meed-logo

line1 line2 line3
SIGN IN / REGISTER

Saudi water projects momentum holds steady

12 September 2023

This package on Saudi Arabia’s water sector also includes: 

> Riyadh holds water pipeline bid clarifications
> Red Sea awards Amaala utility package
> Five banks agree $545m Rabigh 4 financing
> Saudi Arabia extends desalination bid deadline
> Albawani joins Jafurah water developer team
> Saudi Arabia evaluates Al-Haer wastewater bids

 

The Saudi water market remains the region’s largest, with $30bn-worth of projects in varying planning and procurement stages.

The sector is expected to expand further with multibillion-dollar capital expenditures allocated by the potable water and wastewater collection and treatment firm, the National Water Company (NWC), and Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC), the world’s largest producer of desalinated water.

This offers great opportunities for water asset developers and engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractors aiming to capture a share of the kingdom’s burgeoning water projects market.

SWCC, NWC and the principal buyer of water, Saudi Water Partnership Company (SWPC), awarded over $32bn of water infrastructure and utility projects between 2013 and 2022, according to MEED Projects data.

Driving investment within the sector is the need to improve water security, a key component of Saudi Vision 2030, along with rising demand due to population and economic expansion.

Reducing the carbon footprint of the kingdom's existing seawater desalination fleet, dominated by plants running on older technologies, is also contributing to the urgency to build more energy-efficient water infrastructure.

This is matched by moves to make potable and wastewater water transmission and distribution more efficient and to minimise leakage and non-revenue water. The kingdom also needs to expand its overall water storage capacity to improve its emergency response.

Simultaneously, like most of its groundwater-scarce neighbours, there is growing pressure to adopt treated sewage effluent for agricultural and industrial applications to reduce demand for seawater desalination and comply with the kingdom’s circular carbon economy approach.

“It is an interesting time for the Saudi water sector,” says a Dubai-based water expert.

“There are many projects in the tendering phase, but there is also some degree of uncertainty in terms of how the roles of the key stakeholders could shift [in the future].”

This stems from the years-long restructuring of the sector and last year's cabinet resolution approving the transfer of water production, transportation and storage assets owned directly or indirectly by SWCC to Water Solutions Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Saudi sovereign vehicle, the Public Investment Fund (PIF).

There is widespread expectation that SWCC will focus on research and development following the transfer of its assets to the PIF subsidiary, although this has not been formally announced. 

Diversified clients

The lengthy restructuring of the kingdom’s water sector and rapid advance of so-called gigaprojects have diversified the profile of clients in the kingdom.

Neom and its subsidiary Enowa, SWCC transmission arm Water Transmission & Technologies Company (WTTCo) and other gigaproject developers, such as the royal commissions for Riyadh City and Al-Ula, have joined the mainstream water utility companies and municipalities in tendering new water infrastructure contracts over the past year.

In terms of projects in the pre-execution phase, SWPC is the top client, with a pipeline of projects worth at least $7bn.

SWPC is mandated to procure all water infrastructure projects in the kingdom on a public-private partnership (PPP) basis, including water desalination, wastewater treatment, transmission and reservoirs.

Its latest Seven-Year Planning Statement covering 2022-28 stipulates the procurement of about 50 independent water infrastructure projects, including several in the bid stage.

SWPC’s future projects pipeline outperforms that of NWC and SWCC. Neom, Enowa, WTTCo and the Royal Commission for Al-Ula round out the top seven clients.

Riyadh rides power projects surge

Independent projects

Following consecutive awards of independent water producer (IWP) and independent sewage treatment plant (ISTP) contracts between 2019 and 2021, SWPC has recently paced out the award of new contracts.

It has only awarded one contract, directly negotiated with Saudi utility developer Acwa Power for the Shuaiba 3 seawater reverse osmosis (SWRO) project in 2022. This year, it awarded another contract for the Rabigh 4 IWP scheme, in addition to the contract to develop the kingdom’s first independent water transmission pipeline, which connects Rayis and Rabigh.

SWPC is evaluating the bids it received for the contract to develop the Al-Haer independent sewage treatment plant (ISTP), the first of the round-three projects under its ISTP programme, and expects to receive bids in October for the 300,000 cubic-metre-a-day (cm/d) Ras Mohaisen IWP.

The contract to develop the kingdom’s first independent strategic water reservoir (ISWR) project is expected to be awarded this year. The Juranah ISWR has a capacity to store 2.5 million cubic metres of water. The project is anticipated to significantly boost water security, particularly in Mecca and Medina, which host several million pilgrims annually.

EPC works

Despite moves to transfer its assets to the PIF subsidiary, SWCC cemented its reputation as the world’s largest producer of desalinated water when its fleet of 30 desalination plants reached a total combined capacity of 6.6 million cm/d in 2022.

The company is not resting on its past success, having issued successive tenders for SWRO plants using an EPC model over the past 12-18 months.

In July this year, it invited bids for the contract to build a 200,000 cm/d SWRO facility in Ras al-Khair.

This came three months after it received two bids for the contract to build the second phase of the Shuaibah water desalination plant, which has an even higher capacity of 545,000 cm/d.

Around the same time in March, SWCC tendered a contract to construct a greenfield SWRO plant in Yanbu with a design capacity of 500,000 cm/d.

SWPC last awarded a major SWRO contract in mid-2021. The giant 1 million cm/d Jubail SWRO plant is being built by a team of Metito and local firm Saudi Services for Electromechanic Works.

Before this, in late 2019, it awarded a contract to construct a 400,000 cm/d SWRO plant in Shuqaiq to a team of Spain’s Acciona and Al-Rashid Trading & Contracting Company.

SWCC, though WTTCo, has also tendered multiple water transmission projects, including pipelines around Riyadh and connecting Riyadh and Ras al-Khair, Shuqaiq and Jizan and Al-Duwadimi and Atif.

In its 2022 annual report, SWCC stated that it had achieved exceptional results in supporting the Saudi Green Initiative, reducing carbon emissions, increasing operational efficiency to above 99 per cent and saving SR1.6bn ($427m) in operational costs.

The company also “increased local content in its operational efficiency by 61 per cent and demonstrated noteworthy patent accomplishments, innovations, studies and scientific publications”.

Innovation

New tourism-related developments, the expansion of industrial complexes and the need to limit carbon emissions are driving capacity-building and innovation.

The Red Sea development is completing the kingdom’s first private sector multi-utility project, which includes developing and operating a solar photovoltaic power plant, battery energy storage system, water desalination and treatment and waste recycling plants in one contract.

In addition to tendering major water transmission and distribution networks, Neom is also finalising the design for a zero-liquid discharge SWRO plant catering to the development. Enowa, Japan’s Itochu and France’s Veolia are expected to tender the project's EPC package soon.

The proposed state-of-the-art desalination plant will be powered 100 per cent by renewable energy and use advanced membrane technology to produce separate brine streams.

This will enable the production of brine-derived products, which will be developed and monetised downstream. The bigger plan includes establishing a brine processing complex in Oxagon, which could require an investment of between $15bn and $20bn.

https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/11132882/main.gif
Jennifer Aguinaldo

Register for MEED's guest program now to access this article.

Click here to register
Exclusive from Meed
Related Articles
  • Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh

    9 October 2026

     

    Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

    In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

    At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

    Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

    However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

    Yemen dynamics

    Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

    Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

    It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

    The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

    Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

    Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

    On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

    Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

    Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

    Strategic independence

    The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

    Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

    It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

    In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20435670/main.gif
    Dominic Dudley
  • Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh

    9 October 2026

     

    Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.

    In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.

    At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.

    Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.

    However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.

    Yemen dynamics

    Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.

    Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.

    It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.

    The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”

    Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.

    Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.

    On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.

    Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.

    Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.

    Strategic independence

    The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.

    Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.

    It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.

    In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.

    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20432716/main.gif
    Dominic Dudley
  • Adnoc secures Thailand LNG supply deal

    9 October 2026

    Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Adnoc) has secured a deal with Thailand-based energy and infrastructure company Gulf Group to supply 2 million tonnes a year of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with deliveries starting in 2027.

    The multi-year sale and purchase agreement (SPA), whose exact duration Adnoc did not disclose, builds on an initial LNG supply deal agreed between the two companies last year. The transaction was arranged through Adnoc’s integrated LNG marketing and trading platform, which was established in July within Abu Dhabi Global Market.

    The hub integrates the marketing operations of Adnoc subsidiaries Adnoc Gas and XRG with the trading activities of Adnoc Trading. It targets a combined portfolio of 47 million t/y of marketable LNG by 2035. Adnoc Trading has developed an active third-party trading portfolio over the past four years, operating from commercial offices in Abu Dhabi, Singapore and Geneva.

    ALSO READ: Adnoc signs energy agreements with Japan and South Korea

    Separately, Adnoc has secured offtake commitments covering approximately 90% of the 9.6 million-t/y capacity planned for its low-carbon Ruwais LNG project.

    In July, Adnoc signed a 15-year SPA with Japan’s Inpex Corporation for the supply of up to 1 million t/y from Ruwais. That contract marked Adnoc’s third long-term Ruwais supply agreement with a Japanese buyer, following deals with Osaka Gas and Mitsui & Co in March and April 2025, respectively. Together, the agreements with the three Japanese firms account for 2.4 million t/y – one-quarter of the terminal’s total capacity, which will be delivered across two 4.8 million-t/y liquefaction trains.

    Adnoc has also secured long-term Ruwais LNG supply agreements with Malaysia’s Petronas, Germany’s EnBW Energie Baden-Wurttemberg and SEFE (Securing Energy for Europe), China’s ENN Natural Gas, UK-based Shell and Indian Oil Corporation.

    Currently under construction in Ruwais Industrial City, Abu Dhabi, the facility is scheduled to begin commercial operations in 2028. Its commissioning will more than double Adnoc’s LNG production capacity to approximately 15 million t/y.

    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20421415/main4048.jpg
    Indrajit Sen
  • Fibrex wins $217m Abu Dhabi Seamont residences contract

    9 October 2026

    Register for MEED’s 14-day trial access 

    Abu Dhabi-based contractor Fibrex Construction Group has won an AED800m ($217m) contract to build the Seamont Autograph Collection Residences project, located on Al-Reem Island in the UAE capital.

    Abu Dhabi-based real estate developer Royal Development Holding, a subsidiary of Emirates Stallion Group, and local firm Saas Properties awarded the contract.

    The development comprises two 22-storey towers offering 497 residences, ranging from one- to four-bedroom apartments.

    The construction programme is scheduled to run for 27 months, with completion due in December 2028.

    Fibrex will begin mobilisation immediately, following the completion of enabling works this month, which were undertaken by Sharjah-based Swiss Pro Foundations.

    Dubai-based architectural firm Dewan Architects & Engineers is the project consultant.

    The contract marks another major win for the contractor. Last year, Dubai-based developer Nakheel awarded Fibrex a AED2.6bn ($708m) contract to build the Bay Villas project at Dubai Islands.

    That contract includes the construction of 636 villas.

    READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDF

    Industry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.

    Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:
    To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here
    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20420509/main.jpg
    Yasir Iqbal
  • Dubai picks contractor for Al-Maktoum airport terminal

    9 October 2026

     

    Dubai Aviation Engineering Projects (DAEP) has selected a contractor for an estimated AED10bn ($2.7bn) substructure package for the West Terminal, as part of the first phase of the $35bn expansion of Al-Maktoum International airport.

    A joint venture of Beijing-headquartered China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and Abu Dhabi-based Tristar Engineering & Construction will execute the contract.

    According to a description on DAEP’s website, the expanded airport’s West Terminal will be a seven-level facility spanning 800,000 square metres, with annual capacity for 45 million passengers.

    The terminal will be the second of three planned terminals at Al-Maktoum International airport. It will connect to the airside via a 14-station automated people-mover (APM) system.

    In July, MEED exclusively reported that DAEP had awarded an estimated $1.5bn contract to a joint venture of Japan’s Mitsubishi Corporation and Indian contractor Larsen & Toubro for the APM system.

    The APM will run beneath the apron and terminal areas, using multiple tracks to transport passengers between terminals and concourses. Four underground stations are planned in the first phase, while the full airport development is expected to include 14 stations.

    The latest awards form part of a wider programme of contracts recently signed by DAEP, covering enabling works, the second runway, initial structural foundations for passenger terminals and concourse substructures.

    Upcoming awards

    In June 2026, DAEP said it will award construction contracts worth over AED55bn ($15bn) for Al-Maktoum International airport by the end of the year.

    At the time, DAEP said the planned awards included substructure works for the West Terminal, the fourth aircraft concourse and the baggage-handling system. The programme also included superstructure works for the West Terminal and the first, second and third aircraft concourses.

    The packages are expected to include long-span structural frameworks for buildings covering about 1.5 million square metres, infrastructure works for the southern airfield area, and power-generation and district-cooling plants supporting the construction programme.

    DAEP also plans to award façade and roofing packages in 2026.

    The Dubai Government approved updated designs and timelines for its largest construction project in April 2024. In September 2024, MEED exclusively reported that a team comprising Austria’s Coop Himmelb(l)au and Lebanon’s Dar Al-Handasah had been confirmed as lead masterplanning and design consultants for the Al-Maktoum International airport expansion.

    Construction of the airport is planned in three phases. Once complete, the airport will cover 70 square kilometres south of Dubai and include five parallel runways and 430 aircraft gates.

    It will be five times the size of Dubai International airport and is planned to have a passenger-handling capacity of 260 million passengers a year – the largest in the world. For cargo, it is planned to have the capacity to handle 12 million tonnes a year.

    READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDF

    Industry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.

    Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:
    To see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click here
    https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20417755/main.jpg
    Yasir Iqbal