Related Articles

• 
  JGC yet to return evacuated workers to Basra refinery

  12 October 2026

  

   

  Japan’s JGC has yet to bring evacuated workers back to the Basra refinery project in Iraq, according to industry sources.

  JGC evacuated its personnel from the site in the southern oil hub of Basra following the start of the regional conflict on 28 February, when the US and Israel attacked Iran.

  The evacuation halted work on the project, which was in its final construction stage.

  On 14 August 2026, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil announced that it had signed an agreement with JGC to resume work on the fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) project at Basra refinery.

  One source said: “Even though the agreement to bring the evacuated workers back was signed about two months ago, there is still no sign of the evacuated workers on the project site.

  “It is possible that they will return soon, but it is hard to tell what will happen next in the current security environment.”

  Earlier this month, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil said it met with Japanese officials to discuss plans to commission the FCC unit under the Basra refinery upgrade project.

  The statement did not say when the evacuated JGC workers would return to the project site.

  Strategic project

  Iraq’s state-owned South Refineries Company (SRC) sent JGC notice of the main contract award for the FCC package of the Basra refinery upgrade project in August 2020.

  JGC was awarded the contract in consortium with South Korea’s Hyundai E&C.

  The official contract signing ceremony was held in Baghdad on 1 October 2020.

  The contract awarded to JGC, which uses the engineering, procurement, construction and commissioning model, was worth $3.78bn.

  The FCC package is part of a broader project to upgrade the Basra refinery.

  The project site is located about 12 kilometres east of Iraq’s southern city of Basra.

  The wider upgrade project involves installing new facilities on land adjacent to the existing Basra refinery, including a vacuum distillation unit and a diesel desulphurisation unit.

  In April 2021, France’s Axens won a contract in Iraq to provide four process technologies to SRC for the Basra refinery upgrade project.

  The technologies that SRC selected are:

  • Diesel hydrotreatment unit (Prime-D)
  • Vacuum gasoil (VGO) hydrotreating unit
  • VGO fluid catalytic cracker unit
  • Oligomerisation unit (polynaphtha)

  In addition, Axens is providing catalysts and adsorbents, proprietary equipment, training and technical services.

  ---

  MEED’s latest report on Iraq includes:

  > COMMENT: Iraq’s reform window narrows
  > GOVERNMENT: Al-Zaidi takes Iraq’s premiership under US shadow
  > BANKING: Financial challenge tests Iraq’s resolve
  > ECONOMY: Iraq enters era of resilience, reform and rising risks 
  > OIL & GAS: Iraqi oil and gas sector in crisis
  > POWER & WATER: Focus shifts to delivery of Iraq utilities expansion
  > CONSTRUCTION: Momentum builds in Iraq’s post-war construction sector

  To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here

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  Wil Crisp
• 
  Abu Dhabi plans Mussafah road upgrades

  12 October 2026

  Abu Dhabi’s Department of Municipalities and Transport (DMT) has announced plans to upgrade roads in Mussafah, improving links between the industrial area, Mohamed Bin Zayed City and Zayed City.

  The scheme covers about 13 kilometres of roads on the E30 and 8th Street. It aims to reduce congestion, improve road safety and cut journey times.

  The works include a new three-lane highway in each direction along 8th Street, with parallel three-lane service roads on both sides providing access to local businesses and facilities.

  The upgraded corridor is expected to accommodate up to 4,000 vehicles an hour.

  Other works include upgrades to four E30 interchanges, improved links to 8th Street and the E20, and modifications to nine junctions.

  The DMT also plans to build two bridges connecting Mussafah and Mohamed Bin Zayed City, along with a pedestrian bridge.

  Abu Dhabi is planning major investments to upgrade its road network across the emirate.

  Last week, it disclosed plans for a major new transport corridor in the capital, comprising a 37km coastal route linking Al-Hudayriyat Island with the E11 at Al-Nouf.

  It is planned to have three lanes in each direction and will include a tunnel, about 7km of marine bridges and about 4km of causeways.

  The scheme will provide a direct connection between Al-Dhafra, Al-Hudayriyat Island and Abu Dhabi Island via Halat Al-Bahrani, Al-Futaisi and Al-Aryam islands.

  ---

  READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDF

  Industry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.

  Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:

  > AGENDA: Oxagon takes centre stage at Neom > MARKET FOCUS: Saudi projects hold steady > INDUSTRY REPORT: MEED’s 2026 GCC power developer ranking > POWER: AI is creating a grid capacity problem > LEGAL: What IFAD’s wind-down means for Gulf commodity markets > OIL: Oil companies focus on North Africa amid Hormuz crisis  > LEADERSHIP: The future city does not need to hang above the ground

  To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here

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  Yasir Iqbal
• 
  Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh

  9 October 2026

  

   

  Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

  In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

  At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

  Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

  However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

  Yemen dynamics

  Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

  Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

  It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

  The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

  Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

  Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

  On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

  Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

  Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

  Strategic independence

  The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

  Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

  It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

  In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

  https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20435670/main.gif

  Dominic Dudley
• 
  Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh

  9 October 2026

  

   

  Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

  In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

  At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

  Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

  However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

  Yemen dynamics

  Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

  Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

  It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

  The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

  Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

  Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

  On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

  Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

  Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

  Strategic independence

  The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

  Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

  It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

  In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

  https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20432716/main.gif

  Dominic Dudley
• 
  Adnoc secures Thailand LNG supply deal

  9 October 2026

  Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) has secured a deal with Thailand-based energy and infrastructure company Gulf Group to supply 2 million tonnes a year of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with deliveries starting in 2027.

  The multi-year sale and purchase agreement (SPA), whose exact duration Adnoc did not disclose, builds on an initial LNG supply deal agreed between the two companies last year. The transaction was arranged through Adnoc’s integrated LNG marketing and trading platform, which was established in July within Abu Dhabi Global Market.

  The hub integrates the marketing operations of Adnoc subsidiaries Adnoc Gas and XRG with the trading activities of Adnoc Trading. It targets a combined portfolio of 47 million t/y of marketable LNG by 2035. Adnoc Trading has developed an active third-party trading portfolio over the past four years, operating from commercial offices in Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Geneva.

  ALSO READ: Adnoc signs energy agreements with Japan and South Korea

  Separately, Adnoc has secured offtake commitments covering approximately 90% of the 9.6 million-t/y capacity planned for its low-carbon Ruwais LNG project.

  In July, Adnoc signed a 15-year SPA with Japan’s Inpex Corporation for the supply of up to 1 million t/y from Ruwais. That contract marked Adnoc’s third long-term Ruwais supply agreement with a Japanese buyer, following deals with Osaka Gas and Mitsui & Co in March and April 2025, respectively. Together, the agreements with the three Japanese firms account for 2.4 million t/y – one-quarter of the terminal’s total capacity, which will be delivered across two 4.8 million-t/y liquefaction trains.

  Adnoc has also secured long-term Ruwais LNG supply agreements with Malaysia’s Petronas, Germany’s EnBW Energie Baden-Wurttemberg and SEFE (Securing Energy for Europe), China’s ENN Natural Gas, UK-based Shell and Indian Oil Corporation.

  Currently under construction in Ruwais Industrial City, Abu Dhabi, the facility is scheduled to begin commercial operations in 2028. Its commissioning will more than double Adnoc’s LNG production capacity to approximately 15 million t/y.

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  Indrajit Sen