it had been selected by Aramco to carry out EPC works on the third expansion phase at Jafurah, worth $2.24bn. The EPC scope mainly covers building three gas compression plants, each capable of processing 200 million cf/d. Aramco officially awarded the contract to the Tecnicas Reunidas/Sinopec consortium in late September.

Capex to hold steady

While the Mena upstream oil and gas industry may not be able to match its 2024 level of project capex in 2025, the sector is expected to maintain a robust level of spending, especially with national energy companies striving to achieve their strategic long-term oil and gas production capacity goals before the end of the decade.

Data from regional projects tracker MEED Projects suggests that the Mena upstream sector could invest about $40bn on projects in 2025, with gas output expansion schemes predicted to dominate spending.

In line with its target to increase gas production by 60% by 2030, with 2021 as its baseline, Aramco is on course to further advance its Jafurah unconventional gas production programme. It issued the main EPC tender for the fourth expansion phase of the programme in July, within days of selecting the main contractors for the third phase.

Contractors are preparing bids for the project, the scope of which is similar to that of the third expansion phase, and which is therefore understood to be valued at $2.5bn.

Saudi Arabia’s spending on offshore brownfield and greenfield EPCI contracts is set to remain high, with the tendering process under way for eight more Aramco CRPOs.

Four tenders were issued in August for CRPOs 149, 150, 152 and 153, which cover the EPCI works on the Arabiyah, Hasbah and Marjan offshore oil field developments. Of the four CRPOs, contractors in Saudi Aramco’s Long-Term Agreement (LTA) pool have submitted bids for 149, 152 and 153. 

Separately, LTA contractors are also preparing bids for four tenders worth a total of $4bn, which will further expand the Zuluf offshore field development.

Meanwhile, Iran is expected to give shape to its plan for gas extraction from its North Pars field, along with raising output from its onshore and offshore oil fields. Increasing production is vital for Tehran in order to maintain steady volumes of exports to earn vital revenue for its economy, which has been crippled by years of international sanctions.

Pars Oil & Gas Company is estimated to have allocated $15bn to the North Pars gas field development project. However, with the project being in the study phase, and with Iran’s cash-strapped government barely able to provide support to its population, the scheme could see little to no progress in 2025.

In the UAE, with the deadline approaching for Adnoc’s target of raising crude output capacity to 5 million b/d by 2027, it is anticipated that the company will funnel billions of dollars into increasing the production potential of its onshore and offshore oil fields. 

Adnoc Group subsidiary Adnoc Offshore is evaluating bids for three packages of a multibillion-dollar project to boost oil production at the Lower Zakum offshore hydrocarbons concession in Abu Dhabi. The goal of the first phase of the Lower Zakum long-term development plan is to raise the asset’s output capacity to 520,000 b/d by 2027 and maintain that level until 2034. 

Adnoc Offshore has also started the tendering exercise for front-end engineering and design work on the second expansion phase of the Umm Shaif offshore oil field.

Another Adnoc Group subsidiary, Adnoc Onshore, has made a significant capex investment in growing crude output from its main Bab, Northeast Bab, Bu Hasa and Southeast fields. As a result, it is on course to award more contracts in 2025 to maintain and eventually increase output from these fields through its P5 projects, which aim to achieve an oil production potential of 5 million b/d by 2027. 

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Indrajit Sen

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