Meed | Foreign policy issues cloud Bahrain’s horizon

Foreign policy issues cloud Bahrain’s horizon

8 November 2023

MEED’s December 2023 special report on Bahrain also includes:

> Bahrain waits for major infrastructure projects
> Bahrain takes renewables strides
> Bahrain charts pathway to net-zero future
> Bahrain banks have cause for cheer

Bahrain’s Sheikh Khalid bin Hamad al-Khalifa, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council for Youth & Sports and head of the Bahrain Olympic Committee, flew into Doha on 28 October to watch his compatriots take on Japan in the final of the Asian Men’s Handball Qualification Tournament for the 2024 Paris Olympics.

Sheikh Khalid was welcomed on arrival by Qatar's Sheikh Thani bin Hamad al-Thani in what was another sign of the ongoing process of rapprochement between the two countries, following the 2017-21 boycott of Qatar by Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

The rebuilding of the bilateral relationship has been a slow process. Indeed, Bahraini officials complained on several occasions in 2022 that Qatar had repeatedly declined to take up its offer of talks.

However, the process picked up momentum in early 2023, with several meetings at the headquarters of the Gulf Co-operation Council in Riyadh. In mid-April, the two sides agreed to restore full diplomatic relations, although they have yet to reopen embassies or appoint new ambassadors.

Regional tensions

Other foreign policy issues are causing greater diplomatic headaches these days. As one of the two Gulf countries to sign normalisation deals with Israel, Bahrain has found itself in a difficult position in light of the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October and the subsequent heavy bombardment of Gaza by Israeli forces.

That issue rose to the fore on 2 November, when the Council of Representatives issued a statement saying the Israeli and Bahraini ambassadors to each other’s country had returned home and there had been a “cessation of economic relations”.

This was initially taken by many commentators to mean that diplomatic relations had been broken off, but the reality appears to be a suspension rather than a formal severance of ties. The Bahrain government subsequently issued a statement confirming its ambassador to Tel Aviv had returned home “some time ago” and the Israeli ambassador to Manama had also left. There had been protests outside the embassy since the Hamas-Israel war began.

In addition, direct flights between Bahrain International airport and Tel Aviv airport “stopped as of several weeks ago”, Manama said.

However, the statement made no mention of diplomatic relations being cut. The Israeli government meanwhile said that bilateral relations were “stable”.

However, there is clear potential for the war to escalate and the Bahrain-Israel relationship to worsen. Speaking at the 10th emergency special session of the UN General Assembly on 1 November, Bahrain’s ambassador to the UN, Jamal Fares al-Ruwaei, warned about the risks that Israel’s bombing of Gaza could radicalise a new generation. “Such scenes of death and destruction can create entire generations filled with accumulated anger and thirst for vengeance,” he said.

The authorities in Manama will be watching closely in case future protests against Israeli actions include explicit challenges to the Bahrain regime itself.

Economic headwinds

On the economic front there have also been challenges. Italian energy major Eni recently pulled out of the offshore Block 1 licence it secured in May 2019. An exploratory well was drilled on the block in mid-2021.

Bahrain has also yet to make any significant progress on the Khaleej al-Bahrain offshore field, which was discovered in April 2018.

In a more positive development, a $7bn upgrade of the Bapco refinery is due to enable a ramp-up of production to about 380,000 barrels a day by mid-2024, which should bolster government revenues, though there have been some reports of delays.

Bahrain’s headline real GDP growth estimate for 2023 has meanwhile been curbed to 2.7 per cent in the latest update from the Washington-based IMF, down from an estimate of 3 per cent in April. This is down from an estimated 4.9 per cent growth in 2023 and comes amid an extension of Opec+ oil production cuts. Real GDP is forecast to rise back to 3.6 per cent in 2024.

Although high oil prices have bolstered the country’s fiscal position over the past two years, the government has also had to continue trimming public spending to bring its budget closer to balance. In 2023, Bahrain is running an estimated fiscal deficit of 5 per cent of GDP.

Capital Intelligence sovereign analyst, Dina Ennab, predicts the budget deficit will fall to 5 per cent of GDP in 2023, compared to 6.1 per cent in 2022. It could fall further, to 3.6 per cent of GDP by 2025, “provided the government continues to contain public spending and improves revenue mobilisation”, she wrote in a mid-October ratings review.

This is still a far larger deficit than the government has been aiming for. In early June, the government issued its two-year budget for 2023-24 and said it was targeting a deficit of less than 1 per cent of GDP in 2024.

Under the Fiscal Balance Programme launched in 2018, the government had initially aimed to balance its books by 2022, but the year before that deadline – and amid the Covid-19 pandemic and lower oil revenues in 2021 – it pushed the target date back to 2024.

The government’s forecast revenues of BD3.1bn ($8.2bn) in 2023 and BD3.5bn in 2024 are based on a conservative target of oil prices averaging $60 a barrel. The IMF estimates that the country will need an oil price of $108.3 a barrel to balance its budget this year, falling to $96.9 a barrel in 2024 – both figures are by far the highest in the GCC.

Should instability spread around the region, there could be the sort of spike in oil prices that would, in theory, bring the budget into balance, but the wider geopolitical and macroeconomic consequences would almost certainly be broadly negative for Bahrain and neighbouring countries.

Image: Sheikh Khalid bin Hamad attends Olympiad qualifier in Doha. Credit: Bahrain News Agency

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Dominic Dudley

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Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026

Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

Yemen dynamics

Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

Strategic independence

The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20435670/main.gif

Dominic Dudley
Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026

Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

Yemen dynamics

Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

Strategic independence

The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20432716/main.gif

Dominic Dudley
Adnoc secures Thailand LNG supply deal
9 October 2026

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) has secured a deal with Thailand-based energy and infrastructure company Gulf Group to supply 2 million tonnes a year of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with deliveries starting in 2027.

The multi-year sale and purchase agreement (SPA), whose exact duration Adnoc did not disclose, builds on an initial LNG supply deal agreed between the two companies last year. The transaction was arranged through Adnoc’s integrated LNG marketing and trading platform, which was established in July within Abu Dhabi Global Market.

The hub integrates the marketing operations of Adnoc subsidiaries Adnoc Gas and XRG with the trading activities of Adnoc Trading. It targets a combined portfolio of 47 million t/y of marketable LNG by 2035. Adnoc Trading has developed an active third-party trading portfolio over the past four years, operating from commercial offices in Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Geneva.

ALSO READ: Adnoc signs energy agreements with Japan and South Korea

Separately, Adnoc has secured offtake commitments covering approximately 90% of the 9.6 million-t/y capacity planned for its low-carbon Ruwais LNG project.

In July, Adnoc signed a 15-year SPA with Japan’s Inpex Corporation for the supply of up to 1 million t/y from Ruwais. That contract marked Adnoc’s third long-term Ruwais supply agreement with a Japanese buyer, following deals with Osaka Gas and Mitsui & Co in March and April 2025, respectively. Together, the agreements with the three Japanese firms account for 2.4 million t/y – one-quarter of the terminal’s total capacity, which will be delivered across two 4.8 million-t/y liquefaction trains.

Adnoc has also secured long-term Ruwais LNG supply agreements with Malaysia’s Petronas, Germany’s EnBW Energie Baden-Wurttemberg and SEFE (Securing Energy for Europe), China’s ENN Natural Gas, UK-based Shell and Indian Oil Corporation.

Currently under construction in Ruwais Industrial City, Abu Dhabi, the facility is scheduled to begin commercial operations in 2028. Its commissioning will more than double Adnoc’s LNG production capacity to approximately 15 million t/y.

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Indrajit Sen

Fibrex wins $217m Abu Dhabi Seamont residences contract

9 October 2026

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Abu Dhabi-based contractor Fibrex Construction Group has won an AED800m ($217m) contract to build the Seamont Autograph Collection Residences project, located on Al-Reem Island in the UAE capital.

Abu Dhabi-based real estate developer Royal Development Holding, a subsidiary of Emirates Stallion Group, and local firm Saas Properties awarded the contract.

The development comprises two 22-storey towers offering 497 residences, ranging from one- to four-bedroom apartments.

The construction programme is scheduled to run for 27 months, with completion due in December 2028.

Fibrex will begin mobilisation immediately, following the completion of enabling works this month, which were undertaken by Sharjah-based Swiss Pro Foundations.

Dubai-based architectural firm Dewan Architects & Engineers is the project consultant.

The contract marks another major win for the contractor. Last year, Dubai-based developer Nakheel awarded Fibrex a AED2.6bn ($708m) contract to build the Bay Villas project at Dubai Islands.

That contract includes the construction of 636 villas.

READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDF

Industry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.

Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:

> AGENDA: Oxagon takes centre stage at Neom

> MARKET FOCUS: Saudi projects hold steady

> INDUSTRY REPORT: MEED’s 2026 GCC power developer ranking

> POWER: AI is creating a grid capacity problem

> LEGAL: What IFAD’s wind-down means for Gulf commodity markets

> OIL: Oil companies focus on North Africa amid Hormuz crisis

> LEADERSHIP: The future city does not need to hang above the ground

To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here

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Yasir Iqbal

Dubai picks contractor for Al-Maktoum airport terminal

9 October 2026

Dubai Aviation Engineering Projects (DAEP) has selected a contractor for an estimated AED10bn ($2.7bn) substructure package for the West Terminal, as part of the first phase of the $35bn expansion of Al-Maktoum International airport.

A joint venture of Beijing-headquartered China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and Abu Dhabi-based Tristar Engineering & Construction will execute the contract.

According to a description on DAEP’s website, the expanded airport’s West Terminal will be a seven-level facility spanning 800,000 square metres, with annual capacity for 45 million passengers.

The terminal will be the second of three planned terminals at Al-Maktoum International airport. It will connect to the airside via a 14-station automated people-mover (APM) system.

In July, MEED exclusively reported that DAEP had awarded an estimated $1.5bn contract to a joint venture of Japan’s Mitsubishi Corporation and Indian contractor Larsen & Toubro for the APM system.

The APM will run beneath the apron and terminal areas, using multiple tracks to transport passengers between terminals and concourses. Four underground stations are planned in the first phase, while the full airport development is expected to include 14 stations.

The latest awards form part of a wider programme of contracts recently signed by DAEP, covering enabling works, the second runway, initial structural foundations for passenger terminals and concourse substructures.

Upcoming awards

In June 2026, DAEP said it will award construction contracts worth over AED55bn ($15bn) for Al-Maktoum International airport by the end of the year.

At the time, DAEP said the planned awards included substructure works for the West Terminal, the fourth aircraft concourse and the baggage-handling system. The programme also included superstructure works for the West Terminal and the first, second and third aircraft concourses.

The packages are expected to include long-span structural frameworks for buildings covering about 1.5 million square metres, infrastructure works for the southern airfield area, and power-generation and district-cooling plants supporting the construction programme.

DAEP also plans to award façade and roofing packages in 2026.

The Dubai Government approved updated designs and timelines for its largest construction project in April 2024. In September 2024, MEED exclusively reported that a team comprising Austria’s Coop Himmelb(l)au and Lebanon’s Dar Al-Handasah had been confirmed as lead masterplanning and design consultants for the Al-Maktoum International airport expansion.

Construction of the airport is planned in three phases. Once complete, the airport will cover 70 square kilometres south of Dubai and include five parallel runways and 430 aircraft gates.

It will be five times the size of Dubai International airport and is planned to have a passenger-handling capacity of 260 million passengers a year – the largest in the world. For cargo, it is planned to have the capacity to handle 12 million tonnes a year.