Gaza conflict tests UAE-Israel ties
13 June 2024

The stance of the UAE towards Israel has cooled dramatically in the past eight months amid the conflict in Gaza, which is proving to be a major test of the partnership built between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv.
From boasting of warm and open trade dealings, the UAE has gone quiet on its business deals with Israeli partners, while on a political and diplomatic level the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza has increasingly drawn condemnatory statements from UAE officials.
It is a twist in developments that neither country could have foreseen, as nor indeed had Saudi Arabia, which was nearing its own normalisation agreement with Israel. It has also taken a bilateral strategic partnership that was long in the making into uncertain territory.
Long-term partnership
The 2020 Abraham Accords that normalised relations between the UAE and Israel came at the tail end of at least a decade’s worth of interaction between the two countries. The agreement emerged first and foremost as a set of shared strategic interests in opposition to regional threats in the early 2010s.
In a very tangible interaction in 2016, pilots from the UAE and Israel for the first time participated together in aerial combat training exercises hosted by the United States Air Force (USAF) in Nevada.
The UAE’s relationship with Israel also intersects with its relationship with the US, including its hope of securing access to advanced US military technology and assets, such as the F-35 Stealth Fighter Jet.
In September 2020, UAE foreign ministry spokesperson Hend Al-Otaiba stated that a request for the F-35 had been made six years previously, and that, “given that the UAE intends to be a partner to Israel, and already has a deep strategic partnership with the US, we are hopeful the request will be granted”.
While the sale of the F-35 by the US to the UAE has yet to materialise, relations between the UAE and Israel have nonetheless thrived on their own since the accords, on the basis of ongoing shared security interests and the opportunities for business, trade and investment between the two countries.
Since 2020, the value of trade between the UAE and Israel has swollen to about $3bn annually, and defence ties have only strengthened. In 2022, Israel supplied the UAE with air defence systems following long-range attacks on the UAE's oil infrastructure by the Iran-aligned Houthi movement in Yemen.
Israel-Palestine problems
It was as early as June 2023, however, that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken first warned that rising tensions in Palestine and Israel’s actions in the West Bank could imperil the process of normalisation.
With the advent of the war in Gaza, those fears of a damaging escalation in tensions have been realised.
As the conflict erupted in October, the UAE kept its distance and restricted itself to only the most limited commentary, condemning the “serious and grave escalation” by Hamas-led militants while calling for the full protection of all civilians under international humanitarian law.
By November, as the violence in Gaza ratcheted up, Abu Dhabi similarly affirmed its commitment to the accords even as individual UAE officials publicly condemned Israel’s actions and called for an end to the violence, pushing for a ceasefire, humanitarian aid and the release of hostages.
Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to the president, labelled the conflict a “profound setback” for the region, and stressed that the tragic course of events should lead to a political re-engagement on the issues of realising a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as its capital.
The close working relationship between the UAE and Israel nevertheless continued, as evidenced by Israel’s acquiescence to Abu Dhabi’s humanitarian efforts in Gaza, which have included the UAE setting up a field hospital and performing aerial aid drops in the territory.
The long grind of the conflict and the increasing inflexibility and intransigence on ceasefire negotiations by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have nevertheless steadily eroded this early good will.
While in early January, Gargash affirmed that the normalisation agreement was “a strategic decision, and strategic decisions are long-term”, by late January, senior UAE officials were ringing alarm bells.
Four months on, speaking at the Arab Media Forum in Dubai in late May, Gargash lambasted the conflict in Gaza as having taken on “brutal and inhuman dimensions”, stating that the “heinous attack in Gaza and Rafah cannot be overlooked” – a far more critical tone than his earlier conciliatory speech.
Unreliable partner
On the international stage, the disinclination of the Israeli government to listen to any of its key allies or partners has been trying for all, including the US. For Israel’s normalised partners in the Middle East, the conflict has underscored the tension between the Abraham Accords and underlying regional sentiments.
The UAE’s own founding father, Sheikh Zayed, was an ardent personal supporter of the Palestinian cause, and under his watch, the UAE was one of the first states to recognise Palestine as an independent state.
In the present, the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza is drawing the competing influences of the UAE’s contemporary strategic interests and underlying sympathy for the Palestinian people into stark relief, and it is having a chilling effect on relations.
Public announcements in the UAE of deals with Israeli companies, which abounded before the conflict, have evaporated, and at least one very public deal has been put on hold amid the uncertainty.
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) had been due to take a $2bn stake, alongside the UK’s BP, in Israeli gas producer NewMed, which holds 45% of Israel’s Leviathan offshore gas field.
In mid-May, Netanyahu suggested that the UAE could be involved in the governance of Gaza – drawing a swift rejection from UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, who stated: “The UAE refuses to be drawn into any plan aimed at providing cover for the Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip.”
The episode was a stark demonstration of the breakdown in communication and diplomatic alignment between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, and it joins a wider pattern of reports that UAE officials are already looking beyond Netanyahu and cultivating relations with his potential successors.
On 5 June, the UAE’s foreign minister again condemned the Israeli government after it allowed the divisive annual ‘Flag March’ of Israeli settlers through Jerusalem’s old city, as well as settler activism in the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, despite the extraordinarily heightened tensions over Gaza.
For UAE-Israel ties to thrive, Abu Dhabi needs a government partner in Tel Aviv that it can work with on a productive basis to safeguard interests between the two countries while avoiding diplomatic affronts.
Unfortunately for the UAE, the current Israeli government – with the far-right ministers that Netanyahu has brought into the cabinet – has had a habit of proving itself to be the very antithesis of such a partner.
Looking ahead, it could be a long road for UAE-Israel ties to return to resembling their halcyon state of 2021-22, and it will take a government in Israel under someone other than Netanyahu to get there.
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Iran war erodes LNG’s image of reliability9 March 2026
Commentary
Wil Crisp
Oil & gas reporterThe 28 February attack by the US and Israel on Iran, and the chaotic conflict that has ensued, has dramatically eroded the image of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a stable and reliable source of energy, removing around 20% of global LNG supply from the market.
Within the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region, disruption to LNG production and distribution has left countries including Egypt and Kuwait with serious concerns over energy supplies.
Beyond the Mena region, major economies in Europe and Asia are also badly impacted by an absence of shipments from Qatar, one of the world’s biggest LNG producers, which stopped production of LNG on 2 March due to military attacks on several facilities.
Qatar subsequently declared force majeure on 4 March, helping to push benchmark gas prices to multi-year highs. The Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) rose by more than 80%, hitting its highest levels since fuel markets spiked following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while Asian LNG spot prices also hit three-year highs.
The latest wave of turmoil for countries that are reliant on LNG has undermined the image of the fuel as a flexible and reliable source of energy, which was widely regarded as one of its key advantages.
When Kuwait signed its 15-year LNG supply contract deal with Qatar in 2020, Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi, the president and chief executive of Qatar Petroleum, said: “We are confident that the exceptional reliability of our LNG supplies will provide KPC [Kuwait Petroleum Corporation] with the required flexibility and supply security to fuel the State of Kuwait’s impressive growth.”
Similarly, in Egypt last year, when Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouli made an announcement about bringing a third floating LNG import terminal online, an official government statement said that the terminals would be “ensuring stable energy for households and industry”.
The latest crisis has highlighted that, in some ways, the LNG market can be even more dramatically disrupted by geopolitical issues than the oil market.
Unlike the oil market, where producers such as Saudi Arabia maintain spare capacity and US shale producers quickly ramp up production if prices move higher, LNG facilities typically operate close to full capacity, leaving few options to boost production if other producers go offline.
On top of this, compared to the oil market, much more of the production relies on a relatively small number of producers and transport routes.
Kuwait’s gas crunch
In recent years, Kuwait has invested billions of dollars in an energy strategy that has made it structurally reliant LNG imports, and the centerpiece of the country’s LNG infrastructure is its $2.9bn Al-Zour import terminal, which was brought online in July 2021.
It is the country’s first permanent facility to import LNG and has allowed the country to take delivery of large volumes of gas.
Between March 2025 and February 2026, Kuwait imported 7,352 kilotonnes (kt) of LNG, making it the second-biggest importer in the Mena region after Egypt, according to data recorded by the market analytics company Energy Aspects.
The vast majority of Kuwait’s imports came from Qatar, with significant additional volumes also coming from Oman and Nigeria.
Now, as a result of fallout from the Iran war, Kuwait is going to face serious issues surrounding gas imports, at least in the short term.
With the Qatari LNG export facilities offline, the Al-Zour facility can’t receive shipments from Qatar, and due to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, ships cannot reach Kuwait’s import terminal from Oman or Nigeria.
The gas shortage in Kuwait is also likely to be exacerbated by Kuwait cutting oil production due to an inability to export crude via the Strait of Hormuz.
On 7 March, state-owned KPC said it had implemented a precautionary reduction in crude oil production due to “threats against safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz”.
Shutting in production at oil fields will mean that the country will not be able to gather as much associated gas that is produced alongside the crude oil and feeds some domestic power stations.
Just how severe the consequences of Kuwait’s gas crunch will be remains to be seen.
Several of Kuwait’s gas power plants have been designed to be able to run on fuel oil in emergencies, so it is possible that the country will be able avoid widespread blackouts.
When these powers stations are switched to oil they are usually less efficient and have more maintenance issues.
Last summer, even without a major gas shortage, the country was forced to resort to rolling power cuts across some regions due to high electricity demand and insufficient generating capacity.
Egypt uncertainty
Egypt, the Mena region’s biggest LNG importer, is also going to face uncertainty over its LNG supplies in coming months.
Between March 2025 and February 2026, Egypt imported 9,440kt of LNG, but unlike Kuwait, the majority of its imports are purchased through more short-term agreements, mainly with third parties like trading houses.
Last year, it was reported that Egypt had signed deals for around 150 cargoes through to the summer of 2026.
While much of Egypt’s LNG is likely to come from the US, and won’t be directly impacted by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the recent surge in LNG prices could mean that the North African country will struggle to afford shipments.
Slava Kiryushin, an international oil and gas lawyer and a partner at the London-headquartered law firm HFW, says that the imports Egypt has already signed contracts for will only provide a partial buffer to the new higher price environment.
“While having existing deals in place is likely to help to mitigate Egypt’s exposure to the recent surge in LNG prices, it is unlikely that these deals will cover all of the country’s gas demand.
“Because of this, Egypt is likely to need to buy volumes on the spot market, where it will face much higher payments.”
Exacerbating the need for increased LNG imports, on 28 February Israel shut down production from its offshore gas fields due to security concerns, cutting pipeline exports to Egypt.
Prior to the fields being taken offline, Egypt was importing about 1.1 billion cubic feet a day (bcf/d) from the Tamar and Leviathan fields.
On 4 March, addressing concerns about energy supplies in the country, Madbouly said that Egypt had just concluded “several contracts” to procure gas shipments at “preferential prices” in cooperation with a range of countries and international companies.
However, he did not provide details about exact pricing of the deals.
Qatar deal
On top of the LNG deals Egypt has with trading houses, in January, Egypt signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Qatar related to 2026 LNG imports.
The preliminary deal included plans for 24 LNG deliveries through the summer of this year, when energy demand typically peaks.
Now, the shuttering of Qatar’s export terminals and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz is casting a shadow over the deal and there is increased uncertainty over whether these deliveries will be executed.
Egyptian chemicals
As well as impacting power generation in Egypt, the higher gas prices are also likely to cause problems for Egypt’s petrochemicals sector, where natural gas is used as a feed stock.
In June last year, when Israel cut gas flows to Egypt after strikes on Iran, several major urea producers in Egypt were forced to stop production.
Misr Fertilizers Production Company (Mopco) is one of the companies that could feel the brunt of the gas shortage.
It is Egypt’s largest producer of nitrogen-based fertilisers and, in November last year, said that it was planning to invest $200m-$250m in 2026 and 2027, increasing its production capacity in the country.
Jordan and Bahrain
Jordan and Bahrain are also likely to be exposed to the surge in global LNG prices. They each respectively imported 665.7kt and 641.2kt of LNG between March 2025 and February 2026.
Both countries have recently invested in their capacity to import LNG, and were anticipating ramping up imports prior to the latest spike in international prices.
In April last year, Bahrain LNG Import Terminal (BLNG) received its first delivery of LNG since the terminal was officially commissioned in 2019. And, amid plans to boost imports to meet domestic demand, Spain-headquartered Noatum was awarded a five-year contract by state-owned Bapco Upstream in November to run marine services at the facility.
In Jordan, a new floating LNG import terminal (FSRU) arrived at the country’s Aqaba port in August 2025.
At the time, Sufian Batayneh, the general director of the country’s National Electric Power Company (Nepco), said that the terminal would benefit the region by providing LNG to operate Jordan’s power plants, as well as allowing the shipments of gas via pipeline to Egypt.
Now, with the global price of LNG at multi-year highs, it seems possible that both Jordan and Bahrain will have to choose between paying significantly higher prices for imports or scaling back their plans for increased deliveries.
Ongoing vulnerabilities
The latest disruption to the LNG markets has highlighted vulnerabilities to the global LNG supply chain and has undermined the image of stability that was previously seen a key reason why many countries have been making it a central pillar of their energy strategies.
Just how bad the economic damage will be for the Mena nations that are reliant on LNG imports will largely depend on how long it takes to bring Qatar’s export facilities back online and effectively reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
If the current disruption to the global LNG market does persist for an extended period of time and significant damage is done to economies like Kuwait and Egypt, other countries in the region may well think twice before committing to the development of LNG import infrastructure as a central part of their energy strategy.
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Oil companies evacuate staff from Iraq9 March 2026
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Several international companies working in Iraq’s oil sector have evacuated foreign personnel from the south of the country amid rising concerns about reduced security due to the US and Israel’s ongoing war with Iran.
Companies that have evacuated employees include the US-based service companies Halliburton, KBR and SLB, according to reports by local news services.
Iraq’s oil production has dropped by nearly 60% as closure of key export routes has forced the country to stop production at key fields.
Production currently stands at about 1.3 million barrels a day (b/d), down from around 3.3 million b/d before the outbreak of the war, according to Kazem Abdul Hassan Karim, the assistant director general at the department of fields and licensing affairs at the Iraqi Oil Ministry.
He also said that a drone attack involving two unmanned aircraft targeted the Burjesia oil area southwest of Basra Province and caused material damage to warehouses belonging to a foreign logistics services company.
The attack did not cause direct damage to oil facilities or production fields, according to Karim.
Authorities in northern Iraq’s Kurdish region also said on 6 March that production had been stopped at an oil field operated by HKN Energy in the Sarsang area of Duhok Province after a drone attack.
Amid growing concerns about disruption to oil production and exports due to the Iran war, global crude prices passed $100 a barrel for the first time in nearly four years.
Brent crude, the international benchmark, jumped 26.3% to $117.08 a barrel on 7 March, the first time market prices have soared above the $100 threshold since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
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Kuwait cuts oil production due to Iran conflict9 March 2026
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State-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) has started reducing crude oil production and refining throughput, according to a statement.
It said that it declared force majeure “in light of the ongoing aggression by Iran against the State of Kuwait, including Iranian threats against safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz”.
Force majeure, a French term meaning “superior force”, is a clause included in many international commercial contracts. It allows companies to suspend contractual obligations when extraordinary events happen that are beyond their control.
KPC said the reduction in production and refining is precautionary and will be reviewed as the situation develops.
It said: “The corporation remains fully prepared to restore production levels once conditions allow. KPC stresses that all domestic market needs remain fully secured, in accordance with established plans.”
The company also stated that it remains committed to prioritising employee safety, safeguarding Kuwait's national assets and promoting stability within global energy markets.
Amid growing concerns about disruption to oil production and exports due to the Iran war, crude prices passed $100 a barrel for the first time in nearly four years.
Brent crude, the international benchmark, jumped 26.3% to $117.08 a barrel on 7 March, the first time market prices have soared above the $100 threshold since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
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Qatar starts prequalification for salt production project9 March 2026

Qatar Petrochemical Company (Qapco) has started the prequalification process for the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) of a project to build a salt production plant in Qatar.
Qapco is an 80:20 joint venture of Industries Qatar and France’s TotalEnergies. QatarEnergy, in turn, owns the majority 51% stake in Industries Qatar.
Qapco has undertaken the salt production project jointly with Qatar Salt Products Company (QSalt). It has set a deadline of 9 March for contractors to express interest in participating in the prequalification round, and 15 April for the submission of prequalification documents.
MEED understands the salt production project by Qapco and QSalt is the same facility QatarEnergy that had previously been planning to build in the Um Al-Houl area of Qatar.
QatarEnergy launched the Umm Al-Houl salt production project in September 2024. At the time, it also announced the signing of a tripartite memorandum of understanding between its subsidiary Mesaieed Petrochemical Holding Company (MPHC), Qatar Industrial Manufacturing Company (QIMC) and Turkiye’s Atlas Yatirim Planlama, to create QSalt.
The project, which was estimated to cost $275m, was to be built by the newly created QSalt.
MPHC is the largest shareholder in QSalt with a 40% stake, while QIMC and Atlas Yatirim Planlama each hold 30% stakes, QatarEnergy said in a statement on 23 September 2024.
Upon completion of the salt production plant in Um Al-Houl, QatarEnergy subsidiary Qatar Petrochemical Company (Qapco) and MPHC subsidiary Qatar Vinyl Company (QVC) were to operate the facility.
MPHC, in which QatarEnergy holds the majority 57.85% stake, owns a 55.2% stake in QVC.
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The new plant in Um Al-Houl was planned to produce industrial salts essential for the petrochemicals industry, along with bromine, potassium chlorides and demineralised water, which were to be produced at a later stage, “contributing to product diversification and economic growth”, QatarEnergy said previously.
The plant was planned to have a production capacity of 1 million tonnes a year. It would have significantly reduced Qatar’s “reliance on imported raw materials, addressing the current import of approximately 850,000 tonnes of table and industrial salts annually”.
The facility was designed to utilise wastewater from reverse osmosis desalination units, transforming waste from desalination processes into a valuable resource.
QSalt, the new joint-venture company, and the planned industrial salts project were to receive support from QatarEnergy’s Tawteen localisation programme, the state energy enterprise said previously.
QatarEnergy started a tendering exercise for front-end engineering and design (feed) for the proposed salt production plant project last year.
Contractors had submitted proposals to QatarEnergy for feed works on the project by 29 May, MEED previously reported.
However, following the submission of feed proposals, there was no communication from the project operator to bidders for months. QatarEnergy eventually communicated its decision to cancel the tendering process to bidders in October, MEED previously reported.
The floating of the prequalification notice by Qapco and QSalt for the EPC tendering phase of the salt production plant marks a revival of the project.
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Executive briefing: US-Israel-Iran conflict6 March 2026
In this executive briefing, Ed James and Colin Foreman from MEED outline the key developments in the US-Israel-Iran conflict and examine the potential economic, infrastructure and market impacts across the Middle East.
Drawing on regional data and analysis, the briefing explores the drivers behind the escalation, the scale of attacks across GCC states, and the possible short- and long-term implications for energy markets, shipping, aviation and regional investment.
For ongoing updates and verified reporting as events unfold, follow MEED’s mega thread here.
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