Meed | Iraq hits the spend button

Iraq hits the spend button

11 May 2023

MEED's latest coverage on Iraq includes:

> GOVERNMENT: Sudani makes fitful progress as Iraq's premier
> POWER: Iraq power projects make headway
> UPSTREAM DEVELOPERS: No place like Iraq for international oil firms
> CHEMICALS: Iraq continues technical studies for $8bn chemical project
> SOLAR: Total continues 1GW Iraq solar talks
> TRANSPORT: Baghdad approves funds for metro and airport projects

After a year of turmoil, Iraq has found itself in a better place economically in 2023, with an improved fiscal and external position on the back of high oil prices and production and two years of budget surpluses.

That is the good news. Analysts fear that this relative strength may lead the government into dangerous territory. A 2023 budget submitted to the Council of Representatives amounts to ID199tn ($153bn) of spending – an unprecedented fiscal programme for Iraq, even if oil revenues look flush.

“Iraq remains vulnerable to swings in oil prices, especially given spending pressures, the difficulty of passing meaningful budget reforms and the shallowness of domestic financing options,” says Toby Iles, head of Middle East and Africa sovereign ratings at Fitch Ratings.

“The proposed budget for 2023 pencils in large spending increases, including for sticky items such as salaries. This would increase Iraq’s vulnerability to oil price volatility.”

Previous episodes of low oil prices, in 2015-16 and 2020, quickly led to financing challenges and recourse to central bank borrowing, notes Iles.

The last time Iraq attempted to push through reforms was after the 2020 collapse in oil prices. But the recovery of prices, together with other factors, removed the immediate pressure for change and snuffed out these attempts. “One could argue that it was a wasted crisis,” says Iles.

Most of the budget is current spending – about three-quarters of it, leaving investment spending at ID49.5tn ($38bn). The budget anticipates a sizeable deficit of ID117.3tn ($89bn).

The deficit would be financed by a mix of funding from the Ministry of Finance’s account at the Central Bank of Iraq and foreign financing of investment projects. This would necessitate domestic borrowing of ID31.5tn ($24bn), according to an analysis by Ahmed Tabaqchali, chief strategist of the AFC Iraq Fund.

Cleared path for spending

The Iraqi authorities’ thinking is that now the political logjams of recent years have, for the most part, been removed, the timing is ripe to open the purse strings.

“They are sitting on $115bn of sovereign reserves, which they haven’t been able to spend for a couple of years,” says Michael Knights, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

“And now they’ve got a fully empowered government. Soon they’re going to have a fully empowered budget. So they see it as time to splurge all the oil income that’s been built up.”

There is a logic to this. Yet the sheer scale of the financing programme is the issue here. The $153bn budget is one and a half times the last authorised budget in 2021, says Knights.

And if the budget is approved as part of a three-year programme – which remains an option – it leaves the state finances particularly vulnerable should oil prices slip.

“If you play out the numbers, you can see that if they spend at these record high levels for three years, they’ll wipe out the majority of their sovereign reserves. And they’ll be down to very close to import cover levels,” says Knights.

One particular concern is that the government intends to increase the size of the public sector by bringing hundreds of thousands of civil servants on board and paying them more. Public sector salaries and pensions are projected to account for 41 per cent of operating expenditures, according to Tabaqchali’s analysis.

In Knights’ view, this approach falls under “out populist-ing the populists, keeping people happy while the government cements its control over the military, the judiciary and intelligence services”.

Risk-fraught gambit

It may still be risky, given that Iraq struggled with the last major oil price drop in 2020. Having to cope then with the degree of public sector fixed expenses, it could be much harder to carry this off now.

Iraq’s single commodity dependence is more acute than other Middle East and North Africa (Mena) oil exporters. Oil revenue accounts for almost all of the government’s revenue and export revenue.

“This high commodity dependence is the key vulnerability, while weak governance and political risk undermine prospects for a stronger non-oil economy,” says Iles.

The undeveloped banking sector is also an important weakness, hampering non-oil development and limiting government financing options during times of fiscal deficit.

“Buoyant oil prices have improved many of Iraq’s sovereign credit metrics, but the absence of structural, economic or fiscal reforms and persistence of political risk constrain the rating (B-),” says Iles.

There will be positives that will emerge from the substantive spending programme. For one thing, there will be a substantial liquidity boost that will drive economic growth. It will also help insulate the government against protests.

For a country that, in the words of the World Bank, has suffered from a combination of corruption, weak state institutions and patronage – leaving 9 million Iraqis living below the poverty line and unemployment as high as 14 per cent – this spending will come as a soothing balm.

Currency crisis averted

Another plus is that the country’s currency crisis of previous months, which led to a shortage of dollars, appears to have been contained.

“The dollar shortages that we have seen in Iraq since late 2022 reflect governance issues and political risk, rather than any fundamental economic imbalances. The central bank’s foreign reserves are at record high levels,” says Iles.

The constraints on FX supply came from long-standing concerns about the ultimate recipients and uses of FX sold via the central bank’s daily auctions. However, notes Iles, now there are higher volumes again in the central bank’s daily auctions and the premium of the unofficial exchange rate over the official rate has narrowed to some extent, reflecting gradual adaptation to the central bank’s new procedural requirements.

If more robust and transparent procedure bed in and normalise, this will have ultimately been positive.

And yet, if the 2023 budget gets passed and Iraq commits itself to a highly expansionary three-year fiscal cycle, fresh vulnerabilities will be baked into the Iraqi economic system that could store up troubles for later generations of Iraqis to deal with. The clock is ticking.

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James Gavin

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Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026

Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

Yemen dynamics

Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

Strategic independence

The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20435670/main.gif

Dominic Dudley
Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026

Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

Yemen dynamics

Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

Strategic independence

The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20432716/main.gif

Dominic Dudley
Adnoc secures Thailand LNG supply deal
9 October 2026

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) has secured a deal with Thailand-based energy and infrastructure company Gulf Group to supply 2 million tonnes a year of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with deliveries starting in 2027.

The multi-year sale and purchase agreement (SPA), whose exact duration Adnoc did not disclose, builds on an initial LNG supply deal agreed between the two companies last year. The transaction was arranged through Adnoc’s integrated LNG marketing and trading platform, which was established in July within Abu Dhabi Global Market.

The hub integrates the marketing operations of Adnoc subsidiaries Adnoc Gas and XRG with the trading activities of Adnoc Trading. It targets a combined portfolio of 47 million t/y of marketable LNG by 2035. Adnoc Trading has developed an active third-party trading portfolio over the past four years, operating from commercial offices in Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Geneva.

ALSO READ: Adnoc signs energy agreements with Japan and South Korea

Separately, Adnoc has secured offtake commitments covering approximately 90% of the 9.6 million-t/y capacity planned for its low-carbon Ruwais LNG project.

In July, Adnoc signed a 15-year SPA with Japan’s Inpex Corporation for the supply of up to 1 million t/y from Ruwais. That contract marked Adnoc’s third long-term Ruwais supply agreement with a Japanese buyer, following deals with Osaka Gas and Mitsui & Co in March and April 2025, respectively. Together, the agreements with the three Japanese firms account for 2.4 million t/y – one-quarter of the terminal’s total capacity, which will be delivered across two 4.8 million-t/y liquefaction trains.

Adnoc has also secured long-term Ruwais LNG supply agreements with Malaysia’s Petronas, Germany’s EnBW Energie Baden-Wurttemberg and SEFE (Securing Energy for Europe), China’s ENN Natural Gas, UK-based Shell and Indian Oil Corporation.

Currently under construction in Ruwais Industrial City, Abu Dhabi, the facility is scheduled to begin commercial operations in 2028. Its commissioning will more than double Adnoc’s LNG production capacity to approximately 15 million t/y.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20421415/main4048.jpg

Indrajit Sen

Fibrex wins $217m Abu Dhabi Seamont residences contract

9 October 2026

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Abu Dhabi-based contractor Fibrex Construction Group has won an AED800m ($217m) contract to build the Seamont Autograph Collection Residences project, located on Al-Reem Island in the UAE capital.

Abu Dhabi-based real estate developer Royal Development Holding, a subsidiary of Emirates Stallion Group, and local firm Saas Properties awarded the contract.

The development comprises two 22-storey towers offering 497 residences, ranging from one- to four-bedroom apartments.

The construction programme is scheduled to run for 27 months, with completion due in December 2028.

Fibrex will begin mobilisation immediately, following the completion of enabling works this month, which were undertaken by Sharjah-based Swiss Pro Foundations.

Dubai-based architectural firm Dewan Architects & Engineers is the project consultant.

The contract marks another major win for the contractor. Last year, Dubai-based developer Nakheel awarded Fibrex a AED2.6bn ($708m) contract to build the Bay Villas project at Dubai Islands.

That contract includes the construction of 636 villas.

READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDF

Industry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.

Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:

> AGENDA: Oxagon takes centre stage at Neom

> MARKET FOCUS: Saudi projects hold steady

> INDUSTRY REPORT: MEED’s 2026 GCC power developer ranking

> POWER: AI is creating a grid capacity problem

> LEGAL: What IFAD’s wind-down means for Gulf commodity markets

> OIL: Oil companies focus on North Africa amid Hormuz crisis

> LEADERSHIP: The future city does not need to hang above the ground

To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here

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Yasir Iqbal

Dubai picks contractor for Al-Maktoum airport terminal

9 October 2026

Dubai Aviation Engineering Projects (DAEP) has selected a contractor for an estimated AED10bn ($2.7bn) substructure package for the West Terminal, as part of the first phase of the $35bn expansion of Al-Maktoum International airport.

A joint venture of Beijing-headquartered China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and Abu Dhabi-based Tristar Engineering & Construction will execute the contract.

According to a description on DAEP’s website, the expanded airport’s West Terminal will be a seven-level facility spanning 800,000 square metres, with annual capacity for 45 million passengers.

The terminal will be the second of three planned terminals at Al-Maktoum International airport. It will connect to the airside via a 14-station automated people-mover (APM) system.

In July, MEED exclusively reported that DAEP had awarded an estimated $1.5bn contract to a joint venture of Japan’s Mitsubishi Corporation and Indian contractor Larsen & Toubro for the APM system.

The APM will run beneath the apron and terminal areas, using multiple tracks to transport passengers between terminals and concourses. Four underground stations are planned in the first phase, while the full airport development is expected to include 14 stations.

The latest awards form part of a wider programme of contracts recently signed by DAEP, covering enabling works, the second runway, initial structural foundations for passenger terminals and concourse substructures.

Upcoming awards

In June 2026, DAEP said it will award construction contracts worth over AED55bn ($15bn) for Al-Maktoum International airport by the end of the year.

At the time, DAEP said the planned awards included substructure works for the West Terminal, the fourth aircraft concourse and the baggage-handling system. The programme also included superstructure works for the West Terminal and the first, second and third aircraft concourses.

The packages are expected to include long-span structural frameworks for buildings covering about 1.5 million square metres, infrastructure works for the southern airfield area, and power-generation and district-cooling plants supporting the construction programme.

DAEP also plans to award façade and roofing packages in 2026.

The Dubai Government approved updated designs and timelines for its largest construction project in April 2024. In September 2024, MEED exclusively reported that a team comprising Austria’s Coop Himmelb(l)au and Lebanon’s Dar Al-Handasah had been confirmed as lead masterplanning and design consultants for the Al-Maktoum International airport expansion.

Construction of the airport is planned in three phases. Once complete, the airport will cover 70 square kilometres south of Dubai and include five parallel runways and 430 aircraft gates.

It will be five times the size of Dubai International airport and is planned to have a passenger-handling capacity of 260 million passengers a year – the largest in the world. For cargo, it is planned to have the capacity to handle 12 million tonnes a year.