Oman pursues utility and grid expansion

5 December 2024

 

Expanding renewable energy and water production capacity and interconnecting disparate grids have been key priorities for Oman’s main utility stakeholders, especially over the past two years.

These efforts support a stated objective for renewable energy to account for 30% of Oman’s electricity generation capacity by 2030 – or an intervening milestone of about 3,000MW by 2027 – while ceasing to procure new thermal capacity.

“As in every other GCC state, the role of renewables is enshrined in Oman’s overall energy production mix target,” notes a UAE-based infrastructure consultant.

In addition to the longer-term renewable energy target, the sultanate expects new wind and solar projects to contribute to almost 11% of electricity production by 2025, according to the state offtaker Nama Power & Water Procurement Company’s (Nama PWP) latest seven-year statement covering 2023-29.

The milestones appear manageable. While Oman’s operational renewable energy capacity, mainly from the Ibri 2 solar independent power project (IPP), is only around 500MW, a further 1,000MW is under construction through the Manah 1 and Manah 2 solar IPPs.

The tendering process is also under way for around 1,000MW of wind IPP schemes.

In September, Nama PWP invited firms to bid for a contract to develop and operate the first two wind farms it is procuring under an IPP framework.

Located in South Sharqiyah Governorate, the Jalan Bani Bu Ali wind IPP will cater to Oman’s Main Interconnection System (MIS). It will have a capacity of 91MW-105MW and a commercial operation target of Q1 2027.

The second scheme is the Dhofar wind IPP, catering to the smaller Dhofar Power System (DPS). It will have a capacity of 114MW-132MW and will be operational in Q2 2027.

Three other wind schemes will be tendered over the following months, bringing the total capacity of wind IPPs to be developed in Oman over the next two to three years to over 1,000MW.

Nama PWP is also expected to issue the request for proposals for the 500MW Ibri 3 solar IPP scheme shortly.

Expiring capacities

While Muscat has said it does not plan to procure further thermal power generation capacity in the foreseeable future, it successfully extended the contracts for several expiring thermal power generation and water desalination capacities earlier this year.

These agreements collectively secured over 1,500MW of electricity and 200,000 cubic metres a day (cm/d) of desalinated water for up to nine years.

The contract renewals follow the expiry or expected expiry of the power- or power and water-purchase agreements for the following plants:

  • Barka 1 independent water and power project (IWPP): 427MW (installed power generation capacity) / 101,000 cm/d (desalination capacity)
  • Barka 2 IWPP: 703MW / 120,000 cm/d
  • Rusail IPP: 184MW
  • Manah IPP: 179MW

According to Saudi utility developer Acwa Power, the Barka 1 plant’s power and water purchase agreement extension is valued at $356m.

It includes extending the operation of the power plant for eight years and nine months, starting from 1 June 2024, and the water desalination plant for three years from 1 September 2024. When it began operations in 2003, the facility contributed 6% of Oman’s electricity and 24% of its desalinated water.

Nama PWP said “efficient utilisation of gas consumption will continue to improve” over the 2023-29 planning horizon.

Peak demand forecast

Peak demand in the MIS is expected to grow at an average of approximately 3.4% a year over the seven-year planning period, reaching about 8,350MW in 2029, up from 6,628MW in 2022.

In the DPS, peak demand is anticipated to grow 5% a year, from 612MW in 2022 to 837MW in 2029.

Oman has been implementing key projects to improve the efficiency of its electricity grids, addressing growing peak demand and intermittent renewable power.

In 2023, Oman Electricity Transmission Company completed works on the $966m, 400-kilovolt (kV) first phase of the North-South Interconnection project – known as Rabt – enabling Oman’s MIS to connect with the Duqm Power System.

The project is expected to stimulate the development of the Special Economic Zone at Duqm (Sezad) and the development of renewable energy projects in the Al-Wusta Governorate. The next phase to expand the Rabt project is expected by 2026.

Oman’s second direct link to the GCC regional electricity grid is also planned to come onstream the same year.

The 400kV Oman Direct Link project will extend the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority’s (GCCIA) 400kV transmission network to enable direct interconnection with Oman.

According to energy consultancy firm Energoprojeckt, which is advising the GCCIA on this project, a new 400kV double circuit overhead line connection, with a total route length of 528 kilometres, will be constructed from the existing 400kV GCCIA Silaa substation in the UAE to the existing 400/220kV Ibri substation in Oman.

Oman’s first link with the GCCIA became operational in November 2011. It comprises a 200kV line connecting the Mahadha grid station in Al-Wasit, Oman, to the Al-Oha grid station in Al-Ain, UAE.

Water sector

The sultanate’s water sector has been similarly buoyant. Contract awards for desalination and treatment capacity and the construction of water transmission pipelines are approaching record highs.

According to MEED Projects data, close to $1bn-worth of contracts are in the bid evaluation stage, including the estimated $100m package for the wastewater network facilities on Masirah Island, as well as several water pipeline, desalination and dam projects across the sultanate.

Oman’s Barka 5 independent water project (IWP) reached commercial operations in August, its owner and operator, Madrid-headquartered GS Inima, announced. Oman’s eighth IWP scheme has a design capacity of 100,000 cm/d.

The project, which uses reverse osmosis technology, will serve 800,000 people in the sultanate’s most populated areas: Muscat, Dakhiliyah and Batinah.

GS Inima, in a consortium with local contractor Sogex and Saudi Arabia’s Aljomaih, won the contract to develop another IWP in Oman, the 300,000 cm/d Ghubrah 3 IWP, in 2020. The project is expected to reach financial close soon.

Peak water demand in the sultanate’s MIS is expected to increase by an average of 2% annually, from 1,172,000 cm/d in 2022 to 1,387,000 cm/d in 2029.

A higher growth rate of 5% annually is expected in the sultanate’s Sharqiyah zone, and 7% is projected in Dhofar.

Other upcoming projects

In addition to Nama PWP’s plans, state-backed Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) is procuring renewable energy capacity to support its target of 30% of its power capacity coming from renewable sources by 2026 and 50% by 2030.

PDO floated a tender for two 100MW wind projects in April 2023. It is understood that PDO is in discussions with Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar) for the contract to develop the Riyah-1 and Riyah-2 wind projects.

PDO has also appointed a team comprising Beijing-headquartered Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina) and its subsidiary, Huadong Engineering Corporation (HDEC), to undertake the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) work for the two wind projects.

PDO plans to develop its second solar photovoltaic project near Saih Nihayda, next to Qarn Alam airport, in the northern region of Oman. The project is expected to come onstream late next year, nearly five years after its first 100MW Amin solar project began operating.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/13017866/main.jpg
Jennifer Aguinaldo
Related Articles
  • Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh

    9 October 2026

     

    Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

    In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

    At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

    Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

    However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

    Yemen dynamics

    Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

    Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

    It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

    The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

    Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

    Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

    On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

    Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

    Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

    Strategic independence

    The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

    Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

    It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

    In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20435670/main.gif
    Dominic Dudley
  • Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh

    9 October 2026

     

    Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

    In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

    At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

    Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

    However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

    Yemen dynamics

    Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

    Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

    It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

    The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

    Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

    Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

    On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

    Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

    Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

    Strategic independence

    The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

    Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

    It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

    In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20432716/main.gif
    Dominic Dudley
  • Adnoc secures Thailand LNG supply deal

    9 October 2026

    Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) has secured a deal with Thailand-based energy and infrastructure company Gulf Group to supply 2 million tonnes a year of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with deliveries starting in 2027.

    The multi-year sale and purchase agreement (SPA), whose exact duration Adnoc did not disclose, builds on an initial LNG supply deal agreed between the two companies last year. The transaction was arranged through Adnoc’s integrated LNG marketing and trading platform, which was established in July within Abu Dhabi Global Market.

    The hub integrates the marketing operations of Adnoc subsidiaries Adnoc Gas and XRG with the trading activities of Adnoc Trading. It targets a combined portfolio of 47 million t/y of marketable LNG by 2035. Adnoc Trading has developed an active third-party trading portfolio over the past four years, operating from commercial offices in Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Geneva.

    ALSO READ: Adnoc signs energy agreements with Japan and South Korea

    Separately, Adnoc has secured offtake commitments covering approximately 90% of the 9.6 million-t/y capacity planned for its low-carbon Ruwais LNG project.

    In July, Adnoc signed a 15-year SPA with Japan’s Inpex Corporation for the supply of up to 1 million t/y from Ruwais. That contract marked Adnoc’s third long-term Ruwais supply agreement with a Japanese buyer, following deals with Osaka Gas and Mitsui & Co in March and April 2025, respectively. Together, the agreements with the three Japanese firms account for 2.4 million t/y – one-quarter of the terminal’s total capacity, which will be delivered across two 4.8 million-t/y liquefaction trains.

    Adnoc has also secured long-term Ruwais LNG supply agreements with Malaysia’s Petronas, Germany’s EnBW Energie Baden-Wurttemberg and SEFE (Securing Energy for Europe), China’s ENN Natural Gas, UK-based Shell and Indian Oil Corporation.

    Currently under construction in Ruwais Industrial City, Abu Dhabi, the facility is scheduled to begin commercial operations in 2028. Its commissioning will more than double Adnoc’s LNG production capacity to approximately 15 million t/y.

    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20421415/main4048.jpg
    Indrajit Sen
  • Fibrex wins $217m Abu Dhabi Seamont residences contract

    9 October 2026

    Register for MEED’s 14-day trial access 

    Abu Dhabi-based contractor Fibrex Construction Group has won an AED800m ($217m) contract to build the Seamont Autograph Collection Residences project, located on Al-Reem Island in the UAE capital.

    Abu Dhabi-based real estate developer Royal Development Holding, a subsidiary of Emirates Stallion Group, and local firm Saas Properties awarded the contract.

    The development comprises two 22-storey towers offering 497 residences, ranging from one- to four-bedroom apartments.

    The construction programme is scheduled to run for 27 months, with completion due in December 2028.

    Fibrex will begin mobilisation immediately, following the completion of enabling works this month, which were undertaken by Sharjah-based Swiss Pro Foundations.

    Dubai-based architectural firm Dewan Architects & Engineers is the project consultant.

    The contract marks another major win for the contractor. Last year, Dubai-based developer Nakheel awarded Fibrex a AED2.6bn ($708m) contract to build the Bay Villas project at Dubai Islands.

    That contract includes the construction of 636 villas.


    READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDF

    Industry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.

    Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:

    To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here
    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20420509/main.jpg
    Yasir Iqbal
  • Dubai picks contractor for Al-Maktoum airport terminal

    9 October 2026

     

    Dubai Aviation Engineering Projects (DAEP) has selected a contractor for an estimated AED10bn ($2.7bn) substructure package for the West Terminal, as part of the first phase of the $35bn expansion of Al-Maktoum International airport.

    A joint venture of Beijing-headquartered China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and Abu Dhabi-based Tristar Engineering & Construction will execute the contract.

    According to a description on DAEP’s website, the expanded airport’s West Terminal will be a seven-level facility spanning 800,000 square metres, with annual capacity for 45 million passengers.

    The terminal will be the second of three planned terminals at Al-Maktoum International airport. It will connect to the airside via a 14-station automated people-mover (APM) system.

    In July, MEED exclusively reported that DAEP had awarded an estimated $1.5bn contract to a joint venture of Japan’s Mitsubishi Corporation and Indian contractor Larsen & Toubro for the APM system.

    The APM will run beneath the apron and terminal areas, using multiple tracks to transport passengers between terminals and concourses. Four underground stations are planned in the first phase, while the full airport development is expected to include 14 stations.

    The latest awards form part of a wider programme of contracts recently signed by DAEP, covering enabling works, the second runway, initial structural foundations for passenger terminals and concourse substructures.

    Upcoming awards

    In June 2026, DAEP said it will award construction contracts worth over AED55bn ($15bn) for Al-Maktoum International airport by the end of the year.

    At the time, DAEP said the planned awards included substructure works for the West Terminal, the fourth aircraft concourse and the baggage-handling system. The programme also included superstructure works for the West Terminal and the first, second and third aircraft concourses.

    The packages are expected to include long-span structural frameworks for buildings covering about 1.5 million square metres, infrastructure works for the southern airfield area, and power-generation and district-cooling plants supporting the construction programme.

    DAEP also plans to award façade and roofing packages in 2026.

    The Dubai Government approved updated designs and timelines for its largest construction project in April 2024. In September 2024, MEED exclusively reported that a team comprising Austria’s Coop Himmelb(l)au and Lebanon’s Dar Al-Handasah had been confirmed as lead masterplanning and design consultants for the Al-Maktoum International airport expansion.

    Construction of the airport is planned in three phases. Once complete, the airport will cover 70 square kilometres south of Dubai and include five parallel runways and 430 aircraft gates.

    It will be five times the size of Dubai International airport and is planned to have a passenger-handling capacity of 260 million passengers a year – the largest in the world. For cargo, it is planned to have the capacity to handle 12 million tonnes a year.


    READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDF

    Industry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.

    Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:

    To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here
    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20417755/main.jpg
    Yasir Iqbal