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Al Sudani struggles to maintain Iraq’s political stability

9 May 2024

 

Iraq’s Prime Minister Mohammed Al Sudani is now more than halfway through his term. While there have been some notable economic developments, such as the massive energy deal with TotalEnergies signed in July 2023, his main accomplishment may well be maintaining a fragile political settlement.

When he took office in late October 2022, it ended a year of tense political infighting following the 2021 election. The next national poll is expected in October 2025, but while the government itself may appear secure, Iraqi politics is as turbulent as ever.

The Council of Representatives has not had a permanent speaker since November, when Mohammed Al Halbousi was dismissed by the Federal Supreme Court and forced to step away from parliament. Mohsen Al Mandalawi was named acting speaker, but fierce debate continues over handing the job to anyone else on a more formal basis.

The latest figure to be proposed is Salem Al Issawi, who is backed by three Sunni blocs but opposed by the largest Sunni group, Al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum (Progress) party.

Under Iraq’s ‘muhasasa’ system of dividing the political spoils along religious and ethnic lines, the speaker’s job goes to a Sunni politician, while the federal presidency goes to a Kurd and the prime minister is Shia.

Al Sudani is now also facing a fresh challenge on the domestic front in the shape of a mooted return to the political scene by rival Shia leader Moqtada Al Sadr, who announced his retirement from frontline politics in August 2022. Earlier that year, he had pulled all his MPs from parliament, effectively handing power to Al Sudani’s Coordination Framework.

Al Sadr now looks set to change course. On 10 April, he renamed his organisation from the Sadrist Movement to the National Shiite Movement and further statements since then point to a possible return to the electoral battlefield. Given his past ability to mobilise large numbers of followers, he could have a significant impact on the next election and events leading up to it.

“Al Sadr maintains strong support from parts of the street, but it may prove difficult for him to reassert himself after ceding control over powerful institutions to the Coordination Framework,” said Winthrop Rodgers, an independent analyst focused on Iraq. “However, his return will certainly complicate dynamics within Shia politics.”

His likely return will also test Iranian influence on Baghdad. Tehran has been able to exert huge influence over Iraqi politics through its allied Shia politicians and militia groups, but Al Sadr has been the most prominent Shia figure to resist such ties in recent years.

Al Sudani has, though, been reaching out to other neighbours, too. In April, he hosted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was making his first trip to the country since 2011. The visit resulted in more than 20 agreements and memoranda of understanding, including one covering the contentious issue of cross-border water resources, as well as security and trade. However, there was no sign of progress on re-opening an oil export pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey.

Trade route

Under Al Sudani, Baghdad and Ankara have also managed to get Abu Dhabi and Doha on board with the Development Road initiative, a $17bn plan to develop a 1,200km trade route from the Gulf through Iraq to Turkey and, from there, on to Europe. The UAE had previously thrown its weight behind the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor initiative, launched in New Delhi in September – but that plan involves using Israeli ports.

“In light of the Gaza war, a trade route through Israel is unlikely to be something that many Gulf rulers want to be too closely associated with at the moment,” said one regional analyst.

For the Iraqi trade route to build up real momentum, the security situation around the country will need to improve further. While the Islamic State has been largely defeated, other pro-Iran groups continue to be active, including several that have banded together as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI).

Many of that umbrella group’s recent actions have been directed against Israel, including a cruise missile attack on 2 May, which targeted Tel Aviv. Such actions hold the potential for Iraq to be drawn into any expansion of the Israel-Hamas conflict, perhaps as a proxy battleground between Iran and Israel.

Other apparent IRI attacks have been directed at local targets, such as a drone attack on the Khor Mor gas field in the Kurdistan region in late April, which killed four Yemeni workers and forced UAE-based operator Dana Gas to suspend operations for several days.

Kurdistan election in doubt

Kurdistan, meanwhile, has other all-but-intractable political problems. Most recently, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) insisted it will not participate in the regional parliamentary election planned for 10 June – two years after it should have been held.

That stance was prompted by a Federal Supreme Court ruling in February that ended the practice of reserving 11 seats for minority groups including Turkmen, Christians and Armenians after ruling that the quota was “unconstitutional”. The MPs holding those seats had generally voted in step with the KDP – something that led its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and others to file a court case arguing that the communities were no longer properly represented.

The KDP has emerged as the largest party from every election in the region over the past two decades and its pledge to sit out this election creates a thorny issue for Baghdad, which is now in charge of the process – after the Supreme Court also ruled in February that oversight of the elections should be handed over from the Kurdish authorities to the federal Independent High Electoral Commission.

“If the KDP does not participate in the election, the Kurdistan Regional Government will effectively cease to function as a cohesive political entity; if Baghdad gives into the KDP’s gamesmanship, it sets a bad precedent that a single party can prevent an election if it feels it will be disadvantaged,” said Rodgers.

No solution has been found as yet. Kurdistan region president Nechirvan Barzani was in Tehran on 6 May, where he held talks with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, among others. Trade and cross-border security issues were at the top of the agenda, but some reports suggested Barzani had also tried to persuade Tehran to put pressure on the PUK to agree to a delay to the June poll.

On 8 May, a further element of chaos was leant to the proceedings when the High Electoral Commission suspended preparation for the Kurdish election in response to a lawsuit filed by the KDP over the distribution of constituencies.

Together, the prospect of a major rival Shia bloc returning to Baghdad politics ahead of the 2025 Iraqi parliamentary election and the risk of the breakdown of the political process in Kurdistan threaten to disrupt the relative political calm that Al Sudani has worked to cultivate. Handling the shifting political landscape will require astuteness.

Image: مكتب اعلامي لرئيس الوزراء, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

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Dominic Dudley

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  • GCC banks prove resilient amid turmoil

    27 July 2026

     

    Gulf banks are proving adept at navigating the economic and geopolitical turbulence that comes with operating in the region. These skills have come to the fore this year, as regional lenders draw on stable funding profiles and ample capital and liquidity buffers that protect them from near-term credit risks. 

    GCC banks’ fundamentals have proved remarkably resilient to the Iran-related turmoil, assuming the intensity of the February-April stage of the military conflict does not resume.

    There have not been any significant outflows of external funding. While anecdotal evidence suggests some depositors briefly moved funds out of the region at the start of the war, ratings agency S&P Global notes that their return reflects confidence that the war will prove short-lived.

    Funding strength

    Metrics for the early part of the year revealed a robust picture. Domestic deposits held up strongly in the first quarter of 2026, total GCC domestic deposits rising by 16.9% in year-on-year terms, compensating for the decline in interbank funding. 

    State-linked deposits grew at a particularly rapid pace, led by the UAE and Kuwait, which offset decelerating private-sector deposit growth in those countries. 

    Domestic deposits accelerated in April, a pointer to GCC governments’ proactive stances in shielding their banking systems from undue stress. The inflow of public deposits accelerated quite significantly in this period, although that pace will likely subside as conditions gradually normalise. 

    Such deposits continue to underpin GCC banks’ wider performances. “Funding and liquidity is generally a strength for the region. Government deposits typically make up 20%-30% of the banking sector deposits. That is really important as these are sticky deposits,” says Redmond Ramsdale, head of Middle East ratings at Fitch Ratings.

    Funding and liquidity is generally a strength for the region

    Gulf states’ heavy reliance on public sector and government-related deposits has proved valuable in the current environment, anchoring banks’ funding profiles and helping reduce potential risks.

    Fund outflows have not materialised to any significant degree. “We had some anecdotal evidence of funds being withdrawn, but they returned in the following weeks,” says Ramsdale.

    Solid fundamentals

    GCC banks entered the conflict period in strong shape. According to S&P, domestic private sector credit growth in the region remained robust in the first quarter – the annualised growth rate was 8% at the end of March. 

    Core capital buffers are about 15%-16% – higher still for the top lenders – ensuring total loss-absorbing capacity stays below 9% of equity. Regulatory ratios exceed relevant thresholds, providing a significant buffer, according to ratings agency Moody’s.

    “If you look at the whole region, the proportion of the lending book that is non-performing, on a weighted average basis, sits around 2%,” says Badis Shubailat, a senior analyst at Moody’s. 

    “Against this solid level of asset quality, you have a cushion of provisions for expected losses that more than covers the existing stock of problem loans, which provides a strong first line of defence.”

    Then, as a second line of defence, are core capital buffers that remain high by global standards, with levels around 15%-16%. Put together, this explains why the banks are sitting on comfortable positions in terms of loss-absorption capacity.

    At the end of Q1 2025, the top 45 GCC banks reported an average Tier 1 capital ratio of 17%, with coverage ratios of 155.8%, according to S&P. 

    “Credit losses are at historical lows of 50 basis points (bps) for the region, and there are very good provisioning buffers – all of which helps to mitigate the negative consequences of the expected asset quality deterioration,” says Tatjana Lescova, director and lead analyst at S&P.

    According to Shubailat, the fact that the conflict impact on GCC banks has not been as pronounced as on other sectors reflects that over the past three years – and until right before the conflict started – the region as a whole, and its banking systems, had demonstrated remarkable resilience. In contrast, major advanced economies were struggling with inflationary pressures and subdued economic growth. 

    “This was visible in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two largest economic diversification engines in the region, which happen to also represent more than two-thirds of total banking system assets,” says Shubailat.

    Limited exposure

    Gulf banks have also been helped by the fact that those economic sectors most impacted by conflict – tourism, hospitality, energy – do not generally form a large part of their collective loans books. 

    “There will be weaker performance of borrowers in the most obvious affected sectors like infrastructure, tourism, logistics, transport and real estate, but tourism is actually a pretty small exposure for the banks – less than 3% of loan books,” says Ramsdale. “There might be a bit of pressure on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are less able to cope with the pressures than the larger corporates, but again, for banks, SME lending is not very big.” 

    Banks’ exposure to the real estate and construction sectors is highest in Qatar – 31% of total credit at the end of March – while the exposure in Kuwait stands at 25%, with Saudi Arabia at 16% and Bahrain at 12%, notes S&P. UAE banks have been consistently reducing their exposure to these sectors, down to 13% at the end of March, compared to 21% at year-end 2020. 

    Moody’s Shubailat says that developers in the UAE sit on solid balance sheets and strong revenue backlogs, while banks’ exposure to the construction sector has declined. “So the quantum is lower, the credit quality of the exposure is better, and the banks are sitting on higher capital and provisioning buffers,” he notes.

    Gulf bankers are not resting on their laurels. They know that even if bad loans have been limited, they cannot forestall the possibility of problem exposures further down the road. 

    “Asset quality deterioration is a risk that we expect to materialise later in the year. This is because of weaker macro expectations, and negative impact on some of the corporate sectors, albeit varying across different GCC countries,” says Lescova.

    On average, for the region, S&P expects 20 bps of increases in credit losses for this year. When it comes to asset quality, the regulatory forbearance measures announced by three central banks will help alleviate the impact.

    Policy support

    Central bank moves have added another layer of support. Forbearance measures from the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar central banks have allowed additional headroom.

    For example, in mid-March, the Central Bank of the UAE launched a five-pillar resilience package that relaxed capital buffer stipulations, representing more than $272bn in support. 

    Kuwait eased liquidity requirements, raised maximum lending limits and released a portion of the capital conservation buffer to expand refinancing and credit quality absorption capacity. Qatar, meanwhile, has cut the reserve requirement from 4.5% to 3.5% for deposits.

    Forbearance measures from the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar central banks have allowed additional headroom

    Such measures were not a response to a banking crisis, says Ramsdale. “Some of the support packages that we have seen coming out of the central banks, in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait, were preventative support measures,” he says.

    “They were designed to boost confidence and limit that pass through from temporary deposit volatility. It was not to do with acute banking stress.”

    Market confidence

    Larger banks are better positioned to cope with straitened economic times. They are generally more geographically diversified beyond their domestic markets, and international operations have historically been a growth driver for them. 

    “When there is increased market uncertainty, larger banks may benefit from a flight-to-quality movement, with deposits moved away from smaller banks. Based on Q1 results, only a few smaller banks have reported a contraction in the customer deposits,” says Lescova.

    The GCC’s largest banks, including Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation, Saudi National Bank, First Abu Dhabi Bank, Qatar National Bank, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and Emirates NBD, remain highly profitable, although they may not perform as strongly as they would have had the conflict not occurred.

    “We already expected some softening in profitability before the conflict, because of the normalisation of the cost of risk upwards from incredibly low levels over the last three years, [which] were driven by a very strong recovery performance from the banks,” says Shubailat. 

    “In turn, this current situation adds a layer of pressure to the normalising profitability story by increasing provisioning needs in light of the recent economic shocks,” he adds.  

    Confidence in GCC banks was evident from the outset of the conflict. In early April, Emirates NBD priced a $750m AT1 capital issuance, the first international debt capital markets transaction by a GCC issuer since late February.

    “The first ceasefire saw things like private placements start happening again, and that slowly translated into the opening up of public markets. 

    “Emirates NBD was one of the first banks to open up that market, and we are seeing the largest banks issuing again,” says Ramsdale.

    The operating environment for Saudi Arabia is ranked BBB+ – a strong position, all things considered. Ramsdale notes that Riyadh’s reprioritisation of large projects associated with Vision 2030 “means growth will probably be slightly slower in Saudi Arabia”, but adds: “That is actually a good thing, because growth was so strong it was beginning to pressure funding, liquidity and capitalisation. 

    “Taking off some of that pressure is a positive for banks.”

    Growth prospects

    Stronger earnings performances will allow banks to bankroll mergers and acquisitions (M&A), building on inorganic routes to growth. Within the past year, the National Bank of Bahrain and Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait (BBK) have agreed to explore a merger, while BBK has also absorbed HSBC’s retail banking business.

    Emirates NBD is reported to be looking to acquire HSBC’s business in Turkiye, a country where the Dubai bank already has a presence through its takeover of DenizBank in 2019. It also grew its stake in India’s RBL Bank this year to 60%. 

    “Certainly the big banks will remain opportunistic over M&A – where the value comes at the right price, then they are interested. And if the big international banks are going to pull out, they tend to have some of the best-quality assets, so you can understand why regional players might be interested in them,” says Ramsdale.

    Such moves should provide reassurance that, despite recent challenges, GCC banks are well placed to ride out the remainder of 2026 and resume the positive trajectory  that was evident before the Iran war shook the region. 

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  • Firms submit Jebel Ali sewage PPP prequalifications

    24 July 2026

     

    Dubai Municipality received statements of qualification on 23 July from firms interested in delivering phase three of the Jebel Ali sewage treatment plant (STP) expansion project.

    Known as DS150/3, the project will be delivered under a public-private partnership (PPP) model on a design, build, finance, own, operate and transfer basis.

    The project involves the development of a new water resource recovery facility with an ultimate treatment capacity of up to 1 million cubic metres a day (cm/d).

    It is being procured through Dubai Municipality’s sewerage and recycled water projects department and will be delivered via a two-stage operational approach over a 30-year concession period.

    It is understood that the following firms are among those likely to qualify for the project:

    • Acciona (Spain)
    • Alkhorayef (Saudi Arabia)
    • Besix (Belgium)
    • Etihad WE (UAE)
    • GS Inima (Spain)
    • Metito (UAE)
    • Miahona (Saudi Arabia) 
    • Samsung E&A (South Korea)
    • Saur (France)
    • Suez (France)
    • Taqa Water Solutions (UAE)
    • Veolia (France)

    The municipality issued a request for qualifications notice in May with an intial bid submission deadline of 18 June. UK-headquartered Deloitte is acting as financial adviser, Aecom is the project's technical adviser and CMS is the legal adviser.

    Dubai Municipality said the project will also include additional land uses and community-focused amenities as part of broader sustainability and urban integration objectives.

    Phase one and two expansion

    On 9 July, firms submitted bids for an engineering, procurement and construction contract covering the expansion of the Jebel Ali STP phases one and two.

    Located on a 670-hectare site in Jebel Ali, the original wastewater facility has a treatment capacity of about 675,000 cm/d, following the completion of phase two in 2019, combining approximately 300,000 cm/d from phase one and 375,000 cm/d from phase two.

    The upgraded facility will be capable of treating an additional sewage flow of 100,000 cm/d, with the expansion estimated to cost $300m.

    UK-headquartered KPMG and UAE-based Tribe Infrastructure are serving as financial advisers on the project.

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  • Contractors submit interest for Riyadh Expo substructure

    24 July 2026

     

    Contractors have submitted expressions of interest on 23 July for a contract to deliver the early works and substructure works for several assets at the Expo 2030 Riyadh site.

    Expo 2030 Riyadh Company (ERC) is tasked with delivering the Expo 2030 Riyadh venue. Saudi sovereign wealth vehicle, the Public Investment Fund, launched ERC – a wholly owned subsidiary – in June 2025 to build and operate facilities for the event.

    The assets include the Icon; the convention centre; and thematic pavilions, including the Culture of Wisdom, Place & Planet and Adaptation & Innovation pavilions.

    The Icon will be located at the entrance of the Expo 2030 Riyadh site, within the Collaboration Precinct.

    The structure will be connected to the metro station and will serve as a gateway to the event.

    It will be 66 metres tall and will comprise an observation platform, food and beverage (F&B) outlets and other features.

    The convention centre will cover about 22,000 square metres. It will be the first point of arrival for visitors to the expo.

    The Culture of Wisdom pavilion will be a 25-metre-tall building that will feature exhibition galleries, innovation laboratories and conference and learning spaces.

    The Place & Planet building will also be 25 metres tall, and will include indoor and outdoor exhibition spaces, F&B and retail facilities and support areas.

    The Adaptation & Innovation pavilion will be located within the Loop of Nations precinct and will comprise a 29-metre-tall building.

    Construction progress

    The tendering of the pavilion structures followed progress on the site’s infrastructure development works.

    In April, ERC awarded two contracts for the next phase of infrastructure works at the site to local firm Al-Yamama Company.

    The scope covered the construction of road networks and infrastructure for water, sewage, electricity, telecommunications and electric vehicle charging.

    These awards followed ERC’s January award of an estimated SR1bn ($267m) contract for initial infrastructure works at the site to local firm Nesma & Partners. That scope covered about 50 kilometres of integrated infrastructure networks, including internal roads and essential utilities such as water, sewage, electrical and communications systems, and electric vehicle charging stations.

    The overall infrastructure works – covering the construction of main utilities and civil works at Expo 2030 Riyadh – are split into three packages:

    • Lot 1 covers the main utilities corridor;
    • Lot 2 includes the northern cluster of the Nature Corridor;
    • Lot 3 comprises the southern cluster of the Nature Corridor. 

    The masterplan encompasses an area of 6 square kilometres, making it one of the largest sites ever designated for a World Expo event. Situated to the north of the Saudi capital, the site will be located near the future King Salman International airport and will provide direct access to landmarks within Riyadh.

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  • Indian firm wins 500kV transmission contract in Egypt

    24 July 2026

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    India-headquartered Bajel Projects, part of Mumbai-based Bajaj Group, has signed a contract with Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company (EETC) to construct two sections of a 500kV overhead transmission line in Egypt.

    In a filing with India's National Stock Exchange, the company said the contract covers lots one and five of the project and is valued at approximately $46m.

    The agreement was signed at a ceremony in Cairo on 22 July, attended by Egyptian and Indian officials including India's ambassador to Egypt, Suresh Reddy.

    Bajel Projects will execute the engineering, procurement and construction works for the two transmission line sections.

    In October 2025, MEED reported that state-owned EETC had retendered a contract for the construction of the 500kV Ektsadiya overhead transmission line.

    The line will run from the El-Eqtesadia substation in Suez Governorate to the S4 substation, using quadruple-bundle all-aluminum alloy conductors and an optical ground wire.

    Egypt previously cancelled the original tender covering three separate lots, as MEED exclusively reported. Under the expanded scope, construction of a 187-kilometre (km) high-voltage overhead transmission was divided into five lots:

    • Lot 1 covers 37.5km
    • Lot 2 covers 37km
    • Lot 3 covers 37km
    • Lot 4 covers 38.5km
    • Lot 5 covers 36.5km

    EETC said at the time that the retender would allow bidders to submit offers for all lots rather than being restricted to a single package.

    MEED understands that at least nine firms submitted bids for the project in December 2025.

    The scheme will support the evacuation of 2.1GW of renewable energy from the Gulf of Suez region to the national grid.

    The development forms part of EETC’s wider grid‑reinforcement plan under Egypt’s National Water, Food and Energy initiative. EETC operates as a division of Egypt’s Electricity & Energy Ministry.

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  • Oil price rises above $100 a barrel after Red Sea attacks

    24 July 2026

    Oil prices rose to their highest level in nearly two months on 23 July after the latest escalation in the US-Iran conflict threatened severe new disruptions to global energy supplies.

    Global benchmark Brent crude closed 7% higher, at $100.69 a barrel on 23 July. Earlier in the trading day, it rose as high as $102 a barrel. That is its highest level in eight weeks, since the end of May.

    Brent was trading at over $100 a barrel in the early hours of 24 July, but later pared gains to settle around $99.63 a barrel as of 11am Gulf Standard Time (GST).

    The surge in the Brent price came after Iran-backed Houthi rebels claimed attacks on two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea following their announcement of a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia.

    It appeared to be the first time since the regional war began that attacks on oil tankers and other commercial ships had extended beyond the Strait of Hormuz, opening up a new front in the volatile conflict.

    The Houthi threat is unsettling to oil markets because millions of barrels a day pass through the Bab El-Mandeb Strait to reach global markets.

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    About 12%-15% of global maritime trade, worth more than $1tn, transits the waterway every year.

    It has also served as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, where traffic remains largely at a standstill, with ship crossings falling to single digits on 21 July.

    Since the start of July, oil prices have risen about 35%. Those prices are more than 60% higher than at the start of the year. This has erased much of the progress made in bringing prices down after the US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding in mid-June.

    The interim peace deal has now collapsed, with US President Donald Trump threatening on 22 July to blow up an Iranian bridge or power plant for every vessel Tehran attacks.

    This was followed by the Houthi claim to have hit two tankers in the Red Sea.

    The UK’s Maritime Trade Office reported a tanker “struck by an unknown projectile” north of the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, and state-run Saudi Press Agency (Spa) reported that a vessel named Encelia was set ablaze by an attack while it was sailing overnight in the Red Sea, citing an unidentified source from the General Authority of Transport. Spa did not mention the other vessel, which is understood to be called Layla.

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    Indrajit Sen