Dubai extends $22bn tunnels prequalification

13 March 2024

Interested engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) companies have been given another month to respond to Dubai Municipality's prequalification request for the $22bn Dubai Strategic Sewerage Tunnels (DSST) public-private partnership (PPP) project.

The client initially expected to receive the statements of qualifications (SOQs) on 26 February, before it was extended for one month. It now expects to receive the SOQs in late April, according to an industry source.

The client intends to start the prequalification process for the PPP consortiums that can bid for the project in the second quarter of this year.

In addition to its size, the project is gaining significant interest due to its unique procurement approach, whereby EPC contractors’ prequalification precedes developers’ prequalification.

International, regional and local EPC contractors are keen to be prequalified to bid for the contracts, sources tell MEED.

The bidders for each of the PPP requests for proposals (RFPs) will be prequalified consortiums comprised of sponsors, EPC contractors and operation and management (O&M) contractors.

MEED previously reported that the overall project will require a capital expenditure of roughly AED30bn ($8bn), while the whole life cost over the full concession terms of the entire project is estimated to reach AED80bn.

The project aims to convert Dubai’s existing sewerage system from a pumped system to a gravity system by decommissioning the existing pump stations and providing “a sustainable, innovative, reliable service for future generations”.

Two major sewerage catchments currently serve Dubai. The first, located in Deira, is called Warsan, where the existing Warsan sewage treatment plant (STP) treats the flow.

The second catchment, called Jebel Ali, is in Bur Dubai, where the wastewater is treated at the Jebel Ali STP.

DSST-DLT packages

Under the current plan, the $22bn DSST project is broken down into six packages, which will be tendered separately as PPP packages with concession periods lasting between 25 and 35 years.

The first package, J1, comprises Jebel Ali tunnels (North) and terminal pump stations (TPS). The tunnels will extend approximately 42 kilometres, with the links extending 10km. 

The second package, J2, covers the southern section of the Jebel Ali tunnels, which will extend 16km, with a link stretching 46km.

W for Warsan, the third package, comprises 16km of tunnels, TPS and 46km of links.

J3, the fourth package, comprises 129km of links, which will be operated by Dubai Municipality once completed, unlike the first three packages, which are envisaged to be operated and maintained by the winning PPP contractors.  

J1, J2 and W will be procured under a design-build-finance-operate-maintain model with a concession period between 25 and 35 years.

J3 will be procured under a design-build-finance model with a concession period of 25-35 years.

J1, J2, W and J3 will comprise the deep sewerage tunnels, links and TPS (DLT) components of the overall project.

MEED understands the remaining two packages of the project, the expansion and upgrade of the Jebel Ali and Warsan STPs, will be procured in a process separate from the four DSST-DLT components of the project.

The RFPs for the four DSST-DLT packages will likely be issued in sequential order on a staggered basis around six to 12 months apart.

Dubai Municipality has appointed Abu Dhabi-headquartered Tribe Infrastructure Group as lead and financial adviser, UK-based Ashurst as legal adviser and the US’ Parsons as technical adviser for the DSST project.

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Jennifer Aguinaldo
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