Related Articles

• 
  Developers prepare Saudi round six solar IPP bids

  2 April 2025

  Prequalified developers are forming teams that can bid for the contracts to develop solar farms under the sixth round of Saudi Arabia's National Renewable Programme (NREP).

  MEED understands bids are due for the four solar photovoltaic (PV) independent power projects (IPPs) by 1 June.

  The four solar IPPs have a combined capacity of 3,000MW.

  The 1,400MW solar photovoltaic (PV) IPP is located in Najran, while the smallest, the 400MW Al-Sufun solar IPP, is in Hail.

  The 600MW Samtah and 600MW Al-Darb solar IPPs are located in Jizan, a region under security-related travel alerts by some countries and international firms.

  Most prequalified bidders participated in the site visits, which Saudi Arabia’s principal buyer, Saudi Power Procurement Company (SPPC), conducted in late January.

  SPPC prequalified 16 companies that can bid as managing and technical members for the solar PV contracts. These are:

  • Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar, UAE) 
  • Alfanar Company (local)
  • EDF Renewables (France)
  • Kahrabel (Engie, France)
  • FAS Energy (local)
  • Jinko Power (Hong Kong)
  • Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco, South Korea)
  • Marubeni Corporation (Japan)
  • Nesma Renewable Energy (local)
  • SPIC Hunaghe Hydropower Development (China)
  • Sumitomo Corporation (Japan)
  • TotalEnergies Renewables (France)
  • AlJomaih Energy & Water (local)
  • Sembcorp Utilities (Singapore)
  • AlGihaz Holding Company (local)
  • Korea Western Power Company (Kowepo, South Korea)

  The following five companies have been prequalified to bid as managing partners:

  • Jera Nex (Japan)
  • Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina)
  • China Power Engineering Consulting Group International Engineering (China)
  • Posco International (South Korea)
  • Saudi Electricity Company (SEC, local)

  Round six of the NREP will have a total combined capacity of 4,500MW, including the 1,500MW Dawadmi wind farm, for which a separate set of bidders had been prequalified.

  SPPC issued the prequalification request for the NREP round six in September last year and received statements of qualifications from interested developers and developer consortiums the following month.

  SPPC is responsible for the pre-development, tendering and subsequent offtaking of the energy from the projects.

  US/India-based Synergy Consulting is the client's financial adviser for the NREP sixth-round tender. Germany’s Fichtner Consulting and US-headquartered CMS are the technical and legal consultancy services, respectively.

  https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/13602412/main.jpg

  Jennifer Aguinaldo
• 
  Mitsubishi Power confirms Rumah 1 and Nairiyah 1 deal

  2 April 2025

  Mitsubishi Power, part of Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, has confirmed receiving two orders to supply six M501JAC gas turbines for the Rumah 1 and Al-Nairiyah 1 power generation projects in Saudi Arabia.

  Rumah 1 is located in the Central Region in Riyadh and is part of the previously planned Riyadh Power Plant 15 (PP15). Nairiyah 1 is located in the Eastern Region.

  The scope includes the supply of generators and auxiliary equipment, Mitsubishi Power said in a statement.

  MEED exclusively reported that the Japanese original equipment manufacturer had been selected to supply its gas turbines for the IPP project in November last year.

  A consortium comprising the local Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) and Acwa Power and South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco) won the contract to develop the Rumah 1 and Al-Nairiyah 1 IPP the same month.

  The power plants will deliver a combined 3.6GW, accounting for nearly 2.5% of the national grid’s capacity.

  The M501JAC turbines will be assembled at Mitsubishi Power Saudi Arabia’s Dammam factory.

  The 17,730 square metre facility also provides services for key gas turbine components.

  According to Mitsubishi Power, the plant features "a majority of Saudi employees, in line with the firm’s Saudi National programme".

  China’s Sepco 3 and South Korea's Doosan Enerbility will undertake the EPC contract for the projects, as MEED reported.

  The SEC, Acwa Power and Kepco team offered a levelised electricity cost (LCOE) of $cents 4.5859 a kilowatt-hour (kWh) for Rumah 1, and $cents 4.6114/kWh for Nairiyah 1.

  Acwa Power said that the two IPPs will require a combined investment of approximately SR15bn ($4bn). The IPPs are expected to reach commercial operations in Q2 2028. 

  SPPC received bids for the contracts for four thermal IPPs – the other two being the similarly configured Rumah 2 and Nairiyah 2 – in August last year.

  The four power generation facilities will be developed using a build, own and operate (BOO) model over 25 years. 

  SPPC’s transaction advisory team for the Rumah 1 and 2 and Al-Nairiyah 1 and 2 IPP projects comprises US/India-based Synergy Consulting, Germany’s Fichtner and US-headquartered Baker McKenzie. 

  Photo credit: Mitsubishi Power (for illustrative purposes only)

  https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/13599792/main.jpg

  Jennifer Aguinaldo
• 
  Riyadh takes the diplomatic initiative

  2 April 2025

  

   

  Saudi Arabia has been at the centre of regional diplomatic activity through the early months of 2025, positioning itself as an intermediary in the Ukraine conflict and at the forefront of engagement with the new regime in Syria.

  The role of regional mediator is one that has in recent years been more closely associated with Qatar – particularly in relation to the Gaza conflict – and, on occasion, Oman.

  Riyadh’s decision to throw its weight behind diplomatic initiatives is part of what Abdulaziz Sager, chairman of the Saudi-based Gulf Research Centre, has described as a “bold multi-alignment strategy”, which seeks to balance Riyadh’s economic and security concerns and its regional leadership ambitions.

  Multipronged initiatives

  The kingdom has gained plaudits for its efforts to resolve the Ukraine war in particular. Following his talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) in Jeddah on 11 March, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said: “Saudi Arabia provides a crucial platform for diplomacy, and we appreciate this.”

  Zelenskyy added that he had “a detailed discussion on the steps and conditions needed to end the war” with the crown prince.

  The previous month, US secretary of state Marco Rubio had said Saudi Arabia had played an “indispensable role” in setting up bilateral negotiations between Moscow and Washington to discuss the conflict.

  Russia’s President Vladamir Putin has also praised the Saudi leadership for providing a platform for high-level meetings with the US and “creating a very friendly atmosphere”.

  Whether all this leads to a lasting peace deal for Ukraine remains to be seen, but Saudi Arabia’s attitude to conflict may be coloured somewhat by its own experiences over the past decade in Yemen.

  It is now 10 years since it launched a bombing campaign against Yemen’s Houthi rebels in March 2015, and the war has not gone as Riyadh had hoped, with the Houthis proving far more resilient than anticipated.

  Saudi Arabia’s southern border has at least been relatively quiet since a truce took hold in 2022, but a comprehensive peace deal has proved elusive.

  Riyadh has also been re-engaging in the Levant this year, in light of the new regime in Damascus.

  The new Syrian president Ahmed Al-Sharaa travelled to Riyadh in early February, on his first trip abroad since taking power. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal Bin Farhan had been in Damascus a week earlier.

  There are some key issues at stake for Riyadh. The regime of President Bashar Al-Assad had overseen the industrial-scale production of the amphetamine-type stimulant Captagon, much of which was smuggled into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Saudi efforts to disrupt the trade – both at its borders and via lobbying of the Syrian authorities – had failed to stem the flow of drugs.

  In addition, Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, has pointed out that between 500,000 and 2.5 million de facto Syrian refugees are thought to be living in Saudi Arabia – a fact that gives Riyadh a clear interest in Syria’s stability, particularly if it wants to encourage them to return home.

  “Saudi Arabia views the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to reassert its influence in the Levant,” he asserted in a recent commentary.

  The ousting of Assad in late 2024 and the recent Israeli campaign against Hezbollah has also changed the situation on the ground in Lebanon, encouraging Saudi Arabia to reconsider its approach there too.

  MBS hosted Lebanon’s recently elected President Joseph Aoun on 3 March. Following their meeting, Saudi Arabia said it would look again at allowing Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia and letting its own citizens travel to Lebanon.

  Manoeuvring around Trump

  The Saudi diplomatic push may also be motivated by a desire to ensure that relations with Washington remain on a positive footing in the wake of Donald Trump’s re-election as US president.

  At first, it appeared that the bilateral relations would follow a similar pattern to Trump’s first term.

  In January, MBS said in a phone call with Trump that Saudi Arabia was planning to invest some $600bn in the US over the coming four years, which the US president suggested should probably be increased to $1tn. This echoed the signing of $460bn-worth of defence deals when Trump made Saudi Arabia his first foreign trip as president in May 2017.

  Riyadh appears to have conceded to Trump’s higher figure, with the US president saying in early March: “I said I'll go if you pay $1tn to American companies, meaning the purchase over a four-year period of $1tn, and they've agreed to do that. So, I'm going to be going there.”

  However, other aspects of the bilateral relationship are more difficult and less predictable. Trump had been pushing Saudi Arabia to join Bahrain, the UAE and Morocco in normalising relations with Israel, but in light of the war in Gaza and Trump’s own plans for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the strip, that looks like a stretch too far.

  Trump will nevertheless have been pleased by the decision by Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Opec+ bloc in early March to unwind some of the production restrictions they had voluntarily agreed.

  From April onwards, the eight-strong group will start to bring 2.2 million barrels a day back onto the market over the course of 18 months. That fits in with Trump’s call in January, soon after taking office, for Riyadh and Opec to do more to help bring oil prices down.

  However, that decision may also create fiscal challenges for the Saudi government, as any rise in production could be more than offset by lower prices.

  Saudi Aramco has announced plans to trim its dividend payouts this year to $85.4bn – down from $124bn in 2024. These payments are a vital source of revenues both for the central government and for its Public Investment Fund (which holds a 16% stake in Aramco)

  All that could force some public sector spending constraint in the kingdom, in a sign that balancing diplomacy and financial interests is not always straightforward.

  ---

  MEED’s April 2025 report on Saudi Arabia includes:

  > UPSTREAM: Saudi oil and gas spending to surpass 2024 level
  > DOWNSTREAM: Aramco’s recalibrated chemical goals reflect realism
  > POWER: Saudi power sector enters busiest year
  > WATER: Saudi water contracts set another annual record
  > CONSTRUCTION: Reprioritisation underpins Saudi construction
  > TRANSPORT: Riyadh pushes ahead with infrastructure development
  > BANKING: Saudi banks work to keep pace with credit expansion

  https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/13483143/main.gif

  Dominic Dudley
• 
  Investing in Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure opportunities

  2 April 2025

  

   

  With a background in private banking and asset management, Edmond de Rothschild is an established player in infrastructure investment. Since launching its infrastructure platform in 2014, the firm has raised over $6.5bn, ranking among Europe’s top infrastructure debt investors.

  The bank prides itself on a conviction-led approach. “We at Edmond de Rothschild are a company that has convictions. Private markets are not a broad, generalist approach for us; we adopt a highly focused strategy, particularly in infrastructure,” says Jean-Francis Dusch, CEO of Edmond de Rothschild Asset Management UK and global head of infrastructure and structured finance.

  This strategic approach has allowed Edmond de Rothschild to establish itself as a key player in infrastructure finance, growing from a small team of fewer than 10 people in 2014 to one that has now raised billions in capital. “We decided to focus first on real estate, then private equity with very specific strategies, and finally infrastructure, where we maintain a global approach,” says Dusch.

  Edmond de Rothschild initially engaged in advisory services for governments and private consortiums, providing expertise in project implementation. The firm’s work in the public-private partnership (PPP) space led to the development of a dedicated infrastructure lending platform. “In less than 10 months from the initial idea being discussed, we raised $400m. Fast forward to today, and we have now raised more than $6.5bn, positioning us as a major player in infrastructure debt,” says Dusch.

  Saudi infrastructure

  Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 has set the stage for significant infrastructure development, and Edmond de Rothschild is positioning itself to play a crucial role. “Saudi Arabia is already the largest infrastructure market in the region, and we see significant opportunities to contribute,” says Dusch.

  A major part of Edmond de Rothschild’s approach focuses on debt financing rather than equity. “The platform I represent is dedicated to debt. There has been a lot of equity investment from the kingdom and the strong regional banks, as well as large global banks. However, as infrastructure investment accelerates, we anticipate a liquidity gap that we can help bridge,” says Dusch.

  This is particularly relevant given Saudi Arabia’s ambitious infrastructure programmes. “With Vision 2030 driving development, the need for private liquidity will increase. Our goal is to provide that liquidity in a structured way, supporting sustainable capital structures while ensuring robust returns for investors,” he says.

  To reinforce its commitment, Edmond de Rothschild has established a local joint venture in Saudi Arabia.

  The firm takes a diversified approach to infrastructure, ensuring it remains at the forefront of evolving sector trends. “Ten years ago, infrastructure was primarily about transport and social infrastructure,” says Dusch. “But we have always believed it also includes renewable energy, digital infrastructure and decarbonisation efforts.” 

  The shift toward digital infrastructure has been particularly notable. “The rise of AI and data-driven technologies has increased demand for digital infrastructure. Sustainable data centres, fibre optics and digital connectivity are becoming key pillars of modern infrastructure investment,” says Dusch.

  Edmond de Rothschild’s portfolio comprises a mix of greenfield and brownfield infrastructure projects. “As a project financier, our natural inclination is to focus on new projects. However, when managing
  investor capital, we also look at brownfield projects that require modernisation. About 30% of our portfolio is greenfield, and 70% is brownfield,” says Dusch.

  This focus aligns with the evolving nature of infrastructure investment. “Assets need to be modernised,
  especially in energy transition and digitalisation,” he says. “Many brownfield projects are still in a growth phase, so while they are technically existing assets, they require significant new investment.”

  Broader region

  While Saudi Arabia is the focus, Edmond de Rothschild is also eyeing broader regional expansion. “Our goal is to develop a multibillion-dollar infrastructure programme in the region, as we did in Europe. The first step is Saudi Arabia, where we have strong local partners. However, we aim to expand our coverage to other GCC countries over time,” says Dusch.

  We don’t need to do everything – we focus on areas where we can add real value

  This approach mirrors the firm’s European expansion strategy. “In Europe, we started with a focused mandate in core markets and gradually expanded,” he says. “We plan to follow a similar trajectory in the Middle East, leveraging our experience and track record to drive growth.”

  One of the critical questions for international investors is whether Saudi projects are investment-ready. “It’s a mix,” he acknowledges. “Like in Europe, large programmes are announced, and while not every project is immediately ready, there is a concrete pipeline of opportunities.”

  Edmond de Rothschild sees particular potential in small to mid-sized projects. “The debt instruments we offer are currently more suited to small and medium-sized projects rather than megaprojects. However, as the market evolves, we anticipate broader participation,” he says.

  Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure financing model is also undergoing a shift. “Previously, infrastructure was largely government-led with a first-generation PPP approach. Now, we are seeing more private sector initiatives. Europe has largely transitioned to private infrastructure development, and Saudi Arabia is following a similar path,” says Dusch.

  Long-term commitment

  With infrastructure demand growing across sectors, Edmond de Rothschild will remain selective with its strategy. “We don’t need to do everything – we focus on areas where we can add real value. That is what has made us successful, and that’s the approach we will continue in Saudi Arabia and beyond.” 

  ---

  MEED’s April 2025 report on Saudi Arabia includes:

  > UPSTREAM: Saudi oil and gas spending to surpass 2024 level
  > DOWNSTREAM: Aramco’s recalibrated chemical goals reflect realism
  > POWER: Saudi power sector enters busiest year
  > WATER: Saudi water contracts set another annual record
  > CONSTRUCTION: Reprioritisation underpins Saudi construction
  > TRANSPORT: Riyadh pushes ahead with infrastructure development
  > BANKING: Saudi banks work to keep pace with credit expansion

  https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/13550738/main.jpg

  Colin Foreman
• 
  Is this the end for Middle East studies?

  2 April 2025

  Commentary
  Edmund O’Sullivan
  Former editor of MEED

  The arrest and proposed deportation of Columbia University student Mahmoud Khalil and sanctions against others involved in Gaza conflict protests at the Ivy League college in 2024 are a disaster for those involved. Whether or not deserved – the conversation still rages among political pundits – the crackdown’s wider implications for academic freedom continue to resound.

  On 14 March, the White House ordered the university to tighten disciplinary and admissions procedures and end the independence of its Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies department or risk losing federal financial support. 

  It is a reminder of how much private US universities still depend on government money.

  There are further threats to higher education’s financing from private donors, both in relation to the student protests and fresh scrutiny being directed towards the statements, lectures and published works of academic staff on Middle Eastern topics.

  US state universities, which largely depend on public finance, are under the same pressure. And similar patterns can be seen in Canada and in the UK, where a Bristol University academic was sacked in 2021 following complaints about his stance against Zionism. Middle East specialists at universities worldwide are increasingly cautious about what they write and say.

  And this is not only about contemporary matters. Anyone teaching Middle East history is obliged to cover the events leading to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and its ramifications. This could be tackled in the past provided that care was taken to ensure all versions of the event were covered. But that may now be impossible. Only one narrative is becoming acceptable.

  Uncertain future

  This may be a short-term storm that will eventually blow over, although that is unlikely. The war to control the Middle East narrative triggered by the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel could even intensify if the fighting continues.

  Balanced reporting on developments in the region is difficult to locate. Those seeking alternative perspectives are being driven towards the fringes of the media, though that too is under siege via online management and censorship.

  All this raises profound questions. Is there any point attempting Middle East studies when it is impossible to talk about contentious moments in the region’s recent past without the threat of sanctions that could be career-ending?

  Unless this issue is addressed, the discipline may lose its purpose in shedding light on recent events. Among the many victims of a new era of destruction, the demise of free-thinking Middle East faculties is one that we may in due course have the most reason to lament.

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  Connect with Edmund O’Sullivan on X

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  More from Edmund O’Sullivan:

  > Trump’s foreign policy shakes global relations
  > Between the extremes as spring approaches
  > A leap into the unknown
  > Middle East faces a reckoning
  > Biden leaves a mixed legacy
  > Desperate days drag on
  > The beginning of the end
  > The death of political risk
  > Italy at centre of new reduced Europe
  > US foreign policy approach remains adrift

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  https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/13543160/main.jpg

  Edmund O’Sullivan