Iraq electricity sector makes slow progress
9 May 2024
Latest news from Iraq's power and water sectors:
> Iraq plans new Baiji power plant
> Decision imminent on Iraq waste-to-energy project
> Iraq discusses nuclear projects with global watchdog
> Siemens Energy and SLB sign Iraq flare gas-to-power deal
> PowerChina in talks for Basra desalination plant
> US seeks firms for Baghdad power plant package
> Iraq plans green hydrogen project at refinery
> Iraq approves long-term grid expansion
In late March, Iraq’s Electricity Ministry struck a five-year gas supply deal with National Iranian Gas Company for up to 50 million cubic metres a day (cm/d), contingent on the needs of Iraqi power stations, in exchange for oil and gasoline.
The deal offers a lifeline to Iraq’s deteriorating electricity sector and replaces an existing agreement whereby contractual volumes were theoretically set at 70 million cm/d for summer and 45 million cm/d for winter.
The two countries signed the deal following nearly three months of longer-than-usual power outages in Iraq, and after Baghdad settled part of the multibillion-dollar debt it owes Iran. The power cuts occurred due to a drastic reduction in Irani gas supply, which dipped to 10 million cm/d and wiped out 4GW from Iraq’s grid.
The deal is a compromise for both countries. It allows Iraq some breathing space to implement projects to reduce its dependence on Iran’s gas exports – a long-running and elusive objective among Iraq’s policymakers and its allies in the GCC states and the US.
The crisis should prompt Iraq to push ahead with projects to boost domestic gas production and build solar power plants, according to the Electricity Ministry.
Supply and demand mismatch
There has been a persistent mismatch between supply and demand in Iraq’s electricity sector, with peak demand during the summer months outstripping available capacity by a sizeable margin.
In recent years, the deficit has returned during the winter when heating requirements rise.
With a few exceptions, however, the procurement process or negotiations for additional generation capacity have been proceeding slowly, leaving a gap that is typically addressed by diesel generators.
Iraq aspires to build 12,000MW of solar capacity by the end of the decade, which is nearly half its known available capacity today.
The Electricity Ministry has signed deals with several companies to develop sizeable solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity over the past two to three years in line with this objective. Yet, despite regular pronouncements that the construction phase for these projects is about to start, none have reached final investment decisions (FIDs) or the construction phase so far.
The Electricity Ministry remains the dominant client for these projects, although the National Investment Commission (NIC) has been an active participant, particularly in bilateral or public-private partnership projects.
For example, the UAE’s Masdar signed a deal to develop 2GW of solar capacity in Iraq with the NIC. The commission is also procuring a contract to develop the country’s first waste-to-energy (WTE) project in coordination with the Municipality of Baghdad, the Electricity Ministry and the Environment Ministry.
Located in the Al Nahrawan area of Baghdad Governorate, the planned WTE project will have the capacity to treat 3,000 tonnes of waste a day and generate nearly 80 megawatt-hours (MWh) of electricity.
Other companies that have committed to develop solar PV projects in Iraq include Power China, which has pledged to develop solar PV projects with a combined total capacity of 2GW, and France’s Total Energies, which has committed to build a 1,000MW solar farm in Artawi.
The solar project in Artawi is a small part of a $27bn package that TotalEnergies is developing in partnership with QatarEnergy. The package involves the development of a common seawater supply project and oil and gas fields in Iraq.
Awarded projects
As earlier cited, there are some exceptions to the endemic start-stop mode for Iraq’s power generation and distribution projects.
For example, Germany’s Siemens Energy and the US-based GE have ongoing projects that include retrofitting or upgrading existing gas turbine power stations or building new substations as part of agreements to help rebuild Iraq and support its goal of reducing carbon emissions.
Earlier this month, the Electricity Ministry signed a preliminary agreement with Germany’s Siemens Energy and US firm SLB, formerly Schlumberger, to explore the development of a power generation plant using flare gas.
According to Siemens Energy Middle East managing director Dietmar Siersdorfer, the planned flare gas-to-power project in southern Iraq will help reduce carbon dioxide emissions and capture value from gas that would otherwise be wasted.
The planned flare gas-to-power plant could have a generation capacity of up to 2,000MW.
In January this year, China-based Oriental International is understood to have signed a contract to convert a single-cycle unit at the Baghdad South power plant complex into a combined-cycle power plant.
In April, the Electricity Ministry awarded another Chinese company, China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC), a second year of operation and maintenance contracts for the Salah Al Din gas-fired power plant.
CMEC was awarded the estimated $1bn contract to build the power plant in northern Iraq in 2011. After a series of delays and challenges, including the Isis uprising, the two 630MW capacity units began operating last year.
In December last year, Siemens Energy also signed a contract to deliver five high-voltage substations on a turnkey basis in Iraq. The 400-kilovolt substations, each with a capacity of 1,500MW, will be installed in Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf, Karbala and Basra.
Similarly, the US’s preoccupation with helping wean Iraq off Iran’s gas and electricity imports has spurred projects to interconnect Iraq’s grid with its neighbour Saudi Arabia through the GCC grid and Jordan.
In October last year, the governor of Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, Prince Saud Bin Naif Bin Abdulaziz, inaugurated the GCC grid's Iraq connection, which had been under development for several years. The 295-kilometre power transmission network will have a total transmission capacity of 1,800MW, with an initial phase expected to supply 500MW of electricity to Iraq.
Future projects
In February this year, Electricity Ministry spokesperson Ahmed Mousa said the government had approved funds for the long-term plans to expand the country’s power transmission and distribution network with Siemens Energy’s help.
Mousa said the ministry “received funds for long-term plans to develop the electricity sector in 2023 … the three-year budget approved in 2023 also includes funds this year and in 2025”.
In early May, it was reported that the Electricity Ministry held discussions with Qatar’s UCC Holding to develop a 2,100MW gas-fired power plant in Baiji. The plant will replace a power station that was damaged during the war.
It is unclear if the project is part of a previous agreement between UCC Holding and NIC to develop two power plants with a capacity of 2,400MW in Iraq.
A new 2,000MW gas-fired power plant is also being proposed in Basra, which is expected to receive gas from the nearby West Qurna 1 and West Qurna 2 oil fields.
As it is, several projects are waiting for final approvals, such as the gas-fired 2,800MW Khairat independent power producer, which has yet to reach FID over two years after the contract was awarded.
Going nuclear
Project delays and indecision in Iraq do not appear to narrow down the options for future power generation expansion.
In March, it was reported that senior Iraq and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials had discussed Iraq’s plans for a possible nuclear energy programme, including small modular reactors.
According to the nuclear watchdog, discussions included maintaining strict adherence to non-proliferation norms.
IAEA director general Rafael Mariano Grossi said his agency has committed to supporting the foundations of what should be an entirely peaceful programme in Iraq.
Iraq, for its part, is considering nuclear energy to enable greater energy security and for water desalination projects as part of the country’s plans for a more sustainable future.
Register for MEED's guest program now to access this article.
Exclusive from Meed
-
JGC yet to return evacuated workers to Basra refinery12 October 2026
-
Contractors prepare Jordan stadium prequalification12 October 2026
-
Abu Dhabi plans Mussafah road upgrades12 October 2026
-
Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh9 October 2026
-
Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh9 October 2026
All of this is only 1% of what MEED.com has to offer
Subscribe now and unlock all the 153,671 articles on MEED.com
- All the latest news, data, and market intelligence across MENA at your fingerprints
- First-hand updates and inside information on projects, clients and competitors that matter to you
- 20 years' archive of information, data, and news for you to access at your convenience
- Strategize to succeed and minimise risks with timely analysis of current and future market trends
Related Articles
-
JGC yet to return evacuated workers to Basra refinery
12 October 2026
Japan’s JGC has yet to bring evacuated workers back to the Basra refinery project in Iraq, according to industry sources.
JGC evacuated its personnel from the site in the southern oil hub of Basra following the start of the regional conflict on 28 February, when the US and Israel attacked Iran.
The evacuation halted work on the project, which was in its final construction stage.
On 14 August 2026, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil announced that it had signed an agreement with JGC to resume work on the fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) project at Basra refinery.
One source said: “Even though the agreement to bring the evacuated workers back was signed about two months ago, there is still no sign of the evacuated workers on the project site.
“It is possible that they will return soon, but it is hard to tell what will happen next in the current security environment.”
Earlier this month, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil said it met with Japanese officials to discuss plans to commission the FCC unit under the Basra refinery upgrade project.
The statement did not say when the evacuated JGC workers would return to the project site.
Strategic project
Iraq’s state-owned South Refineries Company (SRC) sent JGC notice of the main contract award for the FCC package of the Basra refinery upgrade project in August 2020.
JGC was awarded the contract in consortium with South Korea’s Hyundai E&C.
The official contract signing ceremony was held in Baghdad on 1 October 2020.
The contract awarded to JGC, which uses the engineering, procurement, construction and commissioning model, was worth $3.78bn.
The FCC package is part of a broader project to upgrade the Basra refinery.
The project site is located about 12 kilometres east of Iraq’s southern city of Basra.
The wider upgrade project involves installing new facilities on land adjacent to the existing Basra refinery, including a vacuum distillation unit and a diesel desulphurisation unit.
In April 2021, France’s Axens won a contract in Iraq to provide four process technologies to SRC for the Basra refinery upgrade project.
The technologies that SRC selected are:
- Diesel hydrotreatment unit (Prime-D)
- Vacuum gasoil (VGO) hydrotreating unit
- VGO fluid catalytic cracker unit
- Oligomerisation unit (polynaphtha)
In addition, Axens is providing catalysts and adsorbents, proprietary equipment, training and technical services.
MEED’s latest report on Iraq includes:
> COMMENT: Iraq’s reform window narrows
> GOVERNMENT: Al-Zaidi takes Iraq’s premiership under US shadow
> BANKING: Financial challenge tests Iraq’s resolve
> ECONOMY: Iraq enters era of resilience, reform and rising risks
> OIL & GAS: Iraqi oil and gas sector in crisis
> POWER & WATER: Focus shifts to delivery of Iraq utilities expansion
> CONSTRUCTION: Momentum builds in Iraq’s post-war construction sectorTo see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click herehttps://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20503212/main.png -
Contractors prepare Jordan stadium prequalification
12 October 2026
Contractors are preparing to submit prequalification statements on 14 October for a contract to build Jordan’s Al-Hussein Bin Abdullah II International Stadium, located east of the capital, Amman.
The project is part of the first phase of the Amra City development masterplan and is being implemented by Jordan Cities & Facilities Development Company, a Jordan Investment Fund-owned company.
Main works are expected to begin early next year, with the stadium slated for completion in 2029.
The project will cover about 1 million square metres, and the stadium will seat 50,000 spectators.
The stadium is being built within the Amra City development, which is located about 40 kilometres (km) from downtown Amman and 35km from Zarqa and Queen Alia International airport.
MEED reported that preliminary excavation and site preparation began in June.
The project forms part of Jordan’s Economic Modernisation Vision (EMV) 2023-25.
The EMV – Amman’s flagship reform programme – aims to increase real income per capita by an average of 3% annually, create 1 million jobs and more than double the country’s GDP over the next decade.
The strategy envisages a leading role for the private sector, which is expected to account for 73% of the estimated $58.8bn investment required.
READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDFIndustry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.
Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:
> AGENDA: Oxagon takes centre stage at Neom> MARKET FOCUS: Saudi projects hold steady> INDUSTRY REPORT: MEED’s 2026 GCC power developer ranking> LEADERSHIP: The future city does not need to hang above the groundTo see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click herehttps://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20501232/main.png -
Abu Dhabi plans Mussafah road upgrades
12 October 2026
Abu Dhabi’s Department of Municipalities and Transport (DMT) has announced plans to upgrade roads in Mussafah, improving links between the industrial area, Mohamed Bin Zayed City and Zayed City.
The scheme covers about 13 kilometres of roads on the E30 and 8th Street. It aims to reduce congestion, improve road safety and cut journey times.
The works include a new three-lane highway in each direction along 8th Street, with parallel three-lane service roads on both sides providing access to local businesses and facilities.
The upgraded corridor is expected to accommodate up to 4,000 vehicles an hour.
Other works include upgrades to four E30 interchanges, improved links to 8th Street and the E20, and modifications to nine junctions.
The DMT also plans to build two bridges connecting Mussafah and Mohamed Bin Zayed City, along with a pedestrian bridge.
Abu Dhabi is planning major investments to upgrade its road network across the emirate.
Last week, it disclosed plans for a major new transport corridor in the capital, comprising a 37km coastal route linking Al-Hudayriyat Island with the E11 at Al-Nouf.
It is planned to have three lanes in each direction and will include a tunnel, about 7km of marine bridges and about 4km of causeways.
The scheme will provide a direct connection between Al-Dhafra, Al-Hudayriyat Island and Abu Dhabi Island via Halat Al-Bahrani, Al-Futaisi and Al-Aryam islands.
READ THE OCTOBER 2026 MEED BUSINESS REVIEW – click here to view PDFIndustry and logistics drive development at Neom; Saudi Arabia’s investment priorities realign amid conflict; MEED’s 2026 power developer ranking.
Distributed to senior decision-makers in the region and around the world, the October 2026 edition of MEED Business Review includes:
> AGENDA: Oxagon takes centre stage at Neom> MARKET FOCUS: Saudi projects hold steady> INDUSTRY REPORT: MEED’s 2026 GCC power developer ranking> LEADERSHIP: The future city does not need to hang above the groundTo see previous issues of MEED Business Review, please click herehttps://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20501218/main.jpg -
Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026
Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.
In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.
At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.
Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.
However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.
Yemen dynamics
Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.
Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.
It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.
The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”
Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.
Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.
On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.
Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.
Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.
Strategic independence
The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.
Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.
It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.
In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.
https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20435670/main.gif -
Abu Dhabi mends fences with Riyadh
9 October 2026
Ongoing political turmoil in the region may be prompting Abu Dhabi to review its approach to key diplomatic issues, not least its relations with its larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.
In late September, UAE Vice-President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan travelled to Riyadh for talks with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Defence Minister Prince Khalid Bin Salman. Such visits may have been commonplace in the past, but over the past year they have been relatively rare, given the friction between the two Gulf powers over issues such as the conflict zones of Yemen and Sudan, relations with Israel and economic rivalry.
At the start of the year, the UAE retreated from Yemen under pressure from Riyadh, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council made rapid territorial gains at the expense of Saudi-backed groups and advanced close to the kingdom’s southern border.
Since then, against the backdrop of the Iran war, relations have shown further signs of strain, with cross-border financial transactions reportedly being blocked or delayed.
However, there have been intermittent attempts to present a more collegial relationship, such as in July, when a photo emerged on social media of Sheikh Mansour and Prince Khalid posing with their arms around each other, reportedly while on holiday in Europe.
Yemen dynamics
Gains by another group in Yemen may lie behind the latest rapprochement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The visit by Sheikh Mansour on 29 September came in the wake of significant advances by the Houthis, who had recently captured Mokha port and strategically significant areas of land overlooking the Bab El-Mandeb Strait – heightening their ability to menace passing ships.
Saudi Arabia has been leaning on its allies – particularly Pakistan and Turkiye – to support its campaign against the Houthis. It is unclear whether the UAE would be willing to get involved militarily in Yemen again, or whether Riyadh would be happy for it to do so, but it could still be a useful ally in the fight. Analysts have noted that UAE-backed forces have, over the years, had a far greater record than anyone else of scoring battleground victories against the Houthis.
It is also notable that Mansour’s delegation to Riyadh included several senior security officials, including Ali Bin Hammad Al-Shamsi, secretary general of the Supreme Council for National Security; Ali Saeed Matar Al-Neyadi, chairman of the National Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management Authority; and Nasser Humaid Al-Nuaimi, secretary general of the Tawazun Council for Defence Enablement.
The visit was a surprise, given the GCC states’ lack of unified action this year amid the crises in Yemen and Iran. Speaking at an event in Washington in mid-September, Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, noted that: “Despite the fact that [the GCC states] all face a common threat in Iran and its proxies, you still don’t see real coordination between them. You still have these differences between the Saudis and the UAE, for instance; you have differences between the Qataris and the UAE. If anything would have united them, this would be it. And you don’t see that kind of unity.”
Writing for the Arab Gulf States Institute in early October, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East at Rice University, said Mansour’s visit to Riyadh in late September was “likely meant to signal that the thaw [in bilateral relations] was real” and “designed to enable a more coordinated approach to managing the forces ranged against the Houthis in southern and central Yemen”.
Further signs of warming ties came on 8 October, when UAE Investment Minister Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Industry and Mineral Resources Minister Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman covering power grid interconnections, trade in electricity and freight rail connectivity.
On the same day, the Saudi ambassador to the UAE invited President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan to attend a GCC-EU Summit in Saudi Arabia later in the month.
Sheikh Mansour was not the only senior Emirati on diplomatic manoeuvres in recent weeks. The day after the vice-president was in Riyadh, national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoun Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan was in Muscat for talks with Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said.
Oman is a critical partner for the UAE in several areas. Omani ports have provided a trade lifeline for Emirati importers and exporters at a time when ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been sidelined by Iran’s threats against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Muscat’s approach of maintaining dialogue with all actors means it is also able to mediate with both Iran and Yemen’s Houthis.
Strategic independence
The flurry of diplomatic activity may be a sign of closer coordination between the UAE and its neighbours on some critical issues, but that does not necessarily herald a sea change in its approach.
Speaking at the UN General Assembly in New York on 28 September, Minister of State Khalifa Shaheen Al-Marar reviewed the crises in Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere and said “the importance of developing and reforming regional and international multilateral institutions … remains paramount” – but while he name-checked the UN, he did not mention the GCC.
It is also notable that the UAE has not yet joined either of the two security initiatives launched by Saudi Arabia during the summer: a maritime defence alliance designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea, or a mutual defence pact that Riyadh signed with Turkiye and Pakistan.
In his speech to the UN, Al-Marar listed what he saw as the main pillars of the UAE’s national strength: “strategic independence” was the first item in his list.
https://image.digitalinsightresearch.in/uploads/NewsArticle/20432716/main.gif