Meed | Qatar banks look to calmer waters in 2025

Qatar banks look to calmer waters in 2025

15 January 2025

Doha’s lenders enter 2025 with a sense of quiet confidence, backed by broadly favourable macroeconomic trends shaped by still-solid oil prices and non-oil growth that will provide an uplift for operating conditions and loan growth.

Although these operating conditions are not as supportive for Qatari banks as for their peers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, growth is nonetheless coming back to the sector, enabling banks to book more loans.

Credit growth is looking stronger. In the first 10 months of 2024, Qatari banks registered an annualised credit growth of 6.3%, more than double that of 2023, which was 2.9%.

“Resuming growth is supporting operating conditions for Qatari banks,” says Amin Sakhri, primary rating analyst at Fitch Ratings.

According to Sakhri, non-oil economic activity is also increasing. But it is the cornerstone hydrocarbons project, the North Field liquefied natural gas (LNG) expansion, that will likely give ballast to lenders in the next two to three years.

By the end of 2025, Qatari LNG production capacity will have risen to 110 million tonnes a year (t/y), ahead of a further increase to 126 million t/y by 2027. That sets the economy up well, with banks positioned to feel the impact.

“The LNG project, which benefits related sub-sectors, also supports credit growth. So there’s also another supportive element for Qatari banks,” says Sakhri.

Robust profitability

Profits have been healthy in the past year, benefitting from banks’ strong capitalisation levels and adequate liquidity.

Ratings agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) expects this trend to continue with only a modest drop in net interest margins owing to interest rate cuts – and the impact of replacing non-resident funding (which is high in Qatar relative to other regional banking sectors) with higher-cost domestic funding sources.

Full-year 2024 results are awaited, but indications are it will have proved another solid year for banks’ bottom lines.

Qatar National Bank (QNB), which represents over 50% of total system assets – with just eight domestic commercial banks, it is one of the Gulf’s most concentrated banking sectors – reported a Q3 2024 net profit of QR4.5bn ($1.23bn), a 5.4% increase over the previous year. Loans and advances were up by 11% in the same period.

Profits were helped by still high interest rates in the first half of the year. While the lower interest rate environment will have some erosion effect on margins, Qatari banks are generally less sensitive to rates than other banks in the region.

Other metrics also look healthy. “We’ve seen the return on average equity increasing to 16.7% from 15.8% in 2023. This is despite still high loan impairment charges in Qatar, which are some of the highest in the GCC,” says Sakhri.

Property market uncertainty

One area of weakness is in the real estate sector, which has suffered from excess supply over a number of years, bringing down prices. According to Fitch, the banking sector’s exposure to the real estate and contracting sectors remains high, representing 17% of total sector lending.

“The real estate and construction sectors remain under pressure, and we see that in the banks’ loan books,” says Sakhri. “The cost of risk is still elevated in a GCC context, at 78 basis points in the first nine months of 2024 for the Qatari banking sector as a collective, well above the level observed in the UAE and Saudi Arabia.”

Those real estate pressures have contributed to higher loan impairment charges compared to the rest of the region. S&P envisages non-performing loans (NPLs) remaining elevated at 4% in 2025.

“If you look at stage 2 loans, the average for the Qatari banking sector is around 10-11%, whereas for the UAE and Saudi, it’s about 5%. Some of the smaller banks are heavily exposed to the real estate and construction sectors, leading to about a third of the loan book being classified as Stage 2, which is quite substantial,” says Sakhri.

However, Qatari lenders have tightened their underwriting standards in the real estate and contracting sectors, focusing on government-related projects and assignment of cash flow proceeds to reduce their repayment risks, notes Fitch. Some banks have also been reducing their exposure to these sectors.

In S&P’s view, while continued pressure on real estate prices could accelerate the migration of stage 2 loans to NPLs at some midsize banks, public sector initiatives and interest rate cuts will help prevent a more severe deterioration in asset quality.

Underlying strength

In any case, the sector’s strong capitalisation and conservative provisioning remain two core strengths. The average CET1 stood at a solid 15.5% at the end of September 2024. This, says Fitch, is further supported by strong provisioning practices, with 140% of stage 3 loans covered by provisions, among the strongest in the GCC.

Aside from the real estate exposure, the other key risk in Qatar is its long-standing reliance on external funding. The sector’s non-resident funding accounted for a still-high 42% of the banking sector’s funding at the end of October 2024, and the sector’s net external funding was a substantial 50% of GDP at the end of 2023.

There has been some change as GDP has grown, meaning total funding relative to GDP is decreasing. However, about half of the sector’s funding comes from external sources, which is not expected to reduce significantly.

“Yes, hydrocarbon revenues have been supporting domestic liquidity, but Qatari banks are really quite reliant on external funding. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, you’re looking at 15%-20% coming from external funding, and Qatar has been traditionally more than twice that,” says Sakhri.

Looking forward, the broader positive impact from the LNG increase will provide improved operating conditions for Qatari lenders, which will impact on banks’ bottom lines – offsetting the lower credit demand that will result from the completion of a number of key infrastructure projects.

What’s more, notes Sakhri, lower rates mean the cost of funding will reduce, which is favourable for Qatari banks because they have some of the highest cost of funds in the GCC, and the impact on net interest margin will be less marked.

Put that together, and Qatari bank chiefs have reason to view the year as one in which the glass is half-full rather than half-empty.

MEED's February 2025 special report on Qatar includes:

> GOVERNMENT & ECONOMY: Qatar economy rebounds alongside diplomatic activity
> POWER & WATER: Facility E award jumpstarts Qatar’s utility projects
> DOWNSTREAM: Qatar chemical projects take a step forward

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/13260830/main.gif

James Gavin

Exclusive from Meed

Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026
Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026
Adnoc secures Thailand LNG supply deal
9 October 2026
Fibrex wins $217m Abu Dhabi Seamont residences contract
9 October 2026
Dubai picks contractor for Al-Maktoum airport terminal
9 October 2026

Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026

Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

Yemen dynamics

Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

Strategic independence

The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20435670/main.gif

Dominic Dudley
Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026

Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

Yemen dynamics

Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

Strategic independence

The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20432716/main.gif

Dominic Dudley
Adnoc secures Thailand LNG supply deal
9 October 2026

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) has secured a deal with Thailand-based energy and infrastructure company Gulf Group to supply 2 million tonnes a year of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with deliveries starting in 2027.

The multi-year sale and purchase agreement (SPA), whose exact duration Adnoc did not disclose, builds on an initial LNG supply deal agreed between the two companies last year. The transaction was arranged through Adnoc’s integrated LNG marketing and trading platform, which was established in July within Abu Dhabi Global Market.

The hub integrates the marketing operations of Adnoc subsidiaries Adnoc Gas and XRG with the trading activities of Adnoc Trading. It targets a combined portfolio of 47 million t/y of marketable LNG by 2035. Adnoc Trading has developed an active third-party trading portfolio over the past four years, operating from commercial offices in Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Geneva.

ALSO READ: Adnoc signs energy agreements with Japan and South Korea

Separately, Adnoc has secured offtake commitments covering approximately 90% of the 9.6 million-t/y capacity planned for its low-carbon Ruwais LNG project.

In July, Adnoc signed a 15-year SPA with Japan’s Inpex Corporation for the supply of up to 1 million t/y from Ruwais. That contract marked Adnoc’s third long-term Ruwais supply agreement with a Japanese buyer, following deals with Osaka Gas and Mitsui & Co in March and April 2025, respectively. Together, the agreements with the three Japanese firms account for 2.4 million t/y – one-quarter of the terminal’s total capacity, which will be delivered across two 4.8 million-t/y liquefaction trains.

Adnoc has also secured long-term Ruwais LNG supply agreements with Malaysia’s Petronas, Germany’s EnBW Energie Baden-Wurttemberg and SEFE (Securing Energy for Europe), China’s ENN Natural Gas, UK-based Shell and Indian Oil Corporation.

Currently under construction in Ruwais Industrial City, Abu Dhabi, the facility is scheduled to begin commercial operations in 2028. Its commissioning will more than double Adnoc’s LNG production capacity to approximately 15 million t/y.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20421415/main4048.jpg

Indrajit Sen

Fibrex wins $217m Abu Dhabi Seamont residences contract

9 October 2026

Register for MEED’s 14-day trial access

Abu Dhabi-based contractor Fibrex Construction Group has won an AED800m ($217m) contract to build the Seamont Autograph Collection Residences project, located on Al-Reem Island in the UAE capital.

Abu Dhabi-based real estate developer Royal Development Holding, a subsidiary of Emirates Stallion Group, and local firm Saas Properties awarded the contract.

The development comprises two 22-storey towers offering 497 residences, ranging from one- to four-bedroom apartments.

The construction programme is scheduled to run for 27 months, with completion due in December 2028.

Fibrex will begin mobilisation immediately, following the completion of enabling works this month, which were undertaken by Sharjah-based Swiss Pro Foundations.

Dubai-based architectural firm Dewan Architects & Engineers is the project consultant.

The contract marks another major win for the contractor. Last year, Dubai-based developer Nakheel awarded Fibrex a AED2.6bn ($708m) contract to build the Bay Villas project at Dubai Islands.

That contract includes the construction of 636 villas.

READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDF

Industry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.

Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:

> AGENDA: Oxagon takes centre stage at Neom

> MARKET FOCUS: Saudi projects hold steady

> INDUSTRY REPORT: MEED’s 2026 GCC power developer ranking

> POWER: AI is creating a grid capacity problem

> LEGAL: What IFAD’s wind-down means for Gulf commodity markets

> OIL: Oil companies focus on North Africa amid Hormuz crisis

> LEADERSHIP: The future city does not need to hang above the ground

To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20420509/main.jpg

Yasir Iqbal

Dubai picks contractor for Al-Maktoum airport terminal

9 October 2026

Dubai Aviation Engineering Projects (DAEP) has selected a contractor for an estimated AED10bn ($2.7bn) substructure package for the West Terminal, as part of the first phase of the $35bn expansion of Al-Maktoum International airport.

A joint venture of Beijing-headquartered China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and Abu Dhabi-based Tristar Engineering & Construction will execute the contract.

According to a description on DAEP’s website, the expanded airport’s West Terminal will be a seven-level facility spanning 800,000 square metres, with annual capacity for 45 million passengers.

The terminal will be the second of three planned terminals at Al-Maktoum International airport. It will connect to the airside via a 14-station automated people-mover (APM) system.

In July, MEED exclusively reported that DAEP had awarded an estimated $1.5bn contract to a joint venture of Japan’s Mitsubishi Corporation and Indian contractor Larsen & Toubro for the APM system.

The APM will run beneath the apron and terminal areas, using multiple tracks to transport passengers between terminals and concourses. Four underground stations are planned in the first phase, while the full airport development is expected to include 14 stations.

The latest awards form part of a wider programme of contracts recently signed by DAEP, covering enabling works, the second runway, initial structural foundations for passenger terminals and concourse substructures.

Upcoming awards

In June 2026, DAEP said it will award construction contracts worth over AED55bn ($15bn) for Al-Maktoum International airport by the end of the year.

At the time, DAEP said the planned awards included substructure works for the West Terminal, the fourth aircraft concourse and the baggage-handling system. The programme also included superstructure works for the West Terminal and the first, second and third aircraft concourses.

The packages are expected to include long-span structural frameworks for buildings covering about 1.5 million square metres, infrastructure works for the southern airfield area, and power-generation and district-cooling plants supporting the construction programme.

DAEP also plans to award façade and roofing packages in 2026.

The Dubai Government approved updated designs and timelines for its largest construction project in April 2024. In September 2024, MEED exclusively reported that a team comprising Austria’s Coop Himmelb(l)au and Lebanon’s Dar Al-Handasah had been confirmed as lead masterplanning and design consultants for the Al-Maktoum International airport expansion.

Construction of the airport is planned in three phases. Once complete, the airport will cover 70 square kilometres south of Dubai and include five parallel runways and 430 aircraft gates.

It will be five times the size of Dubai International airport and is planned to have a passenger-handling capacity of 260 million passengers a year – the largest in the world. For cargo, it is planned to have the capacity to handle 12 million tonnes a year.