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Israeli offensive leaves Beirut in limbo

5 June 2026

 

Lebanon is being held in economic and political limbo by Israel’s open-ended offensive in the south, which has killed more than 3,500 people since March and is characterised by strategic objectives that offer no clear end in sight.

Political leaders in Tel Aviv are justifying the operation on the grounds of eliminating Hezbollah – a far‑fetched goal against a dispersed guerrilla organisation, as with Hamas in Gaza – while ignoring overtures from Lebanon’s leadership for a ceasefire.

The recently formed Lebanese government, meanwhile, continues to look impotent: unable to secure its territory from Israeli incursions or Hezbollah activity, and unable to deliver on promises of stability, reform, IMF funding and reconstruction.

Echoes of the past

The overarching shape of Israel’s military campaign is ominously familiar, echoing the 1978, 1982, 1985 and 2006 Israeli invasions of southern Lebanon – all entailing creeping encroachment without strategic resolution.

Since fighting resumed on 2 March 2026, Israeli forces have gradually pushed north, crossing north of the Litani for the first time since the 2006 Lebanon war and seizing Beaufort Castle above Nabatieh on 31 May.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has framed the goal as establishing a “security zone” – the same term and concept Israel used to justify the occupation of a roughly 800-square-kilometre belt of southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000.

That occupation was a debacle for Israel’s military and ended in unilateral withdrawal.

Israeli analysts are already drawing the modern parallels as the cost of holding ground in southern Lebanon rises, driven by Hezbollah’s deployment of cheap fibre‑optic first‑person‑view (FPV) drones that inflict a steady drip of Israeli casualties and losses.

As with Russia in Ukraine, Tel Aviv is being tactically embarrassed by the advent of these fibre‑optic drones, which are immune to jamming and – of particular concern to Israeli forces – are too small to be reliably detected and intercepted by conventional counter‑drone systems.

This leap in Hezbollah’s operational threat – based on cheap technology that can be locally assembled – has sharply raised the price of maintaining a military presence in the country.

In an attempt to exact a retaliatory price, Israel’s air strikes rose by 110% between 19-22 May and 23-26 May as Hezbollah’s drone successes accumulated, according to conflict monitor Acled. But the underlying tactical dilemma remains.

Israeli politicians, irate at the situation, have demanded escalation and intensified strikes on civilian areas, including in Beirut  – only to face US pushback.

Tehran as the lever

Planned strikes on Beirut, including on 3 June, have been held off in recent weeks under pressure from Washington after Tehran made Lebanon a bargaining chip in its wider negotiations with the US, repeatedly suspending talks following Israeli escalation in the Levant country.

Tehran has also gone further than walkouts, warning it could respond directly if Israel strikes Beirut – adding an explicit threat of retaliation to diplomatic pressure.

With a Gulf ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz both riding on the outcome, Washington is strongly motivated to keep Israel from striking Beirut.

In this way, Iran is one of the few powers wielding any leverage over Israel’s actions in Lebanon – even if that leverage is a source of discomfort for Lebanon’s leaders, for whom Tehran’s clout contrasts starkly with their own lack of influence.

That protection nevertheless remains narrowly tied to the Lebanese capital, with Washington turning a blind eye to Israel’s ongoing destruction of civilian infrastructure in Lebanon’s south.

Within the border belt that Tel Aviv has dubbed the “yellow line” – amounting to about 7% of Lebanese territory – Israeli forces have accelerated the demolition of villages since the April truce and barred residents from returning.

More than a million people, overwhelmingly Shia from the south and the Bekaa, have been displaced since March, and UN human-rights experts have pointed to the blanket evacuation orders and levelling of housing as mirroring Israel’s conduct in Gaza.

The Lebanese state remains trapped in inaction, partially of its own making. Beirut was initially close to indifferent to renewed strikes on Hezbollah, whose unilateral re-entry into the war it had condemned for endangering the state.

But as the strikes have shifted methodically towards civilian areas, Beirut’s restraint satisfies no one: the domestic audience wants protection, while Israel and the US want decisive Lebanese army action against Hezbollah.

Yet the Lebanese army – still adhering in spirit to the November 2024 ceasefire framework and loath to move seriously against Hezbollah for fear of stoking civil war – has remained aloof from the conflict.

Parliament speaker Nabih Berri, who is close to Hezbollah and maintains dialogue with the group, says it would honour a genuine ceasefire if only Washington could deliver one.

But repeated attempts to shore up the ceasefire have remained conditional on the Lebanese army stepping up to rein in Hezbollah, while failing to guarantee an end to Israel’s destruction of civilian structures in areas it is occupying.

On 3 June, a fourth round of US‑mediated trilateral talks produced a fresh ceasefire announcement, hailed in Washington as a step towards comprehensive peace.

Yet its conditions – a complete halt to Hezbollah fire, the group’s withdrawal south of the Litani and Lebanese army control of undefined “pilot zones”– merely reiterate past failed protocols. The declaration was unsigned by Hezbollah and unenforceable by Beirut.

Within hours, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem rejected the declaration, stating that any ceasefire must cover the south and begin with Israeli withdrawal, not Hezbollah’s.

Both Israeli strikes and Hezbollah attacks have continued since the ostensible deal.

Recovery on hold

The economic cost to Lebanon, meanwhile, compounds by the day. The country entered 2026 already in crisis: cumulative GDP down close to 40% since 2019, the pound down 98%, public debt at 150% of GDP, and reserves as low as $11bn as of June 2025.

The government of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam staked its credibility on a long‑deadlocked IMF programme finally unlocking external support. The war has upended this, driving away investment and delaying reform.

The World Bank’s November 2024 assessment – covering only the previous round of fighting, before the March resumption – placed the economic cost at $14bn and recovery needs at $11bn, figures that the current war is now inflating by the day.

Lebanon’s Bank Audi has warned of zero growth this year if the war continues, versus a pre‑escalation projection of reconstruction‑led recovery. Tourism, historically a fifth of the economy and the engine of the 2024 rebound, has been the biggest casualty.

Looking ahead, no reconstruction can be financed while the destruction continues, and no IMF programme can advance while the state cannot ensure stability.

Iran’s leverage may be keeping the bombs off Beirut, but the south’s entrenchment as a war zone is only deepening – with hopes for recovery receding further with every village levelled.

While the costly occupation is imposing a rising political price on the Israeli government that may, in time, bring it to an end, this will be little consolation for those displaced – many of whom now have no communities to return to, and homes built over decades that are gone.

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John Bambridge

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    Forbearance measures from the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar central banks have allowed additional headroom

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    “They were designed to boost confidence and limit that pass through from temporary deposit volatility. It was not to do with acute banking stress.”

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    “When there is increased market uncertainty, larger banks may benefit from a flight-to-quality movement, with deposits moved away from smaller banks. Based on Q1 results, only a few smaller banks have reported a contraction in the customer deposits,” says Lescova.

    The GCC’s largest banks, including Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation, Saudi National Bank, First Abu Dhabi Bank, Qatar National Bank, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and Emirates NBD, remain highly profitable, although they may not perform as strongly as they would have had the conflict not occurred.

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