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Foreign policy issues cloud Bahrain’s horizon

8 November 2023

MEED’s December 2023 special report on Bahrain also includes: 

> Bahrain waits for major infrastructure projects
> Bahrain takes renewables strides
> Bahrain charts pathway to net-zero future
> Bahrain banks have cause for cheer

 

Bahrain’s Sheikh Khalid bin Hamad al-Khalifa, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council for Youth & Sports and head of the Bahrain Olympic Committee, flew into Doha on 28 October to watch his compatriots take on Japan in the final of the Asian Men’s Handball Qualification Tournament for the 2024 Paris Olympics.

Sheikh Khalid was welcomed on arrival by Qatar's Sheikh Thani bin Hamad al-Thani in what was another sign of the ongoing process of rapprochement between the two countries, following the 2017-21 boycott of Qatar by Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

The rebuilding of the bilateral relationship has been a slow process. Indeed, Bahraini officials complained on several occasions in 2022 that Qatar had repeatedly declined to take up its offer of talks.

However, the process picked up momentum in early 2023, with several meetings at the headquarters of the Gulf Co-operation Council in Riyadh. In mid-April, the two sides agreed to restore full diplomatic relations, although they have yet to reopen embassies or appoint new ambassadors.

Regional tensions

Other foreign policy issues are causing greater diplomatic headaches these days. As one of the two Gulf countries to sign normalisation deals with Israel, Bahrain has found itself in a difficult position in light of the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October and the subsequent heavy bombardment of Gaza by Israeli forces.

That issue rose to the fore on 2 November, when the Council of Representatives issued a statement saying the Israeli and Bahraini ambassadors to each other’s country had returned home and there had been a “cessation of economic relations”.

This was initially taken by many commentators to mean that diplomatic relations had been broken off, but the reality appears to be a suspension rather than a formal severance of ties. The Bahrain government subsequently issued a statement confirming its ambassador to Tel Aviv had returned home “some time ago” and the Israeli ambassador to Manama had also left. There had been protests outside the embassy since the Hamas-Israel war began.

In addition, direct flights between Bahrain International airport and Tel Aviv airport “stopped as of several weeks ago”, Manama said.

However, the statement made no mention of diplomatic relations being cut. The Israeli government meanwhile said that bilateral relations were “stable”.

However, there is clear potential for the war to escalate and the Bahrain-Israel relationship to worsen. Speaking at the 10th emergency special session of the UN General Assembly on 1 November, Bahrain’s ambassador to the UN, Jamal Fares al-Ruwaei, warned about the risks that Israel’s bombing of Gaza could radicalise a new generation. “Such scenes of death and destruction can create entire generations filled with accumulated anger and thirst for vengeance,” he said.

The authorities in Manama will be watching closely in case future protests against Israeli actions include explicit challenges to the Bahrain regime itself.

Economic headwinds

On the economic front there have also been challenges. Italian energy major Eni recently pulled out of the offshore Block 1 licence it secured in May 2019. An exploratory well was drilled on the block in mid-2021.

Bahrain has also yet to make any significant progress on the Khaleej al-Bahrain offshore field, which was discovered in April 2018.

In a more positive development, a $7bn upgrade of the Bapco refinery is due to enable a ramp-up of production to about 380,000 barrels a day by mid-2024, which should bolster government revenues, though there have been some reports of delays.

Bahrain’s headline real GDP growth estimate for 2023 has meanwhile been curbed to 2.7 per cent in the latest update from the Washington-based IMF, down from an estimate of 3 per cent in April. This is down from an estimated 4.9 per cent growth in 2023 and comes amid an extension of Opec+ oil production cuts. Real GDP is forecast to rise back to 3.6 per cent in 2024.

Although high oil prices have bolstered the country’s fiscal position over the past two years, the government has also had to continue trimming public spending to bring its budget closer to balance. In 2023, Bahrain is running an estimated fiscal deficit of 5 per cent of GDP.

Capital Intelligence sovereign analyst, Dina Ennab, predicts the budget deficit will fall to 5 per cent of GDP in 2023, compared to 6.1 per cent in 2022. It could fall further, to 3.6 per cent of GDP by 2025, “provided the government continues to contain public spending and improves revenue mobilisation”, she wrote in a mid-October ratings review.

This is still a far larger deficit than the government has been aiming for. In early June, the government issued its two-year budget for 2023-24 and said it was targeting a deficit of less than 1 per cent of GDP in 2024.

Under the Fiscal Balance Programme launched in 2018, the government had initially aimed to balance its books by 2022, but the year before that deadline – and amid the Covid-19 pandemic and lower oil revenues in 2021 – it pushed the target date back to 2024.

The government’s forecast revenues of BD3.1bn ($8.2bn) in 2023 and BD3.5bn in 2024 are based on a conservative target of oil prices averaging $60 a barrel. The IMF estimates that the country will need an oil price of $108.3 a barrel to balance its budget this year, falling to $96.9 a barrel in 2024 – both figures are by far the highest in the GCC.

Should instability spread around the region, there could be the sort of spike in oil prices that would, in theory, bring the budget into balance, but the wider geopolitical and macroeconomic consequences would almost certainly be broadly negative for Bahrain and neighbouring countries.

Image: Sheikh Khalid bin Hamad attends Olympiad qualifier in Doha. Credit: Bahrain News Agency

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Dominic Dudley

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    In 2023, power generation projects accounted for an estimated 79% of total contract awards, with T&D projects accounting for the rest.

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    A developer consortium comprising the UAE-based Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (Taqa), Japan’s Jera Company and the local Albawani Company successfully bid for the contracts to develop and operate the Rumah 2 and Nairiyah 2 IPPs. Meanwhile, Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), Riyadh-based utility developer Acwa Power and South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco) won the contracts to develop and operate the similarly configured Rumah 1 and Nairiyah 1 IPPs.

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    The UAE, meanwhile, has awarded three key power contracts this year, including for the Al-Ajban solar IPP, which was won by a team of France’s EDF and South Korea’s Korea Western Power Company (Kowepo), and for the Dhafra waste-to-energy project, which a team of Japan’s Marubeni Corporation, Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation and Zurich-headquartered Hitachi Zosen Inova is developing.

    Dubai Electricity & Water Authority (Dewa) is also understood to have awarded the contract to complete the Jebel Ali K-Station to Egypt-based Power Generation Engineering & Services Company.

    2025 outlook

    The Mena power projects pipeline remains robust, with over $45bn-worth of contracts under bid evaluation and another $50bn in the prequalification stage as of late 2024, according to MEED Projects.

    Saudi Arabia is likely to remain dominant, particularly if SPPC and the PIF activate a plan by the Energy Ministry to procure 20,000MW of renewable energy capacity annually until it reaches its target for renewables to account for half of its energy production mix by 2030.

    Morocco has the second-largest power projects pipeline thanks to several planned schemes to export clean energy and green hydrogen to Europe. Notably, the tender is under way for the country’s first two solar PV plus battery energy storage system (bess) projects, Noor Midelt 2 and 3.

    Abu Dhabi also maintains a substantial renewables and gas-fired generation project pipeline. It has several upcoming IPPs with a total combined capacity of over 7,000MW, of which more than 6,000MW is in the tendering stage.

    While the procurement process for Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear power plant in Duwaiheen has been delayed, the UAE has plans to procure the next phase of its nuclear power plant project in Barakah.

    Green industrial development in steel and aluminium, as is being undertaken in the UAE, is a driver for ongoing clean energy capacity buildout, notes Karen Young, senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Centre on Global Energy Policy.

    Egypt, Iran, Kuwait and Iraq have the next largest power projects pipelines. The key drivers in each state vary, with populous countries Egypt and Iran seeking to develop integrated green hydrogen hubs and nuclear power capacity, respectively, while Kuwait remains a promising market with extended plans to procure both conventional and renewable energy capacity to address peak demand.

    There are indications that Iraq’s first utility-scale solar PV scheme – a 1GW project being developed by France’s TotalEnergies – will head into the construction stage in the coming months, along with other similar projects for which preliminary agreements were signed by Iraqi authorities in 2021-22.

    Oman is actively pursuing renewable energy capacity, with the state offtaker having tendered the contracts for two wind IPPs in September 2024.

    In Oman and Qatar, the main downstream companies, Petroleum Development Oman and QatarEnergy, are developing renewable energy capacity as a means of mitigating their greenhouse gas emissions, as well as to support their respective government’s net-zero targets.

    In November, Bahrain started the procurement process for its fourth independent water and power project (IWPP) in Sitra, which replaced the previously planned Al-Dur IWPP 3 scheme.

    Other trends

    SEC affiliate National Grid Saudi Arabia has awarded EPC contracts for several bess packages to local firm Algihaz this year. In August, it tendered a contract for the construction of a further 2,500MW of energy storage capacity. 

    In parallel, the procurement process is under way for the first independent bess packages in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, with other utilities expected to follow suit in procuring bess using an IPP model. Bess will boost grid flexibility and spinning reserves in the face of increased renewable energy capacity and demand.

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    She adds that a telephone survey of 1,000 small and medium-sized businesses in Morocco about their perception of the accessibility and affordability of renewable energy yielded surprising results.

    “They strongly suggested a lack of support, given that smaller enterprises continue to see power outages and this has in many cases caused damage to their equipment and abilities to stay open and service customers.

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    The Middle East’s projects market in 2024 has been fuelled by the same heady cocktail of favourable oil prices, continued investment into oil and gas projects, government infrastructure spending, the energy transition, real estate investment and economic diversification that propelled the total value of awards in 2023 to record levels.

    By the end of October 2024, there were $262bn of contract awards across the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region, according to regional projects tracker MEED Projects. By the end of the year, the 2024 total may top the $290bn recorded in 2023. 

    While economic diversification is a priority for governments across the region, oil and gas remains a key sector for project awards. The three largest contract awards in 2024 were from the sector.

    The top-ranked contract by value was a $20bn deal awarded to Iranian companies Petropars, Oil Industries Engineering & Construction, Khatam Al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters and Mapna Group for the South Pars gas field pressure-boosting project in Iran by Pars Oil & Gas Company.

    Next was the $8bn deal won by China’s Hualu Engineering Technology Company for delivering the Al-Faw refinery in Iraq for Southern Refineries Company.

    The third-largest award was a $5.5bn contract won by a joint venture of France’s Technip Energies, Japan’s JGC Corporation and the UAE’s NMDC Group for the Ruwais low-carbon liquefied natural gas terminal project by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc).

    These contract awards mean that the oil and gas sector accounted for 32% of the $262bn total that was recorded in the Mena region by the end of October 2024.

    Breaking down the sector into oil and gas separately reveals a telling trend. Oil accounts for 12% of awards, while gas accounts for 20%. These numbers reflect the growing importance of gas as a transition fuel that is cleaner and more environmentally friendly than oil, but still provides the dependable energy that many renewable alternatives still do not offer. 

    Strong performances

    Construction is the second-largest sector after oil and gas, accounting for 23% of awards. Its significance has dropped in 2024 compared to 2023, when it accounted for 32% of contract awards. 

    In terms of value, there were $68bn of contract awards in 2024 until the end of October. If the same pace is maintained during November and December, the 2024 total is expected to be about $81bn, which falls short of the 2023 total of $97bn. 

    While the total value of contract awards may have dropped, there was the largest construction contract award on record in 2024 – a $4.7bn deal secured by Italian contractor WeBuild for the construction of three dams for the Trojena mountain resort at Saudi Arabia’s Neom gigaproject. 

    The power sector accounted for 18% of the total awards during the period, the largest of which was the $5.3bn contract won by Saudi Arabia’s Alfanar Projects and China Electric Power Equipment & Technology Company for the 7,000MW Saudi Central, Western and Southern Regions high-voltage direct current overhead transmission lines project being developed by Saudi Electricity Company.

    When analysed by country, Saudi Arabia and the UAE dominate the market, and together they account for over 60% of contract awards across the region in 2024 up to the end of October. 

    As the region’s largest economy, it is unsurprising that Saudi Arabia accounts for the largest share, with 38.6%, followed by the UAE, which had 22%. The next most significant country was Iran, which came in a distant third with 8% of contract awards. 

    The outsized contribution of Saudi Arabia and the UAE reflects the relative economic stability found in the GCC compared to other countries in the region that are grappling with the impact of conflict and other associated financial pressures. 

    Looking beyond the contract awards numbers, the biggest project announcement in 2024 came in April, when Abu Dhabi investment vehicle ADQ released details of plans to invest $35bn in Egypt. The plans involve ADQ acquiring the development rights for Ras El-Hekma, a planned new city on Egypt’s northern Mediterranean coast, for $24bn. 

    The development has been billed as having the potential to attract over $150bn in investment.

    In October, ADQ appointed its subsidiary Modon Holding as the master developer for Ras El-Hekma. Modon will act as the master developer for the entire development, which covers more than 170 square kilometres (sq km). 

    Modon will develop the first phase, which covers 50 sq km, and the remaining 120 sq km will delivered with private developers.

    Key partners for delivering the project have already been found. For construction, Modon has signed a framework agreement with Egyptian firm Orascom Construction to serve as the primary contractor for the project’s first phase. 

    Modon also signed a deal with Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (Taqa) for developing, financing and operating greenfield utility infrastructure projects, water desalination projects, electricity transmission and distribution projects and wastewater projects at the Ras El-Hekma development.

    While economic diversification is a priority for governments across the region, oil and gas remains a key sector for project awards

    Future prospects

    Looking ahead, the performance of the projects market in 2025 will depend  on the favourable macroeconomic conditions remaining in the GCC, which if the other four members of the six-nation bloc are added, accounted for nearly 72% of the Mena region’s total contract awards during the first 10 months of 2024. 

    The key metric to watch in 2025 will be the oil price. In mid-November, the price of Brent Crude was $72 a barrel, which is below what many in the region, including Saudi Arabia, require if they are to maintain their project spending plans. 

    The outlook for oil prices is uncertain and after oil producers’ group Opec cut its global demand growth forecasts for both 2024 and 2025 for the fourth time, highlighting economic weakness in China, India and other regions, there are concerns prices will dip in 2025. 

    The election of Donald Trump as US president adds to those concerns. He has promised to “drill, baby, drill”, and a sharp uptick in output from the US could cause oil prices to soften further.

    Trump is also a protectionist and has said ‘tariff’ is his favourite word. Most of his new tariffs are expected to be aimed at China, which could mean that Chinese companies look to other markets that remain open to them, including the Middle East.

    The appeal is clear to see. Chinese contractors already command a dominant position in the region – particularly in North Africa and Iraq – and Chinese companies will find great appeal in affluent markets such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which can offer large-scale project opportunities.

    The other metric that will drive the projects market in 2025 is real estate. In the UAE, much of the ongoing development work is supported by the buoyant property market, particularly in Dubai, which has grown strongly throughout 2024. 

    According to a report by data and analytics company Reidin, property sales in the UAE reached AED46.52bn ($12.7bn) in October 2024, marking a 55% year-on-year increase. Demand also remains robust, with 19,500 transactions recorded in October, reflecting a 72% rise compared to the same period in 2023. 

    Looking ahead to 2025, Reidin says that the outlook remains optimistic as sustained demand, rising property values and steady inventory turnover are all expected to continue driving growth. 

    While the forecast supports a positive outlook for construction in the UAE, those who have seen Dubai’s property market collapse before will be keenly watching the data in 2025.

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