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Kuwait navigates unchartered political territory

29 August 2024

 

Kuwait’s political situation and its near-term prospects for governance continue to hinge on the dramatic suspension of the nation’s parliament by Emir Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah.

This drastic measure by the country’s leader came in response to a deepening political stagnation in Kuwaiti politics that has seen successive formations of parliament and government deadlocked over the most fundamental of fiscal legislation: approving the budget and raising the debt ceiling.

Underlying these stumbling blocks are allegations of fiscal and budgetary malfeasance levelled by the elected lawmakers in parliament at the ruler-appointed and ruling family-led cabinet.

In recent years, the proceedings in parliament have become increasingly acrimonious, with lawmakers frequently demanding the right to question cabinet members – a demand that has instead often simply resulted in the dissolution of the government.

Kuwait’s political system has often been described as a “democratic experiment”, as it was a first in the GCC to devolve significant legislative authority to a chamber of fairly freely elected representatives.

On 10 May, however, after the fourth election in four years in pursuit of a functioning government resulted in the same rigmarole, the emir triggered the system’s inbuilt circuit breaker for the first time since its establishment and effectively placed the experiment on hold.

Two days later, the emir announced the formation of a new cabinet headed by Sheikh Ahmad Abdullah Al-Sabah as the returning prime minister. The country’s oil, finance and foreign ministers all retained their posts as well, making it a continuity cabinet, but in the absence of parliament.

Officially, the rules allow for the suspension of parliament for up to four years, enabling direct rule by the emir and his cabinet in the interim. Kuwait has thus returned, temporarily, to something of a default setting for the GCC. But it is a dramatic turn of events for Kuwait given the country’s well-worn electoral legacy – even as its other positively regarded attributes, such as a relatively free press, remain intact.

Project revitalisation

The emir’s decision is nevertheless being viewed in many quarters as a potentially positive development, not least in the projects sector. The political deadlock plaguing the country has been a salient problem for contractors in recent years due to the way parliamentary objections have impeded project spending.

Indeed, political disputes over capital expenditure have come close to scuttling Kuwait’s projects sector, which has seen its activity plummet over the past decade, with the country’s $16.5bn in contract awards in 2016 plunging to just $2.6bn in 2019 and averaging less than $4bn in the past five years. Given the parallel $100bn in project completions over the past 10 years, this fall in awards has resulted in a $50bn net decline in the value of projects under execution.

This loss of value from the projects sector has been detrimental to Kuwaiti contractors, who have been looking abroad in increasing numbers for alternative avenues of work. The drop-off in value in the project market has also been even more dramatic in certain industries, including the oil sector, where the total value of active projects fell from $65bn in early 2019 to just over $5bn by early 2023.

The reduction in oil sector projects, where constant work is required to maintain the performance of the infrastructure, is a threat to the main driver of the Kuwaiti economy and government revenues.

Given the country’s limited diversification and the accounting of the oil sector for 60% of Kuwait’s GDP and 90% of government revenue, the potential long-term consequences of the nation’s political dysfunction metastasising into dysfunction in the oil sector are considerable. 

It is not surprising then that one of the first things on the agenda since the suspension of parliament has been the revival of oil sector projects – with the country’s Central Agency for Public Tenders now meeting three days a week since July to advance the tendering of major schemes.

Political correction

Political reform is also on the table. In his televised address to the nation on 10 May, the emir stated: “The recent turmoil in the Kuwaiti political scene has reached a stage where we cannot remain silent, so we must take all necessary measures to achieve the best interest of the country and its people.”

The presentation of the challenges facing the country in existential terms underlined the heightened perception that Kuwait was careening towards disaster amid political paralysis, falling oil infrastructure investment and snowballing expenses.

However, regardless of the “unimaginable, unbearable difficulties and impediments”, facing the country, the retaking of direct control by the emir and cabinet is no assurance that the trouble is over. The country still faces stark policy choices, including how to tackle its burgeoning public wage bill, which currently stands at about 30% of the country’s GDP and is only set to grow with rising pay and pensions.

These are costs that Kuwait cannot bear without robust oil sector development, and even that might not be enough. Economic projections have suggested public salaries could make up as much as 75% of the budget within five years, which could rapidly shrink the fiscal space for any other spending.

This is a burgeoning dilemma for the country that cannot be tackled overnight, but with four years of determined and unencumbered course correction, Kuwait could at least develop some more options.

Constitutional amendments could also be unveiled to prevent a return to political paralysis when a parliament re-forms. The ability of the house to override the emir’s veto with a simple majority, as well as to hold votes of no confidence for ministers, are two areas where changes could be made to smooth the political process – for example by requiring a super majority to overturn the emir’s veto or by making the conditions necessary to challenge the confidence in a minister more stringent.

Regardless, what is abundantly clear is that the existing system was not functioning as required – at the most fundamental level – in making basic legislative progress. Everything could now get back on track, but there are ample more “difficulties and impediments” to address, and Kuwait needs fresh solutions.

This month's special report on Kuwait includes: 

> GOVERNMENT: Kuwait navigates unchartered political territory
> ECONOMY: Fiscal deficit pushes Kuwait towards reforms
> BANKING: Kuwaiti banks hunt for growth 
> OIL & GAS: Kuwait oil project activity doubles
> POWER & WATER: Kuwait utilities battle uncertainty
> CONSTRUCTION: Kuwait construction sector turns corner

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John Bambridge

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    More from Edmund O’Sullivan:

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    MEED Editorial