Sudani makes fitful progress as Iraq’s premier

10 May 2023

 

Mohammed al-Sudani has served almost 200 days as Iraq’s prime minister since being sworn into office in late October.

In that time, he has launched a high-profile anti-corruption drive, sought to repair relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan region, find an amiable balance in relations with Iran on the one hand and the Arab Gulf states and Western powers on the other, as well as giving greater stability to the state’s finances.

These are challenging issues and it remains too soon to judge if he can succeed, but progress on many fronts has often appeared fitful at best.

Soon after coming into office, Sudani threw his weight behind a high-profile anti-corruption drive, prompted by the multibillion-dollar ‘Heist of the Century’, which emerged just before his government took charge. The scandal involved the theft of an estimated ID3.7tn ($2.5bn) from the General Commission for Taxes.

However, after some early positive signs, observers say that the anti-graft drive appears to be losing momentum. One of the main suspects, Haitham al-Jubouri, was released on bail in January. The assets of another suspect, Nour Zuhair Jassim, were unfrozen by a court in April.

Corruption has been endemic in Iraq for years and continues to hobble the economy. There has also been limited progress in other areas of economic activity.

As the Washington-based IMF pointed out in its most recent Article IV report on Iraq, issued in early February, the economy has been growing, but that is in large part due to high oil prices. Indeed, it said Iraq’s dependence on oil revenues has increased rather than decreased.

Gas deal success

The importance of the energy sector is unlikely to diminish anytime soon, given current project activity. Sudani was involved in broking a deal with French oil major TotalEnergies in early April over the $10bn Gas Growth Integrated Project (GGIP), following four meetings with its chief executive Patrick Pouyanne.

The mammoth scheme had been announced in September 2021, but had stalled amid a dispute between Baghdad and Total over what size holdings each side would have. A resolution was helped by the arrival of QatarEnergy, which has taken a 25 per cent stake, leaving Iraq with 30 per cent (held via state-owned Basra Oil Company) and Total with 45 per cent.

That should enable more productive use of the country’s gas resources in the future and will also see the development of a 1GW solar power plant.

On the other hand, oil exports through Turkey have stopped since the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration court in Paris ruled in favour of Baghdad in late March over Kurdish oil flows to Turkey via a cross-border pipeline.

Sudani has been building good publicity and a positive image for himself domestically and abroad, but it’s a rather thin veneer, behind which the machinery of entrenched interests is carrying on as usual
Omar al-Nidawi, Enabling Peace in Iraq Centre

Mixed reception

The former Iraqi ambassador to the US, Rend al-Rahim, has described Sudani as an “energetic and shrewd politician” – both necessary qualities to rise to the top in Baghdad and even more important to survive. Others have been less impressed by Sudani’s performance, though.

“He has been building good publicity and a positive image for himself domestically and abroad, but it’s a rather thin veneer, behind which the machinery of entrenched interests is carrying on as usual,” says Omar al-Nidawi, director of programmes at the Washington-based Enabling Peace in Iraq Centre (Epic).

Sudani came to power due to the support of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Coordination Framework, the grouping of Shia-majority parties with close links to Iran. They and their related militias remain influential to this day – part of a political system in which groups continue to use the state’s resources to entrench their own influence.

Budget concerns

Sudani’s budget plans have prompted concern among some about how that system of patronage might grow even larger. A three-year budget covering the period 2023-25 was finalised by the cabinet in mid-March and then sent to parliament in what was his administration’s first major piece of legislative action.

It included record spending of some ID198tn ($152bn) a year, including current spending of ID150tn and capital expenditure of ID48tn, as well as record annual deficits of some ID63tn, based on an average oil price of $70 a barrel and output of 3.5 million barrels a day (b/d). The plans include a sharp rise in the public sector wage bill, taking that item to a total of ID88tn.

That approach was the opposite of what the IMF had urged Sudani to do. In February, it said the government should save “the bulk of the oil windfall” and added that the 2023 budget “should avoid a procyclical spending boost and aim to increase savings with a gradual tightening of the fiscal stance”.

According to Nidawi, the budget plans point to a government that is more focused on using the state’s resources to bolster its support and minimise criticism rather than rebuild the economy. He described the budget as “exceptionally disappointing”, adding that the spending measures “threaten to waste the financial surplus from high oil prices by expanding the already bloated public payroll”.

The budget also included an attempt to find a new modus vivendi with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), allowing for a 12.7 per cent budget share for Kurdistan and joint management of some 400,000 b/d of oil from the region. Sudani said on 13 March that Baghdad and Erbil had reached “a comprehensive agreement”. However, it remains to be seen if the system they have agreed will work effectively in practice.

In addition, Sudani’s budget has yet to be passed by parliament, and MPs could still force him to change his approach – a final vote may not happen until late May. What is not expected to change, for a time at least, is the parliament itself. When Sudani took office, it was amid speculation that an early election could be called, following the resignation of Moqtada al-Sadr’s bloc of MPs.

Since then, the idea of an early poll has faded and Sadr has remained in the background. Should he decide to change tack once again, Sudani could quickly face a far more challenging political situation, given Sadr’s past ability to quickly fill the streets with his supporters. At that point, Sudani’s political strengths and weaknesses will become far more apparent.

Iraq power projects make headway

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Dominic Dudley
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    > Notify key stakeholders early: Key stakeholders are those that have a vested interest in the project, either through ownership of certain assets on site, such as grid connection assets, or via regulation, such as the environmental authority. Many of these stakeholders take time to respond, so notifying key stakeholders early in the process can ensure that unnecessary delays are avoided.

    > Prioritise HSSE: For any future decommissioning project, HSSE must be a top priority, and this should be the focus throughout the entire decommissioning process – at all levels of work and management. 

    The site manager at Al-Kamil installed a 24/7 closed-circuit television camera, which proved to be extremely effective in terms of monitoring progress and identifying potential HSSE issues before they became an incident. This simple and cost-effective practice should be replicated for all future decommissioning projects.

    > Appoint the environmental consultant early in the process: It is advisable to appoint an environmental consultant early in the process. The consultant is needed to coordinate activities with the local environmental authority and obtain a no-objection letter or certificate, complete an environmental management report and an update of the environmental impact assessment, which includes an environmental baseline.

    Ideally, these reports and environmental authority approvals should be completed well before any work is under way at the site. This information is also useful to potential bidders for the sale of equipment, or to contractors involved in the dismantling and demolition process.

    > Submit an environmental management plan for approval: It is unlikely that any environmental authority will provide a no-objection letter or certificate without reviewing the environmental plan. It is therefore necessary to complete the plan early, prior to informing the environmental authority. This can minimise potential delays in starting the decommissioning process. 

    As a general practice, an environmental consultant should be brought on board early in the process, ideally once the overall master plan is approved by the company.

    > Establish a proactive steering committee: This was done at Al-Kamil and proved to be effective when it came to overseeing project progress and dealing with issues as they arose. Certain members of the steering committee visited the site regularly and undertook spot HSSE inspections.

    At Al-Kamil, the overall decommissioning was relatively straightforward as the plant was in a remote area. However, decommissioning a power plant in a busier location, or when part of the power plant remains in operation, is more challenging. Under these circumstances, a steering committee is vital. 

    > Set realistic delivery and completion timelines: Decommissioning a power plant is a complex process. The initial timeline to complete the process for Al-Kamil was one year, which was the best estimate at the time as there were no benchmarks or references in Oman. However, the actual completion time turned out to be three years – longer than the approximately 2.5 years it took to build the plant, from the start of construction in early 2001 to full commercial operation in July 2003.

    Realistic delivery dates should be set for contractors, suppliers and others involved in the decommissioning process. This is likely to result in better pricing, as bidders tend to factor in higher contingencies with shorter or fast-track delivery dates. More realistic delivery dates also help management to allocate staff resources and manage the decommissioning budget. 

    Finally, realistic delivery dates help to manage owner and shareholder expectations regarding project completion.

    Given the experience with Al-Kamil, a reasonable decommissioning timeline for a power plant is probably close to the actual construction timeline for the plant involved.

    > Allow time to maximise revenues from the sale of assets: The market value for Al-Kamil’s power assets was estimated at a value significantly higher than the prevailing scrap value. This was based in part on the value of similar gas turbine units, after adjusting for age, usage and other factors that affect the net market value. However, the company realised a much lower value, even after retendering the equipment sales in an effort to get a better price.

    It appears that prices close to the market rate are only achievable if there is time to find a suitable buyer. This can take many months or even years – typically a longer time than the owners of power plants wish to take. 

    Moreover, as renewables continue to penetrate the market, there is less worldwide demand for used gas turbine units. Prevailing market supply and demand conditions also have a bearing on the sale price for secondary equipment, and this factor needs to be considered.

    If time is of the essence, then power plant owners need to accept the fact that the expected revenues will likely be on the low side, although still higher than the scrap value of the assets. 


    Main image: Picture 1: Al-Kamil power plant as constructed; Picture 2: Post decommissioning 


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