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Gaza conflict reignites violence in Syria

4 June 2024

 

Since fighting began in the Gaza war in October, Syria’s civil war has been pushed even further down the regional agenda, threatening to turn a largely frozen conflict into a forgotten one.

The intensity of the fighting, which entered its 14th year in March, has atrophied into a near stalemate in recent years, with the regime of President Bashar Al Assad controlling around 70% of the country, while a medley of rebel groups, Turkish forces and Kurdish and Arab militias hold a patchwork of territories across the north and east.

However, the battle between Israel and Hamas has threatened to reignite the Syrian war in new ways.

Assad has been doing his best to avoid getting involved in any regional escalation, but that has not always been easy, with the Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus on 1 April, in particular, raising the risk of Syria becoming a battleground.

Over the past decade, there have been numerous Israeli attacks in Syria against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp’s Al Quds force as well as Tehran-backed militias, but the rate of attacks has increased since the Gaza war broke out.

Expanding violence

In March, the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued a report which said the country has been suffering the worst wave of violence since 2020. “Since October, Syria has seen the largest escalation in fighting in four years,” said commission chairman Paulo Pinheiro at the time. “Syria … desperately needs a ceasefire.”

That analysis has been backed up by the US-based Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, which recorded 201 incidents linked to Israeli attacks in Syria involving 236 deaths between October 2023 and March 2024, the highest number since it began tracking the civil war in 2017.

Assad has several reasons to want to avoid being drawn further into conflict with Israel, not least that his own forces are stretched and weakened after years of fighting.

Damascus has also not forgotten that Hamas broke ties with Assad during the Arab Spring, with the Palestinian group’s leader, Khaled Mashal, leaving Damascus in early 2012. Relations were only restored a decade later, when a Hamas delegation travelled to the Syrian capital, but they remain strained.

In contrast to the threat of escalation as a result of Gaza, the Syrian civil war itself has been largely stagnant since 2020, when Damascus abandoned its attempt to recapture the Idlib governorate in the northwest. Since then, the frontlines have stayed largely the same, but the country is far from being at peace and there is the constant threat of fresh fighting breaking out.

In October last year, a drone strike on a military graduation ceremony in the government-controlled city of Homs killed 80 people and wounded 240. In response, government forces launched an offensive against groups in the northwestern Idlib province, where Tahrir Al Sham (a militant group that emerged in 2017 out of several others) and the Turkish-backed National Liberation Front have their strongholds.

In April this year, suspected members of the Islamic State group killed 22 pro-government fighters of the Quds Brigade near the town of Sukhna in central Syria. There were similar attacks the following month.

Diplomatic overtures

Regional powers, including some in the Gulf, have urged Syria to resist being drawn into the Gaza conflict. Relations between Damascus and several Gulf capitals have been improving over the past few years, although the momentum behind that process appears to be slowing down.

Assad was in Bahrain in mid-May to attend the Arab Summit – the second such gathering he has been at since Syria was re-admitted to the organisation in 2023 following a diplomatic push by Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Among the other signs of diplomatic re-engagement, the UAE’s ambassador to Syria, Hassan Ahmed Al Shehi, took up his post in February, and in late May, Saudi Arabia named Faisal Al Mujfel its ambassador to Damascus – its first senior envoy there for 12 years.

The diplomatic outreach by the Gulf countries is motivated in large part by a desire to put pressure on Damascus to restrict the flow of the illegal drug Captagon into their markets, but there has been little sign to date that the Assad regime is willing to end that trade – which, by some measures, is now the largest part of the Syrian economy.

There are problems with other regional powers too, not least Turkey, which maintains control over two areas of northern Syria along their common border, from where it is trying to neutralise the threat of the People’s Defence Units (YPG), the Kurdish group at the core of the Syrian Democratic Forces now in control of some 20-25% of Syrian territory in the northeast of the country. Ankara views the YPG as a terrorist group due to its association with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is banned in Turkey.

“What Damascus wants of Turkey is a full withdrawal; Turkey leaving and moving all its troops from Syria,” said Dareen Khalifa, senior adviser for dialogue promotion at the International Crisis Group, at the same Chatham House event.

“What Turkey wants of Damascus is preventing a new wave of refugees, crushing the Kurdish-led YPG forces and so on. It wants things from Damascus that Damascus can’t really deliver on. So, I think that deadlock is going to continue.”

That looks to be true of the wider civil war, too, with little sign that the Assad regime or the various rebel groups have the ability to force significant changes on the ground.

Less clear is how the situation in Gaza, and the associated Israeli attacks and provocation against Iranian groups on Syrian soil, could yet affect the ongoing conflict in Syria in less predictable ways.

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Dominic Dudley

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    The past 12 months have tested whether a technocratic Jordanian government installed to address the country’s creeping fiscal crisis can hold the line while the region around it convulses.

    On that narrow measure, it has largely succeeded, though more by adhering to an inherited programme than by breaking new ground. The question of whether Amman can move beyond budget discipline into structural reform remains open.

    The most consequential developments of the past year have spoken more to Jordan’s dependence on external capital than to any decisive shift in domestic policy.

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    When King Abdullah II appointed Jafar Hassan prime minister in September 2024, he installed a figure who had served as his chief of staff and, earlier, as deputy prime minister for economic affairs, with a specific brief to cut public debt. The choice put fiscal credibility in the chair.

    Hassan inherited a wide fiscal gap. The overall government deficit stood at 7.3% of GDP in 2024, with gross public debt at 82% of GDP and the IMF programme targeting a reduction below 80% by 2028. Growth came in at 2.6% in 2024 and is projected at 2.7% in both 2025 and 2026 – providing little support to consolidation efforts.

    The deficit is narrowing – the IMF projects 6.3% of GDP in 2025 and 5.4% in 2026 – on the back of concrete revenue measures: higher taxes on electric vehicles and e-cigarettes, the deferral of a planned customs-tariff cut, and the collection of tax arrears. Losses at the National Electric Power Company (Nepco), the state-owned single buyer, were held to 1.1% of GDP in 2024, against an expected 1.3%.

    Much of that 2024 performance, though, preceded Hassan’s September appointment, and the consolidation is, in that sense, the programme’s trajectory rather than a break attributable to the new government. A March 2026 directive curbing government vehicle use and freezing official foreign travel – tightened as the regional conflict strained the budget and extended through year-end – speaks to the active restraint being applied.

    The discipline is real, but it is the plumbing of the public finances – revenue, tariffs, arrears, loss containment – not the structural reform of the economy.

    The harder reforms

    The reforms that would lift growth and create jobs have gone virtually untouched. Labour market flexibility, stronger competition, and higher female and youth participation have recurred as priorities through successive IMF reviews but have run up against public-sector privilege and entrenched interests.

    The resulting stagnation shows in the numbers. Growth, projected at 2.7% through 2026, sits well short of what the Economic Modernisation Vision demands: a doubling of GDP by 2033 – implying sustained growth at roughly twice the current rate – in order to create one million jobs.

    The labour market is where the failure is sharpest, and where a narrower deficit changes nothing. Unemployment among Jordanians fell to 21.2% in the fourth quarter of 2025, the lowest since early 2020, but barely changed from 21.4% the previous quarter.

    Within that is a widening gender split: male unemployment fell a full point year on year to 17.2%, while among Jordanian women it rose to 34.8%, up 2.6 points. The modernisation plan promises the opposite – a doubling of female labour force participation from 14% to 28% by 2033, from a base among the lowest in the world.

    The distance between that participation target and the worsening female jobless rate illustrates how far the structural agenda still has to travel.

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    With domestic reform slow, Amman leans on external capital to meet its infrastructure needs and stimulate the economy – though even that is faltering. Foreign direct investment ran at $1.3bn in the first three quarters of 2024, or 3.3% of GDP, down from $1.6bn a year earlier, and eased further through 2025.

    The most strategically significant deal of 2026 binds Jordan to a bet on regional logistics: the April signing with the UAE of a $2.3bn agreement to build the 360-kilometre Aqaba Port Railway, structured as a 50/50 joint venture.

    The rail project was first signed in September 2024 and sits within a broader $5.5bn investment framework agreed in 2023. MEED understands that the first-section construction contract is now being finalised and second-section bids are under evaluation, with financial close expected in early 2027.

    The Jordanian half is held by the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, Arab Potash, the Government Investments Management Company and the Social Security Investment Fund. On the UAE side are Abu Dhabi sovereign investment platform L’Imad Holding, with Etihad Rail as the venture’s executing arm.

    The line will carry around 16 million tonnes of freight a year – some 13 million tonnes of phosphate and 2.6 million tonnes of potash – from the mines at Shidiya and Ghor Al-Safi to Aqaba’s terminals.

    The corridor is designed to extend north from Aqaba toward Amman, Syria and Turkey, and south to Saudi Arabia, positioning Aqaba – Jordan’s sole port – as a Red Sea logistics node at a time of acute concern over supply-chain chokepoints.

    For the UAE, the northward reach is the point. Abu Dhabi has moved over the past year to control Syria’s Mediterranean coast – DP World took a 30-year, $800m concession at Tartus; AD Ports took a stake in the container terminal at Latakia – and a rail line running from the Red Sea towards the Syrian border would knit those positions into a corridor from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. For Jordan, it is inward investment, lower export costs and a potential jobs source.

    Dependence on external finance is a standing caveat, however. Jordanian projects have stalled at this stage before, conflict or no conflict: the estimated $2.6bn expansion of the refinery at Zarqa, 25 kilometres northeast of the capital, has been stuck over financing since bids were received in 2021.

    The planned National Water Carrier desalination scheme – targeting financial close in July 2026 at a capital cost estimated at $4.3bn – is the bellwether to watch. If that moves on timeline or terms, the rail scheme may well follow.

    Near-term outlook

    The next two years point to continued consolidation under the IMF programme, Gulf-backed infrastructure edging towards financial close and growth holding near 3% at best.

    Hassan’s test will be to not simply hold the line his predecessors had already drawn, but to advance the structural reforms – labour market flexibility, competition, female participation – that carry a political price and that consolidation cannot substitute for.

    Those reforms have stalled for a decade under governments with more room than this one. Whether Hassan’s administration can deliver what its better-placed predecessors did not is the question that will decide whether the headline growth rate ever moves.

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